Reciprocity, incomplete information and relational contracts by Volk, André








Reciprocity, incomplete information and relational contracts
Volk, André









submitted to the Faculty of Economics,
Business Administration and Information Technology
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. oec.




approved in February 2015 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Armin Schmutzler
Prof. Dr. Björn Bartling
The Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology of the
University of Zurich hereby authorizes the printing of this dissertation, without indicating
an opinion of the views expressed in the work.
Zurich, 11.02.2015




My interest in human behaviour has sparked and fueled this writing. I find that eco-
nomics, enriched with insight from psychology, can be very helpful in organizing individual
and interactive behaviour. I especially value the attempt to conduct a line of argument
transparently, by explicitly stating the assumptions underlying a theory and by deriving
the conclusions using the rules of logic. I consider the particular assumptions, for instance
with regard to the rationality and preferences of individuals, as well as the use of formal
language as characterizing a discipline which provides a way of thinking; a window into the
world, much like the view through a lens which renders certain structures sharp while oth-
ers remain blurry or invisible. Thinking about the economic way of thinking has informed
my understanding of its power and range. This has shaped my ideas and the research
presented in this thesis.
I wish to thank the numerous people who supported me and my work throughout the
time of my dissertation. First and foremost, I feel grateful to Armin Schmutzler for his very
generous support, his encouragement and patience, and the many exchanges of ideas about
my research. I am indebted to Nick Netzer for teaching me how to conduct theoretical
research and to think like a theorist. I am thankful to Holger Herz for showing me how
to run experiments and for his advice on my experimental research. My ideas have also
benefited from the many interesting conversations with current and former members at the
Department of Economics at the University of Zurich, especially Björn Bartling, Charles
Efferson, Ernst Fehr, Andreas Hefti, Alexey Kushnir, Michel Maréchal, Konrad Mierendorff
and Tony Williams.
I am deeply grateful to my friends and family whose loving care and support has helped






1 Robustness and Ex-Post Implementation with Intention-Based Reciprocity 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 General Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.4 Kindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.5 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Notions of Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Type-Invariance of Kindness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Ex-Post Fairness Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 General Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.1 Insurance and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.2 Voluntary Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Public Goods Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.2 Expected Externality Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.3 Ex-Post Fairness Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5.4 Voluntary Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2 Honesty and Relational Contracts 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.1 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.2 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.3 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.1 Efficiency and Signal Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2 Profits and Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Contents
2.5 Theoretical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.1 Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.2 Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Relational Contracts and the Order of Moves 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.1 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.2 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.3 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Bibliography 59
A Appendix to Chapter 2 67
A.1 Regressions and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.2 Formal Definitions and Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A.2.1 Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A.2.2 Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A.3 Technical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 in Case of FCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2 in Case of PFCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.3.3 The RAP Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.4 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.4.1 Instructions for Buyers in Treatment PC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.4.2 Instructions for Sellers in Treatment PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B Appendix to Chapter 3 103
B.1 Regressions and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.2 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.2.1 Instructions for Sellers in Treatment AF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107




Economic research often applies the assumption that individuals are rational and value only
their own material benefit. This view has facilitated many powerful insights in economics.
Unlike the model of material self-interest, the theory of intention-based preferences for
reciprocity, as first introduced by Rabin (1993), presumes that individuals are willing to
sacrifice own material benefit in order to be kind to those who are kind to them and to
be unkind to those who are unkind to them. This behavioural pattern has received strong
empirical support.1 The model of intention-based preferences also differs conceptually
from the theory of material self-interest. Preferences are exclusively defined over final
outcomes in the latter model. By contrast, kindness sensations in the intention-based
model are determined within the underlying game. Hence, the evaluation of outcomes by
individuals who care about intentions can depend on the structure of the game in which
they participate. This procedural aspect of intention-based preferences has interesting
implications for the study of mechanism design, which addresses how games can be designed
to achieve desired allocations.2
Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014) first studied intention-based preferences for reciprocity
in a mechanism design framework. The authors provide conditions such that the im-
plementation under the assumption of material self-interest is robust to a broad class of
other-regarding preferences, including the intention-based model. Moreover, they illustrate
how the procedural properties of intentions-based social preferences can be exploited for
the design of mechanisms. In particular, the authors show how kindness sensations can
be affected by the construction of the mechanism such that individuals behave in the way
desired by the designer. As a result, they provide conditions such that any Pareto efficient
social choice function can be implemented with voluntary participation.
Chapter 1 of this thesis is the result of joint work with Nick Netzer. We build on the
framework developed by Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014) and study two robustness concerns
for the implementation with intention-based preferences for reciprocity. First, we provide
a notion of robustness concerning the formation of beliefs about others’ intentions under
incomplete information. Each player in our model is privately informed about his mate-
rial payoff type, analogous to the conventional framework with materially self-interested
individuals. This implies that a player’s intended kindness depends on his privately ob-
served type. One player therefore cannot pin down another player’s true kindness as he
is uncertain about this player’s actual type. Very little is known about how individuals
1See e.g. Sobel (2005) for a survey article on reciprocity. The empirical relevance of intentions has been
documented by e.g. Andreoni et al. (2002) and Falk et al. (2003, 2008).
2See e.g. the discussion in Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014).
Introduction
attribute intentions under asymmetric information and a designer may not want to rely
on a specific and possibly misspecified model. We therefore propose a notion of imple-
mentation with the property of type-invariance, which requires the equilibrium kindness of
each player to be independent of his type. This property renders each player’s intentions
transparent, despite the presence of asymmetric information.
Second, we propose a notion of ex-post implementation for the case of intention-based
preferences for reciprocity. Our concept requires that a player would not want to deviate
from his equilibrium behaviour, even if he were informed about all other players’ private
information. Having information about others’ actual types would allow each player to infer
their true intentions. Moreover, each player could learn his own ex-post material payoff,
analogous to the case of ex-post implementation with materially self-interested individuals.
Our definition of ex-post implementation implies that a player would not want to revise
his interim decision if he were given such opportunity ex-post. Also, our concept rules out
that a player anticipates at the interim stage that he will regret his decision when he learns
all other players’ private information ex-post.
As our main result, we show that implementation with type-invariance as well as ex-post
implementation is possible for any materially Pareto efficient social choice function which
provides insurance to the agents. In a direct mechanism, insurance is provided if unilateral
deviations from truth-telling do not affect any other player’s material payoff (Bierbrauer
and Netzer, 2014). This insurance property provides the basis for the implementation with
type-invariance as it induces zero kindness if players tell the truth in the direct mechanism.
We exploit the procedural nature of intention-based preferences by adding actions to such
direct mechanism in order to shape kindness sensations obtained from truth-telling while, at
the same time, keeping them type-invariant. We show how mechanisms can be constructed
in this way and equilibrium kindness can be tuned such that private and social interests
become aligned at the interim and even at the ex-post stage. We further illustrate that our
main result holds true even if participation to the implementing mechanism is voluntary.
Incomplete information is considered one of the main impediments to efficiency, not only
within the mechanism design framework studied in Chapter 1, but also in economics more
generally. Much of the research on incomplete information presumes that incentives are
provided by the use of explicit, formal contracts. Many real world economic relationships,
however, are governed by informal, implicit agreements (see e.g. MacLeod (2007) and
Malcomson (2012b) for surveys). In contrast to formal contracts, such relational “contracts”
cannot be enforced by neutral third parties. Yet, the literature suggests that they can be
self-enforcing within an ongoing relationship: individuals follow an implicit agreement to
cooperate if they believe that deviation to the own benefit will be punished in the course of
future interaction. In this sense, cooperation and the provision of efficiency are incentivized
by the shadow of the future.
In Chapter 2, which is result of joint work with Holger Herz and Armin Schmutzler, we
study experimentally and theoretically how incomplete information affects the economic
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performance of relational contracts. Informational asymmetries pose a challenge for im-
plicit agreements as they can preclude one player to tell whether another cooperates and
honours a relational contract or takes an unfair advantage to the own benefit. Doubt about
whether an agent plays fair may lead to allegations and possibly false accusations which
can destabilize a relationship. This suggests that incomplete information adversely affects
the functioning of relational contracts and leads to economically inferior outcomes.
Only little is known about the effect of asymmetric information on relational contracts
and previous research has primarily taken a theoretical perspective. We contribute to the
literature by providing empirical evidence complemented by a theoretical analysis. We
study repeated principal-agent relationships in which the agent holds private information
about his effort costs being either high or low. In the beginning of a relationship, the agent
sends a signal to his principal concerning his costs which, however, need not be truthful.
If a principal receives a high cost signal, then she cannot be sure whether her agent tells
the truth or is assigned to low costs and pretends to have high costs. As a consequence,
such principal cannot be sure whether her agent plays fair or exploits the informational
asymmetry to the own advantage.
Our experimental evidence shows that a large fraction of low cost agents behaves dis-
honestly. Principals doubt the truthfulness of high cost signals. However, this does not
lead to adverse consequences for efficiency compared to the case of high costs in our control
treatment with complete information, where doubts are absent by construction. This is
surprising in light of the fact that dishonesty causes potential for conflict in a relationship:
dishonest low cost agents induce substantial payoff inequality and severely harm their prin-
cipals’ payoffs. Overall, we find that asymmetric information can but must not necessarily
harm efficiency. We show in addition that the observed behaviour can be organized by a
theoretical model of relational contracts.
Chapter 3 of this thesis further contributes to the empirical understanding of relational
contracts. It begins with the observation that many ongoing economic relationships are
structured as a sequence of transactions, where each transaction by itself takes place se-
quentially. In a relationship between a principal and her agent, a transaction may consist
of the principal providing a wage first and the agent exerting effort thereafter. Alterna-
tively, the agent may act as the first- and the principal as the second-mover in a stage
game within the repeated interaction. This chapter explores experimentally how the order
of moves, in which a transaction takes place, can be utilized to enhance the functioning of
relational contracts with regards to the provision of efficiency.
If relational contracts are driven by the shadow of the future, as primarily suggested
by the literature, then the order of moves may not effect efficiency: if the relationship is
ongoing, deviations from the relational contract can be punished irrespective of whether
the deviating party acts as the first- or the second-mover. This suggests that incentives to
conduct efficient transactions do not depend on who moves first. However, this hypothesis
does not account for the possibility that individuals may take a narrow rather than a
3
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broad perspective on their decisions (see Read et al. (1999) for a survey). In particular,
the parties may narrowly focus on the outcome of the current stage game rather than
consider the outcome of the relationship as a whole. The evidence presented in Chapter
3 suggests that such narrow bracketing can lead to consequences of the order of moves on
efficiency.
The experimental data shows that efficiency in stage games in which the agent acts
as the first-mover is substantially higher than stage games in which the principal moves
first. This result emerges if the order of moves persists and also if it alternates over the
course of a relationship. The observed behaviour is consistent with the prediction of narrow
bracketing: second-movers claim more than an equal share of the surplus in a stage game,
despite the fact that the relationship is ongoing. This implies that principals who act
in the position of the first-mover pay higher than fair wages, which substantially exceed
the costs of effort provision. Hence, principals moving first have to make much larger
investments than agents moving first in order to induce a transaction with given efficiency
level. If first-movers hesitate to invest large amounts, this may explain why transactions in
which the agent moves first generate higher efficiency compared to transactions in which
the principal acts as the first-mover.
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Chapter 1
Robustness and Ex-Post Implementation with
Intention-Based Reciprocity
Intention-based reciprocity is an important motivation for human behavior, and it can be
exploited in the design of economic allocation mechanisms. In this chapter, we address
questions of robustness that arise in the context of asymmetric information about in-
tentions. We propose allocation mechanisms that eliminate uncertainty about the players’
intentions, by making all types of each player equally kind, and we investigate a first notion
of ex-post fairness implementation, based on the property that learning about a player’s
type does not change the perception of that player’s intention in such mechanisms. We
show that efficient social choice functions which provide payoff insurance to the agents can
be implemented in this way, with or without voluntary participation constraints.
Chapter 1 Robustness and Ex-Post Implementation with Intention-Based Reciprocity
1.1 Introduction
Private information about payoffs constitutes a key ingredient to the literature on mecha-
nism design. We consider a mechanism design model where behavior is driven by material
as well as psychological motives. In particular, we follow the framework of Bierbrauer and
Netzer (2014) and equip agents with intention-based preferences for reciprocity (Rabin,
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Private information about material payoffs
then gives rise to private information about intentions: players cannot fully determine
the other players’ intended kindness, as they are lacking information about these players’
types.1 We contribute to the existing literature by addressing two problems that may arise
in this context.
First, our understanding of the attribution of intentions under uncertainty is still limited.
We might, for instance, not be able to discard the hypothesis that opponent types with bad
intentions are more salient than those with good intentions, and hence are overweighted
in the process of belief formation.2 Therefore, while we could assume that players treat
intentions like material payoffs and form an expected value at the interim stage, here we
take a broader approach. We propose an equilibrium notion that requires intentions to be
type-invariant, and we construct mechanisms that implement certain materially efficient
social choice functions in this way. An equilibrium where each type of a player displays
the same kindness remains robust for a large class of assumptions about the attribution of
intentions under asymmetric information.
Second, if players were informed about all private information after taking their actions,
then they could infer the other players’ true intentions and may regret their decisions,
as they may have acted differently had they known these intentions beforehand. Such
psychological regret can be a concern in the same way and in addition to material ex-post
regret, linked to the uncertainty about material payoff types, as addressed in the theory of
ex-post implementation.3 We therefore propose a notion of ex-post fairness implementation
which requires that all players would want to stick to their interim decisions even if they
were informed about all private information ex-post. We again utilize the property of
1Models of intention-based preferences rely on the framework of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos
et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009). Most of the papers that develop or apply models where
intentions matter do not explicitly consider asymmetric information (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2000, 2004; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Cox et al., 2007; Segal
and Sobel, 2007, 2008; Hahn, 2009; Sebald, 2010; Nishimura et al., 2011; Dufwenberg et al., 2011, 2013;
Hoffmann and Kolmar, 2013; Netzer and Schmutzler, 2013). Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014) and von Siemens
(2009, 2013) explicitly model intention-based social preferences under asymmetric information. Models
within the framework of Levine (1998) rely on asymmetric information and signalling to generate reciprocity
via type-dependent preferences.
2A large experimental literature has provided evidence for the general importance of intentions for be-
havior, see e.g. Blount (1995) for an early and Falk et al. (2008) for a more recent contribution. However,
already Blount (1995) has pointed out that “[f]indings on attributions and the lability of preferences in
social context are particularly applicable to the relationship between games of incomplete and imperfect
information” (p. 142f).
3See e.g. Bergemann and Morris (2005) and Jehiel et al. (2006), and the discussion therein. Filiz-Ozbay
and Ozbay (2007) argue that a psychological concern to avoid anticipated material ex-post regret can lead
to overbidding in auctions.
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type-invariance to eliminate psychological regret, as it renders intentions fully transparent
in the first place. Our notion of ex-post fairness equilibrium rules out material ex-post
regret at the same time. The mechanisms that we construct align individual and social
objectives both on the interim and on the ex-post stage.
In spite of the strong demands implied by our notions of robustness, we show that ma-
terially Pareto efficient social choice functions can be implemented whenever they provide
insurance to the agents. This requires that the expected material payoff of any player i
is invariant to the private information of any other player j, where expectation is taken
over the private information of all players except j.4 In a direct revelation mechanism, the
insurance property would imply that j cannot affect the payoff of i if all players except
j were to tell the truth (Bierbrauer and Netzer, 2014; Bartling and Netzer, 2014). This
property provides the basis for type-invariant kindness: It implies that truth-telling in the
direct mechanism is associated with zero kindness for all types of all players, as nobody
has the option to make anyone else better or worse off. We then exploit the reference-
dependence of intention-based social preferences and augment the direct mechanism by
messages which trigger additional budget-balanced transfers, but remain unused in equi-
librium. This allows us to manipulate reference points and increase kindness to levels
that guarantee truth-telling of all players, by turning them into maximizers of the sum
of expected material payoffs, without violating the property of type-invariance. If players
become informed about their opponents’ types ex-post, kindness perceptions would not
change and truth-telling would still be a best response, as players remain maximizers of
the sum of ex-post material payoffs.
We also address the issue of voluntary participation, by considering mechanisms that
give all players the right to enforce some status-quo allocation. Such veto rights complicate
the construction of type-invariant kindness, as their execution might be kindness-relevant
for some but not for other player types. Veto rights can thereby compromise the property of
type-invariant kindness despite the insurance property of a social choice function. However,
we show that such concerns can be addressed by a more complicated construction of a
mechanism that uses different out-of-equilibrium transfers depending on whether or not a
player profits in expectation from the execution of the veto right.
Our results complement those by Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014), who first modelled
intention-based social preferences in a mechanism design framework.5 They provide suffi-
4Our notion of insurance is related to similar concepts in the literature on auctions and mechanism design
with risk averse bidders (Maskin and Riley, 1984) or under ambiguity (Bose et al., 2006; Bodoh-Creed,
2012). We will discuss this in Section 1.4 below.
5The growing literature on behavioral mechanism design has also investigated procedural motives (Glazer
and Rubinstein, 1998), robustness to non-equilibrium behavior (Eliaz, 2002), honesty (e.g. Alger and
Renault, 2006), state-dependent and endogenous preferences (e.g. Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Antler,
2014), level-k reasoning (Crawford et al., 2009), learning (e.g. Mathevet, 2010; Cabrales and Serrano,
2011), lack of common knowlegde of rationality (Renou and Schlag, 2011), irrational choice functions (e.g.
de Clippel, 2014) and loss aversion (Eisenhuth, 2012). Distributional preferences have been investigated by
Desiraju and Sappington (2007), Kucuksenel (2012), von Siemens (2011) and Tang and Sandholm (2012).
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) survey the large literature on externalities in mechanism design. De Marco
and Immordino (2012, 2013) and Bassi et al. (2014) examine reciprocity in a team design problem, based
on a model that differs from Rabin (1993) and does not exhibit reference-dependence.
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cient conditions such that any materially Pareto efficient social choice function can be (vo-
luntarily) implemented in (ex-ante or ex-interim) Bayes-Nash fairness equilibrium. Their
argument rests on a manipulation of equitable payoffs very similar to the one employed
here, but it does not guarantee the property of type-invariant kindness, which is central
to the present chapter. The insurance property is used by Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014)
to guarantee robustness of implementation results with respect to non-selfish motives of
the agents.6 The analysis in this chapter combines these arguments about robustness
and about the possibility to manipulate social preferences by choice of a mechanism. Bier-
brauer et al. (2014) also investigate ex-post implementation with social preferences, but, in
contrast to our approach, they do not work with a specific model of social preferences. In-
stead they impose the insurance property as a constraint on an otherwise standard ex-post
implementation problem in a bilateral trade setting.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The general framework is intro-
duced in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 discusses our notions of robustness. The main results are
presented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents an application to a public goods example,
and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 General Framework
1.2.1 Environment
The analysis builds on the formal framework of Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014). We fix an
environment E = [I, A, (Θi, pii)i∈I , p], where I = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents, A is a set of
feasible allocations, Θi is a finite set of types for agent i, pii denotes the material payoff
function for agent i, and p represents a probability distribution with support Θ =×i∈I Θi.
We employ the notation p(θi) and p(θ−i) for marginal distributions with respect to the
types of subsets of agents.
As for material payoffs, we consider a quasilinear environment with independent private
values. Formally, A = Q × T where Q represents a set of possible decisions and T =
{(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn|
∑
i∈I ti ≤ 0} the set of feasible transfers. Each player’s material payoff




A social choice function f is a mapping f : Θ→ A. When referring to its specific parts,
we employ the notation f = (qf , tf1 , . . . , t
f
n). A social choice function is materially Pareto
efficient if (i) its decision rule qf is value maximizing, qf (θ) ∈ arg maxq∈Q
∑
i∈I vi(q, θi)
for all θ ∈ Θ, and (ii) the transfer scheme is ex-post budget balanced, ∑i∈I tfi (θ) = 0
for all θ ∈ Θ. Throughout the chapter, we will restrict attention to investigating the
implementability of efficient social choice functions.
6Bartling and Netzer (2014) investigate the insurance property in an auction setting and provide experi-




A mechanism Φ = [M1, . . . ,Mn, g] prescribes a finite set of messages Mi for every agent
i ∈ I, and an outcome function g : M → A where M = ×i∈IMi. When referring to
specific parts of the outcome function, we use the notation g = (qg, tg1, . . . , t
g
n).
A mechanism Φ and the environment E jointly induce a Bayesian game, where player
i’s pure strategy is a function si : Θi →Mi. Denote by Si the set of all pure strategies for
player i. Let the first-order point belief of player i about player j’s strategy be denoted
by sbij ∈ Sj . A complete first-order belief profile of player i is denoted by sbi = (sbij)j 6=i ∈
Sbi =×j 6=i Sj . A second-order point belief of player i concerning j’s first-order point belief
about player k’s strategy is denoted by sbbijk ∈ Sk. Player i’s second-order belief about
j’s complete first-order belief profile shall be denoted by sbbij = (s
bb
ijk)k 6=j ∈ Sbj . Finally, a
complete second-order belief profile of player i is sbbi = (s
bb
ij )j 6=i ∈ Sbbi =×j 6=i Sbj .
1.2.3 Utility
We first presume every player to submit his message at the interim stage, where each
player is informed about the own type θi while, at the same time, remains uninformed
about the realization of the other players’ types θ−i. We denote the interim expected




















denote the material payoff that i expects to give to j when sending message mi, given
belief sbi .
Next, we follow the definition of interim utility proposed by Bierbrauer and Netzer
(2014, Appendix B), which translates the concept of Rabin (1993) to Bayesian games.
Accordingly, in addition to material payoffs Πi(mi, sbi |θi), each player is motivated by
psychological reciprocity payoffs. We denote player i’s interim belief about his kindness
towards player j by κij(mi, sbi |θi), and his interim belief about j’s kindness towards himself
by λji(sbij , s
bb
ij ). Below we will define κij and λji formally, in a way such that these terms
take on positive values if associated with kind behavior and negative values if associated
with unkind behavior. Reciprocity is captured by the assumption that mutual kindness as










i |θi)λji(sbij , sbbij ),
where yij ≥ 0 indicates the degree to which other-regarding concerns matter for individual
i in relation to individual j. We will also write yi = (yij)j 6=i and y = (yi)i∈I .
9
Chapter 1 Robustness and Ex-Post Implementation with Intention-Based Reciprocity
1.2.4 Kindness
We measure interim kindness of player i towards some other player j as the difference
between the expected material payoff which player i believes to give to player j and the
equitable payoff, Πeij , the reference point for the evaluation of kindness. In other words, we
presume that, given his belief sbi , type θi of player i believes to be kind (unkind) towards
j if his message mi yields a higher (lower) material payoff for j than equitable. Formally,
κij(mi, s
b
i |θi) = Πj(mi, sbi)−Πeij (sbi |θi).7
The equitable payoff equals a value in between the largest and smallest payoff that type θi
of player i can give to player j, conditional on belief sbi :
Πeij (s
b
















for some α ∈ (0, 1). The set of messages relevant for the minimization contains only mes-
sages which induce bilaterally Pareto efficient payoff pairs: Eij(sbi |θi) = {mi ∈ Mi|@m′i ∈
Mi with Πi(m′i, s
b
i |θi) ≥ Πi(mi, sbi |θi) and Πj(m′i, sbi) ≥ Πj(mi, sbi), with at least one strict
inequality}. This assumption guarantees that messages which hurt player j without bene-
fitting player i do not influence the equitable payoff and hence the kindness perception of
i’s behavior.
The messagemi submitted by type θi of player i determines his intended interim kindness
κij(mi, s
b
i |θi) towards player j, given his belief sbi . Suppose player i knew j’s type at the
interim stage. Given beliefs sbij and s
bb





about j’s intended kindness towards himself. On the interim stage, however, player i is
uninformed about θj and therefore cannot put himself into player j’s interim shoes in order
to figure out the intended kindness precisely. Following Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014), we
first proceed under the assumption that player i forms his belief about j’s kindness by














We can now provide a definition of interim fairness equilibrium, adapted to the present
notation from Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014, p. 40).
7Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014, Appendix B) do not explicitly specify interim kindness intentions. Instead,
they provide a condition on interim kindness such that their concept of Bayes-Nash fairness equilibrium,
which is based on an ex-ante perspective, is identical to their notion of interim fairness equilibrium, which
takes the interim perspective. In contrast to our definition of interim kindness, Bierbrauer and Netzer
(2014) allow for an upper and lower bound on ex-ante kindness.
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Definition 1.1. An interim fairness equilibrium (IFE) is a profile s∗ such that, for all
i ∈ I,
(i) s∗i (θi) ∈ arg maxmi∈Mi Ui(mi, sbi , sbbi |θi) for all θi ∈ Θi, and
(ii) sbij = s
∗
j for all j 6= i, and
(iii) sbbijk = s
∗
k for all j 6= i, k 6= j.
A social choice function f is implementable in IFE if there exists a mechanism Φ with an
IFE s∗ such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
1.3 Notions of Robustness
1.3.1 Type-Invariance of Kindness
Picking up on the discussion in the introduction, the fact that kindness κij(s∗i (θi), s
∗
−i|θi)
in IFE will generally depend on θi may be troublesome. A mechanism designer might not
be confident that (1.1) correctly reflects the way players form beliefs about the others’
intentions on the interim stage. We therefore refine the concept of IFE in order to guar-
antee that interim equilibrium intentions are fully transparent to every player, despite the
presence of private information. In particular, we require a strategy profile s∗ not only to





−i|θi) = kij(s∗i (θ˜i), s∗−i|θ˜i) =: kij(s∗) for all θi, θ˜i ∈ Θi and i, j ∈ I, j 6= i.
(1.2)
An IFE s∗ that additionally satisfies condition (1.2) is called interim fairness equilibrium
with type-invariant kindness (IFE-TI). Implementability in IFE-TI is defined accordingly.
For instance, suppose beliefs about intentions and kindness are formed in a way that





















denote the interval spanned by the smallest and the largest values of j’s equilibrium interim
kindness towards i. An IFE-TI remains an equilibrium if we replace (1.1) by the assumption
that λji(sbij , s
bb
ij ) ∈ ∆ji(sbij , sbbij ), without specifying any additional details. For instance, if
players use arbitrary weights wij(θj) ≥ 0 with
∑
θj∈Θj wij(θj) = 1 instead of p(θj) to
calculate λji, or even focus on one of the extremes such as the least kind type of the
opponent, IFE-TI remains robust as it collapses ∆ji to a single value.
1.3.2 Ex-Post Fairness Implementation
Our notion of ex-post fairness implementation shall provide robustness in the sense that
every player should stick to his interim decision even if he were informed ex-post about
the others’ types. Such additional information would allow each player i to update his









ij |θj). Notice that κji is still based on an expectation over θ−j , which reflects











i |θ)κji(sbij(θj), sbbij |θj), (1.3)
where Πi(mi, sbi |θ) = pii(g(mi, sbi(θ−i)), θi) are the ex-post material payoffs and κij(mi, sbi |θ)
is i’s ex-post kindness toward j, defined as the difference between Πj(mi, sbi |θ)
= pij(g(mi, s
b
i(θ−i)), θj) and some equitable payoff.
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We say that a social choice function f is ex-post fairness implementable if it is imple-
mentable in an IFE-TI s∗ and if, for each player i and every type profile θ ∈ Θ, s∗i (θi)
still constitutes a best-response in terms of ex-post utility (1.3), given beliefs fixed on s∗.
This definition captures the above stated robustness concern, since every player would
stick to his equilibrium interim decision even if he observed the others’ private information
on the ex-post stage. Now observe that implementation of a materially Pareto efficient
social choice function in an IFE-TI s∗ implies ex-post fairness implementation if s∗ gives
rise to the kindness values κji(s∗j (θj), s
∗
−j |θj) = 1/yij for all pairs of players.9 To see the
point in more detail, substitute these kindness values into (1.3) and note that s∗i (θi) then
constitutes a best response in ex-post utility terms if and only if it maximizes the sum of
all players’ ex-post material payoffs. By presupposition, strategy profile s∗ results in an
efficient, i.e., payoff-sum maximizing allocation g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for any type profile θ ∈ Θ,
so that this is indeed the case. We will address in the following section whether and how
these conditions can be achieved.
The proposed notion of ex-post fairness implementation is still restrictive. In particular,
the kindness that i attributes to θj ’s interim behavior in (1.3) corresponds to the true
kindness of θj in a mechanism where all choices are made on the interim stage. If a
mechanism systematically grants players the right to reconsider their decisions ex-post, and
this is anticipated on the interim stage, then the interim kindness of a given message might
be different in the first place. An analysis of games with multiple stages of announcements
is currently impeded by the lack of a theory of intentions for general extensive-form games.
Our main intuition for ex-post fairness implementation parallels the intuition for ex-post
Nash equilibrium provided by Crémer and McLean (1985, p. 349): “Of course, in our
model, a bidder can never observe the types of the other bidders. Thus, the concept of
ex post Nash equilibrium corresponds to the following reasoning by agent i. “If I believe
that the other bidders are using [their equilibrium strategies], then even if I observed their
actions, I would have no incentive to change mine””.10 Besides this general intuition, ex-
8Since the equitable payoff does not play a role for the present purposes, we omit its exact specification.
9Any strategy profile that results in a materially Pareto efficient social choice function and satisfies this
particular condition on type-invariant kindness values must in fact be an IFE-TI, as all players are then
maximizing the sum of expected material payoffs at the interim stage. However, not every IFE-TI exhibits
these particular values. See the discussion following Proposition 1 below, and the example in Section 1.5.
10Crémer and McLean’s concept corresponds to the earlier notion of uniform equilibrium proposed by
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post fairness implementation can also be appropriate when the anticipation of regret affects
interim decisions, in the spirit of Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007). Finally, our construction
also applies when agents do in fact observe the others’ types and can revise their decisions
ex-post, but do not anticipate this on the interim stage.
1.4 General Results
1.4.1 Insurance and Implementation
A concept which will be very important is the insurance property. Intuitively, a social
choice function gives rise to this property if each player i is insured against the realization
of the type (or the report in a direct mechanism) of any other player j, provided an
expectation is taken over the types of all other players (or provided that all other players
report truthfully). Hence unilateral deviations from truth-telling in the direct mechanism
will not affect any other player’s payoff when the insurance property is satisfied (Bierbrauer
and Netzer, 2014; Bartling and Netzer, 2014).
Definition 1.2. Given an environment E and social choice function f , the insurance





f(θ˜j , θ−j), θi
)]
= Pi
for all j 6= i and θ˜j ∈ Θj.
Related notions of insurance exist in the literature on optimal auctions with risk averse
bidders (e.g. Maskin and Riley, 1984) or with ambiguity (e.g. Bose et al., 2006). Maskin
and Riley (1984) define a perfect insurance auction (p. 1491) where each bidder’s payment
is deterministic and depends only on the own type and the event of winning or losing
the auction, with marginal utilities of income being equated across these two cases. In our
framework with material payoffs that are linear in transfers, this is satisfied by a large class
of mechanisms, such as first-price or all-pay auctions which do not satisfy our insurance
property based on overall payoffs.11 Bose et al. (2006) define a full insurance mechanism
(p. 416) where each bidder’s ex-post payoff depends only on the own type, and they
show that full insurance is optimal with ambiguity averse bidders.12 The property of full
insurance is stronger than our insurance property, as we require invariance of payoffs with
respect to another player’s type only from an ex-ante expected perspective. We can now
state our first main result.
d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), which builds on the concept of “complete ignorance” (see e.g. Luce
and Raiffa, 1957).
11See Eisenhuth (2012) and Eisenhuth and Ewers (2012) for an analysis of such mechanisms with loss averse
bidders. Maskin and Riley (1984) show that a perfect insurance auction will typically not be optimal with
risk averse bidders, when the auctioneer can use risk to relax incentive constraints.
12Perfect and full insurance coincide for certain classes of risk preferences, see Bose et al. (2006) for a
discussion.
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Proposition 1.1. Assume that y ∈ ]0,∞[n(n−1). If a social choice function f is materially
Pareto efficient and the insurance property is satisfied, then f is implementable in an IFE-
TI s∗ in which κij(s∗) = 1/yji holds for all pairs of players.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. We first prove the result for n = 2. We comment on the case
where n > 2 afterwards. Throughout, we fix a social choice function f that is efficient
and we suppose that the insurance property holds. We also assume y12, y21 > 0, and we
proceed in two steps. First, we construct a specific mechanism Φ for f . Second, we show
that Φ has an IFE-TI in which f is realized with the desired kindness levels.
Step 1. Construct mechanism Φ = [M1,M2, g] as follows. For both i = 1, 2 we let
Mi = Θi×{0, 1}, so that a message mi = (ηi, γi) ∈Mi contains an announced type ηi ∈ Θi
and an announced number γi ∈ {0, 1}. Given a message profile m = (m1,m2) ∈ M , we
also write η = (η1, η2) ∈ Θ for the profile of announced types, and γ = (γ1, γ2) ∈ {0, 1}2
for the profile of announced numbers. The outcome function g is defined as follows. For
all m ∈ M , let qg(m) = qf (η), i.e. only the announced types η matter for the decision
rule, which follows f . For all m ∈M , i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, let tgi (m) = tfi (η) + ri(γ), where
ri(γ) =

+eij if γi = 1, γj = 0,
−eji if γi = 0, γj = 1,
0 otherwise.
Hence, transfers also depend on the announced types η according to f , plus an additional
term that depends on the announced numbers γ. If i announces γi = 1 and j announces
γj = 0, then i takes an additional amount of eij from j, and vice versa. In the following,
use of i and j always presumes j 6= i. Since f is efficient and the additional transfers ri
always sum to zero across players, mechanism Φ is budget balanced for all profiles m ∈M .
As long as the announcements satisfy γi = γj = 0, the mechanism corresponds to a direct
mechanism for f .
Step 2. Consider strategy profile sT = (sT1 , sT2 ) where sTi (θi) = (θi, 0) for all θi ∈ Θi.
The profile sT corresponds to truth-telling in a direct mechanism. Under sT we have
g(sT (θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, so that f is realized. We will show that, for appropriately
chosen values of e12 and e21, strategy profile sT is an IFE-TI of Φ, and the desired kindness





i = 1, 2.
We first derive the kindness term κij((θi, 0), sTj |θi). Given the definition of Φ, choice of











for mi = (ηi, 0) with ηi ∈ Θi,[
Pi(ηi, θi) + eij , Pj − eij
]
for mi = (ηi, 1) with ηi ∈ Θi,
where Pi(ηi, θi) = Eθj [pii(f(ηi, θj), θi)], and Pj = Eθj [pij(f(ηj , θj), θj)] is a constant because
of the insurance property.
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Fix eij = 1/[(1−α)yji], implying maxmi∈Mi Πj(mi, sTj ) = Pj . Let η∗i ∈ arg maxηi∈Θi Pi(ηi, θi).
Since any message (η∗i , 1) simultaneously maximizes Πi(mi, s
T
j |θi) and minimizes Πj(mi, sTj ),
we have (η∗i , 1) ∈ Eij(sTj |θi), and thus minmi∈Eij(sTj |θi) Πj(mi, s
T
j ) = Pj − 1/[(1− α)yji]. It
follows that Πeij (s
T
j |θi) = Pj − 1/yji and therefore κij((θi, 0), sTj |θi) = 1/yji as required.
Replicating the same argument for player j and eji = 1/[(1−α)yij ] yields the type-invariant
kindness κji((θj , 0), sTi |θj) = 1/yij . We thus have λij(sT ) = 1/yji and λji(sT ) = 1/yij in
the hypothetical equilibrium.





i |θi) = Πi(mi, sTj |θi) + yijκij(mi, sTj |θi) · (1/yij).
Omitting terms that do not depend on mi, mi = (θi, 0) is a maximizer of this expression
if and only if it is a maximizer of
Πi(mi, s
T











where the equality holds due to budget balance of Φ. Since f is efficient, so that qf is value
maximizing, mi = (θi, 0) is a solution to the interim utility maximization problem, for any
θi ∈ Θi. Replicating the argument for player j, we can conclude that sT is an IFE-TI.
The case of n > 2. The arguments for n = 2 can be generalized to the case of n > 2,
by defining message sets Mi = Θi × [{0} ∪ (I\{i})]. The announcement of mi = (ηi, γi)
corresponds to the announcement of type ηi in a direct mechanism, but player i obtains
an additional transfer eij from player j if and only if γi = j and γk = 0 for all k 6= i. The
above arguments can then be applied analogously for each pair of players, and bilateral
type-invariant kindness of truth-telling sTi (θi) = (θi, 0) can be adjusted by choice of the
additional transfers payments so that each player’s goal becomes the maximization of the
sum of material payoffs.
The mechanism that we construct in the proof of Proposition 1.1 works like a direct mech-
anism, where each player announces a type, but with the new feature that each player i can
claim an additional payment of eij from any opponent j.13 Truthful revelation s∗ without
claiming such payments then becomes kind behavior. We show that the (budget-balanced)
payments eij can be adjusted so that the type-invariant interim kindness κij(s∗) = 1/yji is
achieved for each pair of players. The insurance property is crucial for this to be possible.
It implies that the realized and revealed type is irrelevant for kindness; all that matters is
the fact that no additional payment is claimed. Each player then becomes a maximizer of
the sum of expected material payoffs on the interim stage. Since the social choice func-
tion f is efficient, truth-telling is then a best-response to truth-telling of the opponents,
13Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014) refer to such mechanism as a “mechanism with a button”. It is isomorphic to
an augmented revelation mechanism (Mookherjee and Reichelstein 1994). The reason why it is formally not
an augmented revelation mechanism is that we define message sets with a product structure, Mi = Θi×Di
for some set Di, instead of defining it as a union Mi = Θi ∪Di so that Θi ⊆ Mi. Saran (2011) discusses
the validity of the revelation principle for general menu-dependent preferences.
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which implies that the mechanism implements f in IFE-TI. Due to the specific values of
equilibrium kindness, our arguments from Section 1.3.2 imply that it also implements f in
ex-post fairness equilibrium.
If only implementation in IFE-TI but not ex-post fairness implementation was required,
a much simpler construction would suffice. In fact, the direct revelation mechanism imple-
ments any efficient social choice function with the insurance property in IFE-TI. This is true
because efficiency and insurance jointly imply standard Bayesian incentive-compatibility
(see Lemma 1.1 below) and Bayesian incentive-compatibility and the insurance property
jointly imply that f is implemented by a fairness equilibrium with (type-invariant) kindness
levels of zero in the direct mechanism (see Bierbrauer and Netzer, 2014).
Lemma 1.1. If f is materially Pareto efficient and satisfies the insurance property, then
f is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. From material Pareto efficiency of f it follows that
n∑
i=1
pii(f(θj , θ−j), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
pii(f(θˆj , θ−j), θi)




Eθ−j [pii(f(θj , θ−j), θi)] ≥
n∑
i=1
Eθ−j [pii(f(θˆj , θ−j), θi)].
Due to the insurance property of f , we have that
Eθ−j [pii(f(θ˜j , θ−j), θi)] = Pi
is independent of θ˜j for all agents i 6= j, so that we can simplify the inequality to
Eθ−j [pij(f(θj , θ−j), θj)] ≥ Eθ−j [pij(f(θˆj , θ−j), θj)],
which is the conventional Bayesian incentive-compatibility condition.
As the next section shows, even IFE-TI implementation (without the additional require-
ment of ex-post implementability) will become more difficult when voluntary participation
is required.
1.4.2 Voluntary Participation
The analysis in the previous section ignored the question whether or not some type of
some player would prefer to opt out of the mechanism (see Myerson and Satterthwaite,
1983, for the classical impossibility result). To show that voluntary participation can be
guaranteed as well, we now require that the mechanism used to implement f admits veto
rights: every player must have a message which enforces a fixed status quo allocation
16
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a¯ = (q¯, t¯1, . . . , t¯n) ∈ A. We assume that a¯ is budget balanced,
∑
i∈I t¯i = 0, but allow it to
be chosen arbitrarily otherwise.14 If IFE-TI implementation of a social choice function f
is possible in such a mechanism, we say that f is voluntarily implementable in IFE-TI.
Voluntary implementation raises several novel issues compared to the previous section.
First, the direct mechanism with veto rights no longer implements f in IFE with zero
kindness, despite efficiency and the insurance property, because some types of some play-
ers might prefer to opt out of the mechanism. Second, veto rights generally complicate the
problem of achieving type-invariant kindness. Execution of the veto may induce bilaterally
Pareto efficient payoff pairs for some but not for other types, so that the veto is relevant
for the computation of equitable payoffs in the former but not in the latter case. Equitable
payoffs and kindness can therefore vary with the realized type despite the insurance prop-
erty of f , because the insurance property constrains payoffs derived from type reports but
not from the exercise of a veto. Finally, truth-telling in a direct mechanism with veto rights
goes along with different kindness values than in a direct mechanism without veto rights.
Hence our construction of off-equilibrium payments must be different, and, in particular,
it can become necessary to decrease equilibrium kindness. Nevertheless, we can establish
the following result:
Proposition 1.2. Assume that y ∈ ]0,∞[n(n−1). If a social choice function f is materially
Pareto efficient and the insurance property is satisfied, then f is voluntarily implementable
in an IFE-TI s∗ in which κij(s∗) = 1/yji holds for all pairs of players.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. As before, we first prove the result for n = 2 and comment
on the case n > 2 afterwards. We fix a social choice function f that is efficient and we
suppose that the insurance property holds. We also fix an arbitrary budget balanced status
quo a¯ = (q¯, t¯1, t¯2) ∈ A. We proceed in two steps. First, we construct a mechanism Φ for
f which admits veto rights. Second, we show that Φ has an IFE-TI in which f is realized
with the desired kindness levels.
Step 1. Construct mechanism Φ = [M1,M2, g] as follows. Let Mi = (Θi ∪ {ν})× {0, 1},
so that a message mi = (ηi, γi) ∈Mi again comprises two components. First, ηi ∈ Θi∪{ν}
allows player i to report either a type from Θi or to exercise a veto ν. Second, player
i announces a number γi ∈ {0, 1}. Given a profile m = (m1,m2) ∈ M , we again write
η = (η1, η2) and γ = (γ1, γ2). The outcome function g is defined differently for two cases.
First, if m has ηi = ν for at least one i = 1, 2, we let qg(m) = q¯ and t
g




+dij if γi = 1, γj = 0,
−dji if γi = 0, γj = 1,
0 otherwise.
Hence allocation a¯ is chosen, with possible additional transfers depending on γ. Second, if
14Our assumption implies that the mechanism remains budget balanced out-of-equilibrium, which simpli-
fies the proof. Our result would continue to hold, however, if
∑
i∈I t¯i < 0 was true.
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m has η ∈ Θ, we let qg(m) = qf (η) and tgi (m) = tfi (η) + ri(γ), where
ri(γ) =

+eij if γi = 1, γj = 0,
−eji if γi = 0, γj = 1,
0 otherwise.
Hence, the outcome function selects allocation f(η) where additional transfers may occur
in accordance with γ. Since f is efficient, a¯ is budget balanced, and the additional transfers
r¯i and ri always sum to zero across players, Φ is budget balanced for all profiles m ∈ M .
If the announcements satisfy γi = γj = 0, then the allocations induced by Φ are equivalent
to the allocations given by a direct mechanism with additional veto rights for every player.
Step 2. Consider sT = (sT1 , sT2 ) where sTi (θi) = (θi, 0) for all θi ∈ Θi, so that the veto
rights remain unused and g(sT (θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. We will show that sT is an IFE-TI
in which the desired kindness levels arise for appropriate values of e12, e21, d12 and d21.












for mi = (ηi, 0) with ηi ∈ Θi,[
Pi(ηi, θi) + eij , Pj − eij
]
for mi = (ηi, 1) with ηi ∈ Θi,[
P¯i(θi), P¯j
]
for mi = (ν, 0),[
P¯i(θi) + dij , P¯j − dij
]
for mi = (ν, 1),
where Pi(ηi, θi) and Pj are defined as in the proof of Proposition 1.1, P¯i(θi) = pii(a¯, θi) is
player i’s material payoff in a¯ and P¯j = Eθj [pij(a¯, θj)] is player j’s expected material payoff
from a¯. Define δj = P¯j −Pj , which does not depend on any type and thus is known to the
mechanism designer, who can distinguish between the following three cases:
(a): δj ≥ 0. Let eij = [1 + αyjiδj ]/[(1 − α)yji] and dij = [1 + yjiδj ]/[(1 − α)yji], so
eij , dij > 0. We obtain
P¯j ≥ Pj > Pj − eij = P¯j − dij
and hence maxmi∈Mi Πj(mi, sTj ) = P¯j . Player i’s own payoff can be maximized only by
either a message mi = (η∗i , 1) for η
∗
i ∈ arg maxηi∈Θi Pi(ηi, θi), or by message mi = (ν, 1).
Hence, one of these messages must belong to Eij(sTj |θi). All of them yield the same minimal
payoff for j, so minmi∈Eij(sTj |θi) Πj(mi, s
T
j ) = P¯j − dij . As a result, Πeii (sTj |θi) = Pj − 1/yji
and κij((θi, 0), sTj |θi) = 1/yji.
(b): −1/[(1−α)yji] < δj < 0. Let eij = 1/[(1−α)yji] and dij = [1 + (1−α)yjiδj ]/[(1−
α)yji], so again eij , dij > 0. We obtain
Pj > P¯j > Pj − eij = P¯j − dij .
Thus, maxmi∈Mi Πj(mi, sTj ) = Pj and minmi∈Eij(sTj |θi) Πj(mi, s
T
j ) = Pj − eij , by the same
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argument as in case (a). This again implies Πeii (s
T
j |θi) = Pj−1/yji and κij((θi, 0), sTj |θi) =
1/yji.
(c): δj ≤ −1/[(1 − α)yji]. Let eij = −δj and dij = [1 + yjiδj ]/[αyji], so eij > 0 and
dij < 0. We obtain
P¯j − dij ≥ Pj > P¯j = Pj − eij
and maxmi∈Mi Πj(mi, sTj ) = P¯j − dij . Player i’s own payoff can be maximized only by a
message (η∗i , 1) where η
∗
i ∈ arg maxηi∈Θi Pi(ηi, θi), or by message (ν, 0). Hence one of these
messages must be contained in Eij(sTj |θi). All of them yield the same minimal payoff for j,
so that minmi∈Eij(sTj |θi) Πj(mi, s
T




j |θi) = Pj − 1/yji, and κij((θi, 0), sTj |θi) =
1/yji.
We have shown that κij((θi, 0), sTj |θi) = 1/yji can be achieved by an appropriate choice of
eij and dij in any case. The remainder of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition
1.1.
The case of n > 2. As for Proposition 1.1, the arguments for n = 2 can be generalized
to the case of n > 2, now using message sets Mi = (Θi ∪ {ν})× [{0} ∪ (I\{i})].
The mechanism constructed in the proof can be interpreted as follows: We first fix
the direct revelation mechanism for f and extend it with veto rights. Analogous to the
construction for Proposition 1.1, we then allow each player to claim extra payments from
any other player, over and above the transfers of f or the status quo allocation. The
goal of these extra payments is again to manipulate kindness of truth-telling to values
that turn players into maximizers of the sum of expected material payoffs. The amount
of these payments depends on whether the claims are coupled with either a type report
or the execution of the veto right. When enforcement of the status quo benefits or does
not hurt player j too strongly (cases (a) and (b) in the proof), then the transfers that i
can claim from j in addition to executing the veto are designed to give the same minimal
payoff to player j as when i reports a type and claims the associated additional transfers.
This minimum is therefore independent of whether or not the status quo is bilaterally
Pareto efficient from the perspective of type θi of player i, which yields the desired type-
invariance. If enforcement of the status quo hurts player j strongly (case (c) in the proof),
then execution of the veto defines the minimal payoff that i can give to j. The transfers
that i can claim in addition to reporting a type are tailored to induce that same minimum,
which again yields type-invariance. The transfers that i can claim in addition to the veto
become negative and are used to adjust the maximal payoff that i can give to j until the
desired equitable payoff is obtained. This construction stabilizes equitable payoffs and
therefore kindness such that it does not vary with the realized type in equilibrium.
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1.5 Public Goods Example
1.5.1 Environment
In this section, we will illustrate the relevance of the insurance property and provide
examples of the mechanisms used in our proofs. We work with a simple public goods
application.15 Consider an environment with two players, I = {1, 2}, and the problem of
whether or not to provide a public good, Q = {0, 1}. Each player can be of either high
or low type, Θi = {θLi , θHi }, both of which are equally likely. Types capture the players’
willingness to pay for the public good, so we have vi(1, θi) = θi− c and vi(0, θi) = 0, where
c > 0 is the per capita cost of providing the public good, assumed to be shared equally by
default. We assume




2 < c < θ
H
2 ,
which implies that player 1 would always like to have the public good provided, but player
2 only if he has the high type. We also assume that
θL1 + θ
L





which implies that Pareto efficiency requires to provide the good except if θ = (θL1 , θL2 ).
1.5.2 Expected Externality Mechanism
The expected externality mechanism (AGV) for an efficient decision rule (d’Aspremont
and Gerard-Varet, 1979; Arrow, 1979) is ex-post budget balanced, hence materially Pareto
efficient, and Bayesian incentive-compatible. As Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014) have shown,
it always satisfies the insurance property for the case of two players. Table 1 summarizes
this mechanism for our example, by stating the decision rule qf and player 1’s transfer tf1 .
The transfer for player 2 is given by tf2 = −tf1 .






2 − θH1 )/2) (1, (θH2 − θH1 − θL1 + c)/2)
θH1 (1, (θ
H
2 − θH1 + θL2 − c)/2) (1, (θH2 − θH1 + θL2 − θL1 )/2)





















Due to the insurance property, each player i = 1, 2 obtains the same expected payoff Pi
even if the other player j 6= i deviates from truth-telling to any of the other possible
15This example application was also used in Bierbrauer and Netzer (2011), an earlier version of Bierbrauer
and Netzer (2014).
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strategies. This implies that the truth-telling strategy profile is associated with type-
invariant kindness levels of zero in this mechanism. Psychological concerns are therefore
irrelevant to both players, and Bayesian incentive-compatibility implies that truth-telling
is also an IFE-TI.
1.5.3 Ex-Post Fairness Implementation
The previous result can still be seen as a corollary of the general robustness arguments in
Bierbrauer and Netzer (2014). The AGV does, however, not guarantee ex-post fairness im-
plementation. To see why, assume that both players have followed a truth-telling strategy
ex-interim, have correct beliefs about this fact, and type profile θ = (θL1 , θL2 ) has realized.
Since updating the interim kindness values to the new information still results in mutual
kindness of zero, the maximization of ex-post utility (1.3) boils down to a maximization of
own material ex-post payoffs for both players. The condition for player 1 wanting to devi-
ate ex-post to the non-truthful type announcement θH1 becomes (θL1 − c) + (θL2 − c)/2 > 0.
With
θL1 = 3/2, θ
H
1 = 2, θ
L
2 = 1/4, θ
H
2 = 2, c = 1, (1.4)
for instance, we can verify that this is true, so that the expected externality mechanism is
not ex-post fairness incentive-compatible.
To achieve ex-post fairness implementation, we can instead apply the construction pro-
vided in the proof of Proposition 1.1 and augment the AGV by giving player i = 1, 2 the
option to take an additional amount of eij = 1/[(1− α)yji] from player j 6= i. With
α = 1/2, y12 = 1, y21 = 1, (1.5)
for instance, we obtain e12 = e21 = 2. Truthful type revelation without claiming this
additional payment is then still an IFE-TI, but the associated kindness values are now
κij(s
∗) = 1/yji instead of zero. Updating leaves these values unchanged, so that ex-post
utility coincides with the sum of ex-post material payoffs. No player therefore regrets
having helped to induce a materially Pareto efficient allocation, or not having taken more
money from the other player.
1.5.4 Voluntary Participation
Consider finally the possibility that each player can veto the AGV mechanism on the
interim stage, thereby inducing the null allocation a¯ = (0, 0) instead of the allocations
described in Table 1. Without social preferences, player 2 of type θL2 would strictly prefer
to do so whenever (θH1 −θH2 )/2+(θL2 −c)/4 < 0, which is again the case for the parameters
introduced in (1.4) above. The same holds with intention-based social preferences. It is
easily verified that both types of player 1 suffer in material terms from using the veto,
provided that player 2 always tells the truth. Since P2 > 0, the veto also hurts player 2’s
expected material payoff, which makes it an inefficient action for both types of player 1.
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Inefficient actions do not influence equitable payoffs, so truth-telling of player 1 remains
associated with a type-invariant kindness of zero, from our earlier arguments. Player 2
then cares for material payoffs only, and still prefers to opt out of the mechanism if type
θL2 has realized.
To guarantee voluntary participation, we can use the construction provided in the proof
of Proposition 1.2. With the parameters given in (1.4) and (1.5), case (b) from the proof
applies. As before, we obtain the payments e12 = e21 = 2 that each player can claim
from the other if none of them makes use of the veto. We obtain the smaller payments
d12 = 11/8 and d21 = 27/16 that can be claimed when at least one player makes use of
the veto. The value of dij is defined by the equality −dij = Pj − eij and ensures that the
maximal damage that player i can do to j by using a veto strategy is the same as by using
a type-announcement strategy.
1.6 Conclusion
We have studied notions of robustness in implementation for a mechanism design frame-
work where agents are characterized by intention-based social preferences. Within this
model, players are uncertain about their opponents’ intentions, as they are uncertain
about their material payoff types. We have firstly addressed robustness with regard to
assumptions about how agents accommodate the uncertainty about others’ intentions.
Our concept of implementation in IFE-TI provides robustness in this regard, as it renders
intentions transparent despite the presence of asymmetric information. We have secondly
proposed a notion of ex-post fairness implementation, which provides robustness to the
extent that no player would want to change his interim decision even if he were informed
about the others’ private information ex-post. This concept rules out any ex-post regret.
As our main result, we have established that any materially Pareto-efficient social choice
function which provides insurance can be implemented under both robustness concepts,
even if participation in the mechanism is voluntary. The insurance property is essential to
our construction, because it facilitates the property of type-invariant kindness. The mech-
anisms that we construct allow the designer to manipulate reference points for kindness
perceptions in order to align individual and social motives both on the interim stage and
on the ex-post stage, even if participation is voluntary.
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Honesty and Relational Contracts
This chapter shows experimentally how asymmetric information and resulting doubt about
cooperation affect the performance of relational contracts. We study the repeated inter-
action between a principal and her agent where the agent holds private information about
his costs of effort provision being either high or low. At the beginning of the interaction,
each agent can choose to either truthfully or dishonestly signal his cost type to his principal.
We observe that many low cost agents decide to signal high costs. Principals facing high
cost signals are uncertain about whether they are facing an honest high cost agent or a
dishonest low cost agent who attempts to exploit the informational asymmetry to the own
benefit. However, doubt about the truthfulness of high cost signals does not adversely
affect the provision of efficiency relative to our control treatment with high cost agents
and complete information. This result follows despite the fact that dishonesty leads to
substantial payoff inequality and strongly reduces principals’ payoffs. Overall, we find
that asymmetric information harms the provision of efficiency if dishonest low cost agents
imitate the behaviour of high cost agents. We furthermore show that our experimental
findings can be organized using a theoretical model of relational contracts.
Chapter 2 Honesty and Relational Contracts
2.1 Introduction
Many economic relationships utilize relational contracts, informal agreements established
and sustained within a relationship, to facilitate cooperation and implement efficient trans-
actions (see e.g. MacLeod (2007) and Malcomson (2012b) for surveys). Informational
asymmetries, pervasive in many economic relations, impede the identification of what con-
stitutes cooperative behaviour. In particular, asymmetric information can preclude one
party to verify whether the other honours a relational contract or takes an unfair advan-
tage to the own benefit. Suspicions about another’s unfair play may lead to allegations,
false accusations and breed conflict within a relationship. This suggests that the provision
of efficiency through relational contracts suffers in the presence of asymmetric information.
In this chapter, we show experimentally how asymmetric information and doubt about
fair play affect the performance of relational contracts. We study the relationship between
a principal and her agent, comprised of a sequence of transactions. Within our main
treatments, the principal first pays a wage and the agent chooses a costly effort thereafter,
to conclude one transaction. A principal’s profit increases in effort and her provided
wage benefits the agent’s payoff. As the parties cannot enter into binding agreements
to behave, they must rely on informal agreements to benefit from the relationship. Before
the interaction begins, each agent is randomly assigned to either low or high costs of effort
provision. In our complete information treatments, each principal is informed about her
agent’s cost type. Therefore, she can identify the surplus as well as her agent’s payoff from a
transaction. Put differently, each principal can verify whether her agent acts cooperatively
or takes an unfair advantage.
In our incomplete information treatments, each agent is privately informed about his
cost type. Prior to the interaction taking place, each agent sends a signal to his principal
concerning his cost type. Each principal knows that the assignment to either the low or
the high cost type is random, that her agent can choose his signal independent of his
actual costs and no principal can verify whether the signal constitutes an honest report
or not. Hence, a principal presented with a high cost signal can not be sure whether she
is facing an honest high cost or a dishonest low cost agent who exploits the informational
asymmetry in pretending to have high costs. This uncertainty can breed doubt about
the agent’s fair play. For instance, a principal facing a high cost signal cannot be sure
whether a transaction constitutes a fair deal with an honest high cost agent or generates
a substantial payoff advantage for a dishonest low cost agent.
A large fraction of low cost agents within our main incomplete information treatment
chooses to be dishonest: about two thirds of all low cost agents send high cost signals to
their principals. Elicited beliefs suggest that such behaviour is common knowledge among
the parties. Hence, principals who receive a high cost signal doubt its truthfulness. Yet,
our evidence shows that such doubt does not adversely affect the provision of efficiency.
Relationships in which the agent provides a high cost signal do not generate significantly
different levels of efficiency compared to relationships with high cost agents and complete
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information, in which doubt is ruled out by design. Moreover, principals who receive a low
cost signal are almost certain about its truthfulness. Their agents’ choice of honesty thus
essentially resolves the informational incompleteness. We observe that efficiency in such
relationships is not significantly different from efficiency in case of low costs and complete
information.
Overall, asymmetric information reduces efficiency in our main treatments to the extent
that relationships with low cost agents generate less efficient outcomes under incomplete
relative to complete information. This finding can be organized as follows. On the one
hand, honest low cost agents induce no different efficiency than low cost agents under
complete information. On the other hand, dishonest low cost agents provide efficiency as
if they were assigned to high costs. High costs, however, lead to inferior levels of efficiency
compared to low costs in the context of complete information. Because two thirds of
all low cost agents choose to lie, efficiency suffers under asymmetric relative to complete
information.
The observation that efficiency with high cost signals under incomplete information
is not different from efficiency with high costs under complete information contradicts
our initial expectation that doubt about the fair play of the agent would destabilize a
relationship. This is particularly surprising because such doubt would have been justified:
the difference in payoffs between a principal and her agent is about 11CHF (12$) higher
in case of dishonest low cost compared to honest high cost agents. Moreover, dishonesty
harms the principals’ profits: those matched with dishonest low cost agents earn about
15CHF (16$) less than those paired with honest low cost agents. Yet, principals seem
to take little action in response as they pay higher wages for a given effort level if they
receive a high cost signal compared to a low cost signal. This suggests that doubt does
not adversely affect efficiency because principals do not let doubt affect their behaviour.
To investigate the robustness of the above insights, we address the behaviour observed
in additional treatments which are identical to our main conditions with the exception
of the order of moves within each round of transacting. In particular, each round within
our additional treatments takes place in the following order: the agent first exerts effort
and the principal provides a wage thereafter. This implies that the principal always has
the final say in the distribution of payoffs from a transaction. Our data show that this
feature empowers the principals to let their doubt about the truthfulness of high cost
signals translate into their behaviour: principals who receive a high cost signal do not pay
different wages for a given effort level than principals who face a low cost signal.
Nevertheless, doubt about high cost signals does not adversely affect efficiency in our
additional treatments. This corroborates the evidence observed in our main treatments.
Yet, in our additional treatments, dishonest low cost agents provide no different levels
of efficiency than low cost agents under complete information. In other words, dishonest
low cost agents in these treatments act as if they had not lied, unlike such agents in
our main treatments who imitate the behaviour of high cost agents. This implies that
asymmetric information within our additional treatment does not harm the provision of
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efficiency compared to complete information.
Our empirical analysis is complemented by a theoretical investigation. We show that
the empirically observed patterns can be organized by a theoretical model of relational
contracts. In particular, the results of our theoretical comparative statics analysis are con-
sistent with the observed relationship between wages and efforts as well as its dependency
on the cost types. For the case of incomplete information, we show that the conditions
characterizing pooling equilibria are equivalent to the conditions in case of high costs and
complete information. This prediction is consistent with the empirical observation of pool-
ing in effort among dishonest low cost and honest high cost agents in our main incomplete
information treatment and the finding that such pooling leads to no different outcomes
than under complete information and high costs. Moreover, we show that simple separat-
ing equilibria exist. This suggests that subjects within our main treatments choose to pool
even though separation could have been feasible.
Related to this study is the experimental literature on relational contracts, especially the
work of Brown et al. (2004, 2012).1 These authors consider principals and agents interacting
in an experimental market environment in which the parties themselves determine their
matching into pairs as well as the duration of their relationships. The authors show that,
in the absence of opportunities to write explicit contracts, long-term bilateral relationships
sustained by relational contracts emerge endogenously.2 Our research builds on this finding.
In particular, we adapt the design proposed by Brown et al. (2004, 2012) to the extent
that principals and agents within our experiment are randomly assigned into bilateral
relationships lasting for a given number of rounds. This simplified design allows us to
cleanly identify the effect of asymmetric information and doubt on the performance of
relational contracts.
Relational contracts under asymmetric information have been addressed within a small
but growing literature (see e.g. Levin (2003), Halac (2012), Englmaier and Segal (2012),
Malcomson (2012a,b), Yang (2013) and Li and Matouschek (2014)). However, this re-
search has primarily focussed on theoretical insight. Empirical results are scarce. We
therefore contribute to this literature by providing experimental evidence concerning the
consequences of asymmetric information on the performance of relational contracts.
Our research is more broadly related to the literature on honesty and deception (see
e.g. Gneezy (2005), Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007), Mazar et al. (2008), Hurkens and
Kartik (2009), Pruckner and Sausgruber (2013), Gibson et al. (2013) and Fischbacher and
Foellmi-Heusi (2013)). This research has discussed the measurement as well as the potential
motives for dishonesty. We also document dishonest behaviour in our experiment. Yet,
the focus of our research lies on the consequences of dishonesty on efficiency.
1See e.g. Wu and Roe (2007), Fehr et al. (2009) and Camerer and Linardi (2010) for studies building on
the research of Brown et al. (2004, 2012).
2The evidence provided by Brown et al. (2012) illustrates that relationships which last for multiple
periods emerge irrespective of whether there is excess demand or excess supply for agents’ labour in a
market. However, these authors also report that more long-term relationships emerge in markets in which




The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We present the design of our
experimental study in Section 2. We state our main behavioural predictions within Section
3 and report the empirical results of our study in Section 4. We then present theoretical
considerations with regard to our empirical findings in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Treatments
As noted in the Introduction, our design builds on the research of Brown et al. (2004,
2012) and focuses on the bilateral relationships between principal and agents. As our
main treatment variable, we vary the principal’s information about the agent’s payoff
type. Prior to the interaction taking place, each agent’s type is randomly determined and
communicated to the agent. In our treatments with complete information, a principal also
gets informed about her agent’s actual type before the interaction begins. Within our
conditions featuring incomplete information, the agent holds private information about his
type. A principal is informed that her agent’s type is randomly determined and that she
cannot obtain definite information about her agent’s true type throughout the experiment.
Our incomplete information conditions additionally feature signalling: after learning the
type, each agent sends a message concerning his type to his principal. The agent can select
the signal independent of his true type and this is known to the principal.
We devised two main treatments, PC and PI, where PC features complete and PI incom-
plete information with signalling prior to the interaction, as described above. A relationship
is comprised of a sequence of transactions each of which takes place sequentially. In the
context of the conditions PC and PI, the principal moves first and the agent thereafter
at each transaction. In particular, a principal first chooses a wage and indicates a desired
effort level. The principal’s wage payment is binding. An agent observes his principal’s
choice and selects an effort level thereafter. Importantly, an agent is free to choose his
effort and does not have to follow the desired effort level indicated by his principal. In
other words, effort can not be enforced within the treatments PC and PI.
We designed two additional treatments AC and AI where condition AC is characterized
by complete and condition AI by incomplete information with signalling as outlined the first
paragraph of this section. The difference between these treatments and our main conditions
PC and PI concerns the order of moves in which the parties conduct a transaction. In the
context of AC and AI, the agent moves first and the principal thereafter in each round. In
particular, an agent first chooses an effort and indicates a desired wage. The agent’s choice
of effort in these conditions is binding. After observing the agent’s choices, the principal
chooses a wage. The desired wage indicated by the agent is non-binding for the principals’
choice and, therefore, wages can not be enforced in the context of the conditions AC and
AI.
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In the context of all treatments, a relationship consists of a sequence of 15 transactions.
In each of these, a principal chooses a wage w from [0, 100] and an agent selects an effort
e from {1, 2, . . . , 9, 10}. A desired wage wd and desired effort ed are chosen from the same
sets as wages and efforts are selected, respectively. For given choices of w and e within a
round, a principal’s material payoff ΠP (w, e) and her agent’s material payoff ΠA(w, e, θ)
are given by
ΠP (w, e) = 10 · e− w and ΠA(w, e, θ) = w − c(e, θ)
where c(e, θ) indicates the cost of effort e given cost type θ ∈ {L,H} as summarized in
Table 2.2 below. Costs are strictly increasing and marginal costs are weakly increasing in
effort, irrespective of the agent’s cost type. For any given e > 1, low costs c(e, L) are strictly
lower than high costs c(e,H). The difference between high and low costs, c(e,H)− c(e, L),
is increasing in e. Yet, since the marginal benefit of effort to a principal always strictly
exceeds the marginal cost of effort to her agent, the efficient effort level equals the highest
feasible effort under both cost regimes.
Table 2.2: Cost of Effort
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e, L) 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16
c(e,H) 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42
In all experimental conditions, and before the interaction took place, every agent is
randomly assigned to either type L or type H and then privately informed about it. After
observing their type, agents within the incomplete information conditions choose between
the message “I have low costs.” and the message “I have high costs.”, irrespective of their
actual type. Hence, agents are free to either be honest or to lie about their type. A message
can only chosen at the beginning of the experiment and can not be reversed in the course
of it. A principal receives the message selected by her agent and is informed that she will
not be able to obtain definite information about her agent’s true costs in the context of
the experiment. Within the complete information conditions, a principal receives either
message “Your seller has high costs.” or message “Your seller has low costs.” depending on




The experiment is framed in the neutral language of a goods exchange where a principal is
referred to as a “buyer” and the agent as a “seller”.3 Assignment into the roles of a buyer
and seller is random, the matching of principals and agent is randomly determined, and
each match persists over fifteen rounds of transacting. At the end of each period, both
principal and agent receive a summary of their choices in the current round including the
wage and effort as well as the desired wage and desired effort, depending on the treatment.
Every player is additionally informed about the own material payoff in the current round
which is noted in terms of the experimental currency “Punkte” (points). The sum of
payoffs, taken over all rounds, is converted into real money by the end of the experiment
(10 Points=1 CHF($1.1)) and paid out in combination with the show up fee (100 points).
In the context of the incomplete information conditions, we additionally elicited principals’
first-order beliefs about the (dis-)honesty of agents after the interaction had taken place.4
We furthermore elicited agents’ second order beliefs about their principals’ first order
beliefs.5 All elicited beliefs are incentivized.6
Table 2.3: Number of Participants





The experiment was computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For or-
ganizing and recruitment, we used the software hroot (Bock et al., 2012). Our subject pool
consists primarily of students at the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich. In total, 312 subjects participated in the experiment in August,
October and November of 2013 and April of 2014. No subject participated in more than
one session. On average, a session lasted 95 minutes with an average payment of 48 CHF
($52).
3See Appendix A, Section A.4 for sample instructions.
4We elicited beliefs about all other agents’ message choices, rather than the belief about a principal’s
actual agent. For instance, in a session with 16 agents where 8 are assigned to low costs, we asked the
following question: “8 out of 16 sellers were assigned to low costs. How many of these sellers with true low
costs sent the message “I have low costs.” to their buyers?”.
5In a session with 16 agents where 8 are assigned to low costs, agents answered the following question:
“Your buyer was asked the following question: ‘8 out of 16 sellers were assigned to low costs. How many
of these sellers with true low costs sent the message “I have low costs.” to their buyers?’ What do you
believe: which answer did your buyer provide in response to this question?”.
6Subjects earn, on average, about 20 additional points for indicating their beliefs.
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2.3 Predictions
Principals and agents within the experimental environment outlined above cannot enter
into binding agreements. The parties may, however, utilize relational contracts to facilitate
efficient transactions within their relationships. For an illustration, suppose a principal and
her agent implicitly agree to exert efficient effort in exchange for a fair wage, i.e. a payment
which yields equal profits for both parties from the transaction. Such behaviour can be
sustained if each party believes that deviating from the agreement to one’s own short-
term benefit will be punished in the course of the relationship and therefore not pay out.7
Because a principal and her agent can always compute each others’ profits from a given
transaction in the complete information conditions, they can always verify if the other
honours the agreement or takes an unfair advantage to the own benefit.
By contrast, doubt about whether the other party plays fair may arise in the presence
of asymmetric information. Suppose the principal receives a high cost signal from her
agent. Hence, the principal cannot not be sure whether she is facing an honest high cost
or a dishonest low cost agent. The principal therefore cannot pin down her agent’s actual
payoff. But nevertheless she can determine her agent’s potential profits. For an illustration,
suppose a transaction constitutes a fair deal between a principal and an honest high cost
agent, i.e. both parties obtain equal profits. As Figure 2.1 indicates, such a transaction
would imply that a dishonest low cost agent earns up to twice as much profit as her
principal. Hence, if a principal receives a high cost signal, then she may not be sure if a
given transaction constitutes a fair deal or comes with substantial payoff inequality.















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Effort
Honest High Cost Agent and Principal
Dishonest Low Cost Agent
Notes: For every given effort, the wage inducing equal profits between a
principal and a high cost agent was computed. If a principal provides such
fair wages, then her profits as well as an honest high cost agent’s payoffs are
described by the grey solid line whereas a dishonest low cost agent’s profits
are illustrated by the red dashed line, where linear interpolation was applied.
Doubt about an agent’s honesty and his fair play may breed conflict in a relationship
and adversely affect its performance. For instance, a principal who suspects a high cost
7See Section 2.5 for formal descriptions of behaviour prescribed by relational contracts.
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signal to constitute a dishonest report may no longer be willing to pay wages which would
be fair in case of true high costs. However, the provision of less than such wages may be
considered unfair by an honest high cost agent and therefore be punished with reductions
in effort which, in turn, implies lower efficiency. A dishonest low cost agent may imitate
such behaviour in order to keep pretending to be assigned to high costs. As a consequence,
efficiency provided in the context of incomplete information and high cost signals could
be lower than efficiency under complete information and high costs, in which case such
doubt is ruled out by design. However, it is not obvious whether this prediction prevails.
A principal may not let doubt about the truthfulness of a high cost signal and her agent’s
fair play translate into her behaviour. This may guard the relationship from additional
conflict and therefore prevent that efficiency is lower than in case of complete information
and high costs. Yet, as illustrated above, such argument rests on the assumption that a
principal is prepared to live with the possibility of being treated unfairly by a dishonest
agent.
In light of the above line of argument, it seems questionable whether low cost agents
select high cost signals in the first place. Indeed, a truthful report of low costs may virtually
eliminate the informational asymmetry, since there seem to be no obvious reasons for high
cost agents to send low cost signals. This may pave the way for a relationship no less
efficient than under complete information and low costs. Moreover, a truthful report of
low costs and therefore the explicit choice to refrain from attempting to take an unfair
advantage may indicate the willingness to behave fairly to a principal. This may foster a
relationship from the start and therefore even enhance its performance beyond the level
provided under complete information.
To sum up, the following questions defy a clear theoretical answer, suggesting a need
for careful experimental analysis. First, do low cost agents select high cost signals or do
they report truthfully? Second, is efficiency lower with high cost signals and incomplete
information than with high costs and complete information? The answer to this question
sheds light on the effect of doubt on the performance of relational contracts. Third, is
efficiency higher with low cost signals and incomplete information than with low costs and
complete information? This question concerns the consequences of honesty on relational
contracts. Fourth, is efficiency lower with low cost types and incomplete information
compared to low costs and complete information? The answer to this question allows us
to judge the effect of asymmetric information on the functioning of relational contracts.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Efficiency and Signal Choice
To lay the ground, we address the case of complete information and report on the con-
sequences of the different cost types on efficiency. We are not aware of any previous
experimental evidence in the regard. Documenting such an effect thus closes a gap con-
cerning the empirical understanding of relational contracts. Moreover, it provides a basis
for understanding the relationship between efficiency and (dis-)honesty which directly con-
cerns the cost types. As the data elicited within our main complete information treatment
PC show, cost types affect the provision of efficiency.
Result 2.1. Effort in case of low costs is higher compared to high costs in treatment PC.
Hence, cost types affect efficiency under complete information.
Average effort provided by low cost agents in condition PC equals 7.58. By contrast,
average effort in PC exerted by high cost agents equals 5.23. The difference in average
effort is significant (p-value 0.01, t-test8). Figure 2.2 presents the cumulative distributions
of effort, which further illustrate the differences in effort depending on the cost regime.
As we argue in Section 2.5.1, this empirical finding can be organized within a theoretical
model of relational contracts by comparing the equilibrium sets in cases of high and low
costs.


























The performance differences between relationships with high and low cost agents raise the
question whether agents within the incomplete information treatments decided to truthfully
signal their types or not. In light of the above results, one may expect low cost agents
to truthfully signal their type, hoping to benefit from a highly productive relationship.
On the other hand, low cost agents may report high signals in the hope for higher wages
and thus higher payoffs. However, as noted in Section 2.1, high cost signals may breed
doubt about whether an agent plays fair and therefore lead to potentially less productive
8In the following, all t-tests concerning effort are two-sided and feature clustering by the individual.
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relationships. The observed empirical data show that a large fraction of low cost agents
choose dishonesty.
Result 2.2. (i) Two thirds of all low cost agents selected a high cost signal in PI.
(ii) Elicited beliefs in this treatment suggest that principals were aware of the extent of
dishonesty and that their agents suspected so.
We find that about 66% of all low cost agents participating in condition PI chose a high
cost signal. True high cost agents, by contrast, chose to be honest: all high cost agents -
with the exception of one agent - reported truthfully. Principals’ first-order beliefs indi-
cate that such behaviour was roughly expected. On average, they believed about 71% of
low cost and about 6% of high cost agents to be dishonest. Principals thus even slightly
overestimated dishonest behaviour. Agents’ second-order beliefs about their principals’
first-order beliefs suggest that agents were well aware of their principals’ suspicions con-
cerning dishonesty. On average, agents believed that their principals believed that about
63% of low cost and 9% of high cost agents reported untruthfully.
Table 2.4: Dishonesty among Low Cost Agents in PI
Observed Dishonesty 66 %
1st order beliefs 71 %
2nd order beliefs 63 %
Since principals believed that a substantial fraction of low cost agents provided a dis-
honest signal, they must have been aware that either a truthful high cost or a dishonest
low cost agent could be hiding behind a high cost signal. As discussed in Section 2.3,
the consequences of doubt about the truthfulness of high cost signals were not obvious ex
ante. On the one hand, one might conjecture that doubt adversely affects the performance
of relationships to the extent that efficiency under high cost signals is lower than under
high costs and complete information, where doubt is absent by construction. On the other
hand, it is possible that doubt does not translate into behaviour if principals accept the
possibility of deception and payoff inequality. In this case, efficiency under high cost signals
in PI may be no different from efficiency under high costs in PC. Indeed, this prediction
is borne out by the data.
Result 2.3. Effort under high cost signals in PI does not differ from effort under high
costs in condition PC. In this sense, doubt does not adversely affect efficiency.
Within treatment PI, average effort exerted by dishonest low cost agents equals 5.78 and
does not significantly differ from the average effort provided by truthful high cost agents,
which equals 5.66 (p-value 0.86, t-test). Such pooling is further illustrated in Figure 2.3
which presents the distributions of effort. We furthermore find that average effort generated
under pooling in case of high cost signals is not significantly different from effort under
high costs in the context of condition PC (p-value 0.54, t-test). As we note in Section 2.5.2,
these findings can very well be organized within a theoretical model of relational contracts.
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Taken together, a high cost signal under condition PI has no different consequences for
efficiency than high costs in condition PC, despite the fact that parties were suspecting a
substantial degree of dishonesty.
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Having addressed the consequences of doubt on efficiency, we now turn to the case of
low cost agents who chose to be honest. Because principals believed low cost signals to be
truthful with high probability, an honest report of low costs should have nearly resolved
the informational asymmetry. As noted in Section 2.3, this may imply that relationships
informed by low cost signals perform no different from relationships with low costs and
complete information. However, because both principals and agents believed that a large
fraction of low cost agents behaved dishonestly, the choice of a low cost signal, and therefore
the explicit choice not to attempt to take an unfair advantage, may have nourished the
performance of such relationships. However, as the following result shows, this prediction
was not confirmed by our data.
Result 2.4. Effort provided by honest low cost agents in condition PI does not differ from
effort exerted by low cost agents in treatment PC. In this sense, honesty does not enhance
efficiency.
On average, average effort among truthful low cost cases within condition PI equals
7.3 and is not significantly different from average effort provided by low cost agents in
treatment PC (p-value 0.77, t-test).9 The evidence presented so far therefore suggests
that asymmetric information reduces the provision of efficiency by low cost agents. On
the one hand, the explicit choice of honesty does not further efficiency beyond the level
provided under complete information. On the other hand, the choice of dishonesty reduces
efficiency since dishonest low cost agents imitate the behaviour of high cost agents and
therefore provide inferior levels of effort than low cost agents in our complete information
treatment PC. Given that a substantial fraction of low cost agents chose dishonesty in PI,
9The distributions of effort, as presented in Appendix A.1, Figure A.1, further illustrate this result.
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we therefore find that asymmetric information harms the provision of efficiency: average
efficiency among low cost agents in condition PI equals 6.31 and is lower than average
efficiency provided by low cost agents in the context of condition PC (p-value 0.07, t-
test).10
Result 2.5. Effort provided by low cost agents in PI is lower than effort selected by low
cost agents in PC. Hence, asymmetric information reduces efficiency under low costs in
our main treatments.
2.4.2 Profits and Wages
As we argued in Section 2.3, there are reasons to believe that doubts can potentially lead
to adverse consequences for the performance of relational contracts. Our prediction in this
regard rested on the joint hypothesis that (a) dishonesty goes along with advantageous
inequality for the dishonest low cost agent and (b) the principal reacts adversely to the
possibility of such inequality. We now argue that the observed absence of efficiency con-
sequences reflects the failure of the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our evidence
shows that dishonesty leads to payoff advantages for untruthful agents and imposes profit
reductions on their principals.
Result 2.6. (i) The difference in profits between a principal and her agent is about 11CHF
(12$) higher in case of a dishonest low cost agent compared to an honest high cost agent.
(ii) Dishonesty does not raise low cost agents’ profits compared to honesty.
(iii) Principals earn about 15CHF (16$) less if they are paired with dishonest low cost
compared to an honest low cost agents.
The average difference between dishonest low cost agents’ and their principals’ profits
amounts to 192 points in PI. This average is significantly different from the average differ-
ence between honest high cost agents’ and their principals’ profits, which equals 85 points
in treatment PI (p-value 0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).11 In other words, if the principal
receives a high cost signal then the difference between her and her agent’s profits is about
11CHF (12$) higher if she is facing a dishonest low cost agent than if she is matched with
an honest high cost agent. This finding strongly suggests that the absence of an effect of
doubt on efficiency does not reflect the absence of advantageous inequality for the dishonest
low cost agent.
Moreover, we find that dishonesty does not pay for low cost agents. On average, honest
low cost agents earn 503 points while dishonest low cost agents make 478 points in PI (p-
value 0.74, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). While the choice of dishonesty rather than honesty
does not enhance low cost agents’ own profits, it substantially harms their principals’. In
particular, principals matched with honest low cost agents earn, on average, 440 points
whereas average earnings of those paired with dishonest low cost agents equal 286 points
10See Appendix A.1, Figure A.2, for the distributions of effort.
11In the following, the indicated points exclude the show up fee as well as the points earned for beliefs and
thus exclusively reflect subjects’ earnings within their relationships.
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in PI (p-value 0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Put differently, by choosing to be untruthful
low cost agents deprive their principals by about 15 CHF (16$).
Having established that principals doubt high cost signals and that dishonesty generates
inequality and payoff reductions, we now investigate whether this affects the principals’
behaviour. In particular, we address how information about the cost type affects the
provision of wages. On the one hand, doubt about the truthfulness of high cost signals
could translate into principals’ behaviour. In order to prevent dishonest low cost agents
from taking an unfair advantage, principals could pay the same wages for given effort if
they receive a high cost signal compared to if they get a low cost signal. This however,
may lead to conflict with honest high cost agents who could consider such wages unfair.
Hence, on the other hand, principals could condition their wages for a given effort level on
the indicated costs, despite their doubt about high signals, to prevent dispute within the
relationship. This prediction is consistent with our evidence.
Result 2.7. (i) Wage and effort are positively related.
(ii) Wage payments for a given effort level depend positively on the indicated costs.
We find a strong positive relation between wages and effort within our treatments PC and
PI. This observation is in line with prior evidence on relational contracts in the laboratory,
for instance as presented by Brown et al. (2004). Within our treatments PC and PI,
an additional unit of effort significantly increases average wages by about 6.6 points as
shown by a regression analysis.12 Moreover, wages for a given effort level are significantly
higher if agents are assigned to high relative to low costs in PC. 13 In addition, principals
in condition PI pay higher wages if they receive a high compared to a low cost signal.14
This shows that principals’ doubt about high cost signals did not translate into their wage
setting behaviour. Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between wages and efforts as
well as its dependency on the indicated costs. As we show in Section 2.5, these empirical
findings are consistent with the corresponding comparative statics results in a theoretical
model of relational contracts.
2.4.3 Robustness
The evidence presented so far suggests that doubt does not adversely affect efficiency,
despite the fact that dishonesty increases inequality and harms principals’ profits, because
principals still pay higher wages in case of high compared to low cost signals and therefore
avoid introducing conflict into a relationship. In the following, we investigate whether
the observed effects are specific to the design of our treatments PC and PI. In particular,
every transaction within these conditions was conducted in the same order: the principal
moved first and the agent thereafter. Hence, an agent always had the final say in the
distribution of payoffs within a round. Our evidence shows that being in the position of a
12See Appendix A.1, Table A.1, Column (1).
13See Appendix A.1, Table A.1, Column (2).
14See Appendix A.1, Table A.1, Column (3).
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Notes: One data point in the above plot represents the vector of average wage
and average effort chosen in one relationship between a principal and an agent,
where the averages are taken over all periods. All data points were elicited
within condition PC and PI. “Low Cost Info” (“High Cost Info”) represents
relationships in which either principals received low (high) cost signals in the
context of PI or costs were low (high) within PC.
second-mover empowered agents relative to their principals: agents’ average profits in PC
and PI are about 117 points higher than their principals’ profits (p-value 0.00, t-test15).
As a consequence, acting in the comparatively less influential position of a first-mover may
have rendered it infeasible for the principals to challenge high cost signals, meaning that
they pay no higher wages in response to high compared to low cost signals. Therefore,
the order of moves within our treatments PC and PI may have impeded doubts to affect
efficiency.
To investigate this claim, we address behaviour observed in our conditions AC and
AI. Within these treatments, the agent moved first and the principal thereafter in order
to conduct a transaction. Hence, in these treatments, principals could directly shape the
distribution of payoffs within each round. Our evidence shows that acting as second-movers
put principals’ in a more powerful position: their average profits in AC and AI are about
150 points higher than agents’ average payoffs (p-value 0.00, t-test). One might therefore
conjecture that, empowered by their position as a second-mover, principals’ doubt about
the truthfulness of high cost signals translates into their behaviour.
A large fraction of low cost agents signalled high costs and principals doubted the truth-
fulness of such signals in treatment AI.16 Contrary to condition PI, principals’ doubt about
high cost signals translated into their behaviour in condition AI: wages for a given effort
level in this condition are not significantly higher if principals receive a high compared to a
low cost signal.17 Moreover, the wages provided by almost all principals in AI who received
15In the following, t-tests concerning differences in profits are two-sided and employ clustering by each
principal-agent pair.
16About 87 % of all low cost agents in AI chose a high cost signal. Principals believed about 78% of all
low cost agents to be dishonest in AI.
17See Appendix A.1, Table A.1, Column (4). As Column (5) in this table shows, wages for a given effort
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a high cost signal range below the wages which would be fair in case of true high costs.18
But nevertheless, such behaviour did not adversely affect the performance of relational
contracts.
Result 2.8. (i) Effort under high cost signals in AI does not differ from effort under
high costs in AC. In this sense, doubt does not adversely affect efficiency in our additional
treatments.
(ii) Effort provided by low cost agents in AI does not differ from effort selected by low cost
agents in AC. Hence, asymmetric information does not harm efficiency for the case of low
costs in our additional treatments.
Average effort exerted by agents who sent a high cost signal in AI equals 7.6 and does
not significantly differ from average effort chosen by high cost agents in AC which equals
6.9 (p-value 0.31, t-test19). This finding is further illustrated by the distributions of effort,
as presented in Figure 2.5.20 Hence, despite the fact that principals do not reward high
cost signals with higher wages than low cost signals, we reject the hypothesis that this has
negative consequences for efficiency. This shows the robustness of our finding presented in
Result 2.3.
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However, in contrast to the evidence presented in Result 2.5, low cost agents’ average
effort in AI equals 8.1 which is not significantly different from low cost agent’s average
effort in AC, which equals 7.9 (p-value 0.71, t-test). This follows because almost all low
within the corresponding complete information treatment AC are higher if costs are high rather than low.
18See Appendix A.1, Figure A.3, for a plot of the wage-effort relationship which emerged under high cost
signals in AI.
19In the following, t-tests concerning efforts are two-sided and employ clustering on the individual level.
20The distributions of effort presented in Figure 2.5 suggest that dishonest low cost and honest high cost
agents separate in effort, in contrast to the pooling reported in the context of Result 2.3. This intuition
is descriptively confirmed, yet the difference in average efforts turns out to be statistically insignificant:
average effort provided by dishonest low cost agents equals 8.23 whereas average effort of honest high cost
agents amounts to 7.11 (p-value 0.13, t-test). As our theoretical analysis presented in Appendix A.3.3
shows, both pooling and separation constitute theoretical possibilities.
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costs agents in AI choose to lie, but their average effort does not statistically differ from
the average effort provided by low cost agents in AC (p-value 0.63, t-test). In other words,
dishonest low cost agents in AI behave as if they had not lied. This stands in contrast to the
observation that dishonest low cost agents in PI imitate the behaviour of high cost agents
in PC, as noted in in the context of Result 2.3. Taken together, asymmetric information,
dishonesty and doubt in condition AI do not harm the performance of relational contracts
relative to treatment AC.
2.5 Theoretical Considerations
In the following, we interpret our empirical findings using the established theoretical frame-
work for the analysis of relational contracts. We consider the following infinitely repeated
principal-agent (RPA) game. In each of the periods t = 0, 1, 2, ... a principal and an agent
play a two-stage game. The discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).21 We suppose that, in the
first stage, principals choose wages wt from [0, 100]; in the second stage, agents choose
efforts et from {1, ..., 10}. Agents have a cost function c (et, θ), where θ ∈ {H,L}. The
function c is increasing in et for both cost types, and it satisfies c (1, H) = c (1, L) = 0,
c (et + 1, H)− c (et, H) > c (et + 1, L)− c (et, L) for et ∈ {0, ..., 9}. The payoff of the prin-
cipal is 10et − wt. The payoff for an agent of type θ is wt − c (et, θ). In Section 2.5.1, we
analyse this game under complete information about the cost type. In Section 2.5.2, we
turn to the case of incomplete information. This corresponds to an analysis of the inter-
action starting after the agent has sent a high cost signal. In this case, the common prior
of the event that θ = L is µ ∈ (0, 1). Appendix A.2 contains our main formal definitions
and proofs; further technical details are provided in Appendix A.3.22 In the main text, we
confine ourselves to an intuitive presentation of the arguments.
2.5.1 Complete Information
Following the literature on relational contracts, we analyse trigger-strategy equilibria (TE).
These are subgame perfect equilibria in which the players use trigger-strategy profiles (TP)
described as follows. The principal starts with some w∗ > 0, and the agent responds with
some e∗ > 1. As long as the history of play consists only of wage choices w∗ and effort
choices e∗, the principal continues to choose w∗ and the agent continues to choose e∗; after
a deviation, principals (agents) choose minimal wages (efforts) forever. In addition, we
consider forgiving cut-off strategy equilibria (FCE). These are subgame perfect equilibria
21For reasons of tractability, we designed our experiment as a finite rather than an infinitely repeated
game. Figures A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A.1 show that end effects occur primarily in the last period
of interaction. Omitting the data of the last round would not qualitatively change the empirical results
presented above. Hence, we believe that the theoretical insight gained within an infinitely repeated game
framework can help us interpret our data.
22Within Appendix A.3 we also present an analysis of the infinitely repeated agent-principal (RAP) game
which is identical to the RPA game with the exception of the order of moves within each stage game:
within the RAP game, the agent moves first and the principal thereafter in every round. The predictions
within this game therefore correspond to the data observed within our treatments AC and AI.
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in which the players use forgiving cut-off strategy profiles (FCP) such that the principal
(agent) sticks to w∗ (e∗) unless the other player has initiated a downward deviation from
which she has not returned. While the TP is particularly simple to analyze, the FCP
has two advantages. Firstly, it appears more plausible to punish only after downward
deviations and not after upward deviations. Secondly, punishment behaviour in our data
corresponds more closely to forgiving than to trigger strategies.23
We shall say that a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as a TE (FCE) for δ and
θ if, for these parameter values, there exists a TE (FCE) such that the resulting outcome
path is the infinite repetition of wages w∗ and efforts e∗. In this case, we also say that an
effort e∗ is sustainable as a TE (FCE) given (δ, θ, w∗).
As stated in the following proposition, the conditions required to sustain any given
wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) under complete information are identical for TE and FCE. In
this proposition, S (e∗) = 10e∗ − 10 denotes the additional benefit for the principal from
choosing e∗ for a fixed w∗ rather than the minimal effort 1, for which S (1) = 0.
Proposition 2.1. Consider the RPA game with complete information and cost type θ ∈
{L,H}. Then, a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as a TE for δ and θ if and only
if
S (e∗) ≥ w∗, (2.1)




Moreover, a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as an FCE for δ and θ if and only if
(2.1) and (2.2) hold.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. See Appendix A.2.1.
The intuition for the result is similar for TE and FCE. Condition (2.1) guarantees that
the principal is willing to pay the wage w∗ rather than the minimal wage: She must expect
an equilibrium effort of at least e∗, generating benefits S (e∗) that are high enough to
compensate for the wages w∗. Condition (2.2) guarantees that the agent who is expecting
a normalized discounted equilibrium payoff δw∗ is willing to incur the equilibrium effort
costs of c (e∗, θ) rather than exerting the minimal effort.
Proposition 2.1 has several implications that are useful to interpret our empirical ob-
servations. For θ ∈ {H,L}, all efforts in {1, ..., 10} are sustainable for suitable wages and
sufficiently high discount factors: This follows from (2.1) and (2.2) because S (e) > c (e,H)
for all e ∈ {1, ..., 10}. Figure 2.6 illustrates the sets of sustainable wage-effort vectors for a
given parameter choice.24 The following corollary is immediately intuitive from the figure.
23Detailed descriptions of our data are available on request.
24We fixed δ = 2/3; similar qualitative patterns emerge for sufficiently large δ.
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Corollary 2.1. (i) The set of e∗ that are sustainable as a TE (FCE) given δ and θ is
increasing in w∗.25
(ii) The maximal e∗ that is sustainable as a TE (FCE) given (δ, θ, w∗) is higher for θ = L
than for θ = H.
(iii) The minimal w∗ for which e∗ is sustainable as a TE (FCE) given (δ, θ, w∗) is higher
for θ = H than for θ = L.
















Note: The specifications of c(e,L) and c(e,H) constitute linear interpola-
tions of the low and high cost specifications employed in our experiments,
see Table 2.2.
Statement (i) is consistent with the empirical observation that high efforts and high
wages go hand in hand (Result 2.7). (ii) states that, if costs increase, higher efforts are
harder to sustain with a given wage. This follows because the right boundary of the region
described by (2.1) and (2.2) shifts to the left. This provides a possible rationalization of
Result 2.1. Similarly, (iii) says that sustaining a higher effort requires higher wages with
high costs: the lower bound of the region described by (2.1) and (2.2) shifts up. This
statement is in line with the observation that wages conditional on efforts are higher for
high costs (Result 2.7).
2.5.2 Incomplete Information
We now proceed to the incomplete information case to understand behaviour in situations
in which the agent signals high costs. As reported in Result 2.3, the behaviour of truthful
high types and low types who sent the high signal within condition PI under incomplete
information is similar. We therefore first search for conditions under which simple pooling
equilibria exist. Thereafter, we ask whether separating equilibria exist as well.
25The formulation that a set is increasing in some parameter refers to the strong set order; thus both the
minimum and the maximum of the set increase.
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Pooling Equilibria
We define a pooling trigger strategy profile (PTP) by the requirement that principals and
agents play a trigger strategy as described in Section 2.5.1 and both types of agents choose
the same strategy (that is, e∗ is the same for both types). The definition of the pooling
forgiving cut-off strategy profile (PFCP) is analogous. A pooling trigger strategy equilibrium
(PTE) is a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the players choose a PTP. A pool-
ing forgiving cut-off strategy equilibrium (PFCE) is a weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which the players use a PFCP. The adaptation of the sustainability definition to pooling
equilibria is straightforward.
Proposition 2.2. Consider the RPA game with incomplete information. Then, a wage-
effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as a PTE given δ if and only if





Moreover, a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as an PFCE for δ if and only if (2.3)
and (2.4) hold.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. See Appendix A.2.2.
Thus, the condition for sustainability with incomplete information exactly corresponds
to the condition for sustainability under high costs with complete information. Intuitively,
in a pooling equilibrium the binding incentive constraint is that the high-cost types remain
on board and are willing to exert effort. Proposition 2.2 is consistent with Result 2.3:
behaviour of high-cost agents in the incomplete information treatment following high cost
signals is very similar to behaviour in the complete information condition with high costs.
Moreover, Proposition 2.2 obviously implies that, for fixed discount factor δ, the set of
sustainable e∗ is increasing in w∗. This statement, which is the incomplete information
analogue of the first part of Corollary 2.1, is consistent with the observed positive relation
between wages and efforts in condition PI (Result 2.7).
Separating equilibria
In the following, we show that a particularly simple type of separating equilibrium exists
for a large set of parameters and efforts. In a separating trigger-strategy equilibrium (STE)
sustaining eH and eL, the principal chooses a wage w∗ ≥ 0 in the first period. Then high
and low cost types separate by choosing efforts eH and eL, respectively, where eH < eL.
Furthermore, there exist wL > wH such that the principal chooses wages wθ, for θ ∈
{H,L}, in periods 1, 2, ... if she has only observed efforts eθ and has chosen w∗ in period 1
and wθ thereafter, and she chooses zero wages after any other history. Agent θ ∈ {H,L}
sticks to the effort eθ as long as the initial wage was w∗, and only wθ and eθ have been
chosen thereafter. After any history such that the agent of type L has always chosen eH
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and the principal has chosen w∗ in period 0 and wH thereafter, this agent continues to
choose eH . After all other histories, the agents choose minimal efforts. In Appendix A.2.2,
we provide a formal definition of an STE and prove the following result.
Proposition 2.3. In the RPA game with incomplete information, an STE sustaining eH
and eL, exists for suitable wages wH and wL given δ if
δS(eH) ≥ c (eH , H) , (2.5)
δS(eL) ≥ c (eL, L)− c (eH , L)+ c (eH , H) . (2.6)
Proof of Proposition 2.3. See Appendix A.2.2.
It is simple to show that conditions (2.5) and (2.6) hold for many different choices of eH
and eL if δ is in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of 1. For instance, for the cost functions
used in the experiment, (2.5) and (2.6) both hold with strict inequality for eH = 1 and
eL = 10 if δ is sufficiently close to 1. Thus, even though observed behaviour in treatment PI
shows no evidence of separation, it is a clear theoretical possibility. Thus, we should think
of our empirical result as a statement that, among different possible equilibria, players
select those involving pooling behaviour.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown experimentally that asymmetric information and suspicion
about the other player taking an unfair advantage do not necessarily harm the economic
performance of relational contracts. Within our main treatments PI and PC, we observe a
negative effect of asymmetric information on efficiency. This result mainly follows because
dishonest low cost agents imitate the behaviour of true high cost agents. High costs,
however, generate inferior levels of efficiency compared to low costs. As many low cost
agents choose to be dishonest about their cost type, efficiency in relationships with low
cost agents suffers. By contrast, our evidence shows no loss in efficiency as a consequence of
asymmetric information within our additional treatments AI and AC. This result is driven
by the fact that dishonest low cost agents behave as if they had not lied and provide
no different levels of efficiency than low cost agents under complete information. This
evidence suggests that asymmetric information may not even harm relational contracts




Relational Contracts and the Order of Moves
This chapter shows experimentally that the order of moves within a stage game can be
utilized to enhance the economic performance of relational contracts. Repeated principal-
agent relationships characterized by stage games in which the agent moves first and the
principal thereafter generate higher levels of efficiency compared to relationships in which
the principal acts as the first- and the agent as the second-mover in every stage game.
Behaviour observed in treatments in which the order of moves alternates after every round,
such that the first-mover in the current round becomes the second-mover in the subsequent
round, further corroborate that efficiency can be enhanced if the agent rather than the
principal moves first within a stage game. The evidence can be organized by a notion of
narrow bracketing: despite the ongoing nature of a relationship, second-movers claim more
than an equal share of the surplus in a stage game and, as a consequence, principals moving
first have to incur much larger costs to induce a given level of efficiency than agents who
act in the position of the first-mover.
Chapter 3 Relational Contracts and the Order of Moves
3.1 Introduction
Many ongoing economic relationships are governed by implicit and informal agreements
(see e.g. MacLeod (2007) and Malcomson (2012b) for surveys). Such relational “contracts”
are built and maintained by discretionary rewards and punishments executed over the
series of transactions which characterizes the repeated relationship. A single transaction
often takes place sequentially, particularly in the context of a principal-agent relationship
where a stage game within the repeated interaction can consist of the principal paying a
wage upfront and the agent exerting effort thereafter. Alternatively, the order of moves
can be reversed such that the agent first provides effort and the principal pays a wage
thereafter in order to conduct a transaction. This chapter explores how the order of moves
in a stage game can be utilized to enhance the provision of efficiency through relational
contracts.
The literature views relational contracts, which facilitate cooperation to transact effi-
ciently, primarily as incentivized by the shadow of the future: principal and agent abide
by the relational contract if they believe that deviation from the agreement to one’s own
short-term benefit will be punished in the course of future interaction and therefore not pay
out in the long run. If behaviour in relational contracting environments is only driven by
the shadow of the future, then the provision of efficiency should not vary with the order of
moves within a stage game because, if the relationship is ongoing, then the possibilities to
punish deviations from the agreement do not depend on whether a party acts as the first-
or second-mover within a stage game. However, this hypothesis does not take into account
that individuals may have a narrow rather than broad perspective on their decisions (see
e.g. Read et al. (1999) for a survey). In an ongoing relationship, the parties may “narrowly
bracket” each stage game to the extent that they, at least partly, consider each transaction
in isolation from the subsequent interaction. The outcome of a given stage game may
therefore be particularly salient and second-movers may shape it to their advantage by
claiming more than an equal share of the surplus within a transaction. Consequently, a
principal moving first may be required to invest much larger amounts into a transaction
with a given efficiency level than an agent moving first: the wages necessary to contribute
to a given surplus may substantially exceed the corresponding costs of effort. A principal
who acts as the first-mover may therefore be less willing to induce a transaction with a
given efficiency level than an agent in the position of the first-mover.
To investigate these predictions, we study repeated principal-agent relationships in an
experiment which builds on the design of Brown et al. (2004, 2012). A relationship is
characterized by a sequence of 15 rounds each in which the the principal and her agent
conduct a transaction. In every round, an agent exerts costly effort and a principal provides
a wage payment. A principal’s payoff per transaction increases in effort and an agent’s
profit per round grows in wage. Each transaction takes place sequentially where the order
of moves constitutes the main treatment variable. Under the order “P”, the principal
provides a wage first and the agent exerts effort thereafter. By contrast, the order “A”
46
3.1 Introduction
dictates the agent to choose his effort first and the principal to pay a wage in the position
of the second-mover.
The main result of this chapter shows that the order of moves can be exploited to enhance
the economic performance of relational contracts. Relationships in which every transaction
is conducted in the order A, where the agent moves first, generate more efficiency than
relationships in which the parties transact in the order P, where the principal moves first.
The observed behaviour is consistent with the prediction of narrow bracketing as second-
movers earn higher profits per transaction than first-movers. This finding is also reflected
in the relationship between wages and efforts. In particular, wages for a given effort level
are substantially higher if transactions are conducted under the order P than under the
order A. As the wages paid by the principals moving first strongly exceed the costs of the
corresponding efforts, they have to invest much more than agents in the position of the
first-mover to conduct a transaction with a given surplus. If first-movers hesitate to invest
large amounts, then this difference may explain why the order P generates lower levels of
efficiency than the order A.
To explore the robustness of these patterns, we additionally conducted treatments in
which the order of moves alternates between the order P and the order A after every
transaction. For instance, if the order A applies to one round, then the subsequent round
takes place in the order P, the round after in order A, and so on. In the context of
these treatments, the effect of the order of moves on efficiency is strikingly confirmed:
transactions conducted under the order A generate higher efficiency than stage games under
the order P. Moreover, second-movers in the treatments in which the order alternates reap
larger profits from a transaction than first-movers, again consistent with the prediction of
narrow bracketing. Hence, the evidence suggests that the order of moves need not persist
over the relationship for narrow bracketing and the consequences of the order of moves on
efficiency to emerge.
This chapter is related to the experimental literature on relational contracting, partic-
ularly to Brown et al. (2004, 2012).1 In the context of these authors’ experiments, the
matching of principals and agents as well the duration of their relationships is determined
within a market. The authors show that long-term bilateral relationships governed by
relational contracts emerge endogenously in markets where explicit contracts, enforced by
third parties, are infeasible.2 The present study builds on this finding and adapts the
design proposed by Brown et al. (2004, 2012) to the extent that principals and agents do
not participate in a market but instead are randomly assigned into bilateral relationships
which last for a fixed number of rounds.
Individuals taking a narrow versus a broad perspective on their decisions have been
addressed in the literature on decision-making under risk, in particular, and closest to the
1Further experimental research on relational contracting is reported in e.g. Wu and Roe (2007), Fehr
et al. (2009) and Camerer and Linardi (2010).
2Brown et al. (2012) show that multi-period relationships emerge irrespective of whether the number of
principals exceeds or falls below the number of agents in the market. However, more long-term relationships
were observed under excess supply of compared to excess demand for agents’ labour.
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present chapter, with regards to myopic loss aversion (e.g. Samuelson (1963), Benartzi and
Thaler (1995), Gneezy and Potters (1997), Thaler et al. (1997), Langer and Weber (2001,
2005), Gneezy et al. (2003), Haigh and List (2005), Sutter (2007), Haisley et al. (2008)).3
These authors show theoretically and experimentally that subjects’ decision-making under
risk can depend on the timeframe over which they evaluate outcomes. This insight is
related to the hypothesis suggested in the present study that individuals narrowly bracket
each transaction rather than focus on the outcome of the relationship as a whole. Despite
this similarity, the present study differs from this previous literature because bracketing
within the present environment relates to the grouping of decisions in the context of a
repeated strategic interaction rather than the bracketing of decisions over lotteries.
At a more general level, this chapter can also be linked to the experimental literature
which studies cooperation in repeated two-player games.4 In particular, Bó (2005) provides
strong evidence supporting the view that the shadow of the future affects the provision
of efficiency. However, this literature has primarily focussed on behaviour in the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma.5 By contrast, the present research concerns relationships with sequen-
tial move stage games and players who contribute asymmetrically to efficiency, analogous
to many real world relationships. By investigating this setup rather than the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma and by exogenously varying the sequence of moves, the present study
can reveal to what extent the order of moves constitutes a determinant of efficiency.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experi-
mental design in detail. The behavioural predictions are addressed in Section 3.3 and the
experimental results are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Treatments
The present experimental design builds on the setup of Brown et al. (2004), as noted in
the introduction. It centres on the bilateral relationship between a principal and her agent,
which consists of 15 rounds of interaction. Within each round, a transaction is realized
sequentially. The order of moves within a round constitutes this study’s main treatment
variable. The order of moves P prescribes that a principal first pays a wage and indicates
a desired effort level, where the principal’s wage payment is binding. The agent observes
his principal’s choice and then selects an effort, where the desired effort indicated by the
3The studies on narrow bracketing and narrow decision framing in the context of decision making under
risk including e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Barberis et al. (2006),
Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) are more broadly related. See Read et al. (1999) for a survey.
4See e.g. Roth and Murnighan (1978), Murnighan and Roth (1983), Feinberg and Husted (1993), Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1994), Aoyagi and Fréchette (2009), Duffy and Ochs (2009), Bó and Fréchette (2011),
Blonski et al. (2011), Fudenberg et al. (2012).
5Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004, 2006a,b) constitute a notable exception. These authors study repeated
trust games and focus on the difference between behaviour in finitely and indefinitely repeated games, on
the inference of strategies from observed behaviour and on the consequences of the length of the current
interaction on trust and trustworthiness in subsequent relationships.
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principal is non-binding for the agent’s choice. By contrast, in order of moves A, the agent
first exerts effort and proposes a desired wage payment. After the principal learns her
agent’s choice, she selects a wage payment. The agent’s desired wage is not binding for
the principal in the order A. Taken together, the agent acts as the first- and the principal
as the second-mover under the order A, whereas the principal moves first and the agent
thereafter under the order P.
The persistence of the order of moves over the course of a relationship constitutes an
additional treatment variable within the present design. In the fixed order conditions F,
the sequence of moves is the same at each of the 15 rounds of a relationship. In the
alternating order conditions X, by contrast, the sequence of moves alternates after every
round between the order P and the order A. Taken together, the experiment features a two
by two design consisting of the treatments PF, AF, PX and AX, as illustrated in Table 3.1.
In particular, every transaction in treatment PF takes place in the order P. By contrast, the
order A applies to each round under condition AF. In the treatment PX, order P applies
to the first transaction, the order A to the second, the order P to the third, the order A to
the fourth round and so on. A relationship conducted under condition AX begins in the
order A and continues in the order P in the second round, the order A in the third round,
the order P in the fourth round and so on.
Table 3.1: Treatments and the Order of Moves
Treatment Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 ...
PF P P P P ...
AF A A A A ...
PX P A P A ...
AX A P A P ...
3.2.2 Parameters
Within every round, a principal chooses a wage w from [0, 100] and an agent selects an
effort e from {1, . . . , 10}. The desired wage and desired effort are selected from the same
sets as wages and efforts, respectively. For given choices of w and e, the payoff for the
principal ΠP (w, e) and the payoff for the agent ΠA(w, e) within a round is computed as
follows:
ΠP (w, e) = 10 · e− w and ΠA(w, e) = w − c(e),
where c(e) denotes the cost of effort e as summarized in Table 3.2 below. The costs are
strictly increasing and the marginal costs are weakly increasing in effort. However, since
the marginal costs at every feasible effort level are lower than the marginal benefit, the
highest possible effort level induces efficiency.
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Table 3.2: Cost of Effort
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42
3.2.3 Procedures
At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects are randomly assigned to either the role
of a principal or the role of an agent and the assignment remains fixed throughout the
experiment. Principals and agents are randomly matched and the matching persists for
the fifteen rounds of a relationship. The interaction between a principal and an agent is
framed as a buyer-seller relationship.6 At the end of each round, every subject receives
a summary of his action(s), the behaviour of the subject he is matched with and his
own payoff in the current round. This summary of results contains the same elements
across all treatment conditions. During the experiment, payoffs are noted in terms of the
experimental currency “Punkte” (points). The subjects are provided with a show up fee of
100 points.
Every session of a given treatment is executed under the same protocol. Yet, the proce-
dures for fixed and alternating order treatments differ in the number of matches between
principals and agents. In every fixed order treatment, a subject exclusively interacts with
one other subject and every payoff earned during the match is converted into real money
by the end of the experiment (10 Punkte = 1 CHF). In the context of every alternating
order treatment, each subject participates in a total of four matches. After the fifteenth
round of a given match has ended, principals and agents are rematched using a perfect
stranger protocol.7 One of the four matches is randomly selected and every payoff earned
during this match is paid out by the end of the experiment (10 Punkte = 1 CHF). Un-
less noted otherwise, the data presented in the following section correspond to behaviour
elicited within each subject’s first match.8
The experiment was computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
software hroot (Bock et al., 2012) was employed for organizing and recruitment. The
subject pool primarily consists of students at the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology in Zurich. A total of 188 subjects participated in the experiment
which took place during October 2013, April and May 2014. The number of sessions per
6Sample instructions are provided in Appendix B, Section B.2.
7In particular, subjects in a given session are randomly assigned into matching groups, each consisting of
four principals and four agents. Over the course of the session, every principal interacts with every agent
in her matching group for one fifteen period relationship.
8An additional procedural difference between the alternating and fixed order treatments concerns the
presentation of the effort costs. In every alternating order condition, costs are presented as listed in Table
3.2. Under the fixed order protocol, every agent is randomly assigned to either a high or low cost structure
(see the sample instructions in Appendix B, Section B.2.1, for the exact specification). High costs are
equivalent to the costs listed in Table 3.2. Low costs are lower than high costs and featured lower marginal
costs for every given effort level. The present chapter is confined to data elicited under high costs. Hence,
every agent in the alternating and the fixed order conditions faces the same costs and the differences
between these conditions relate to the labelling of the costs and the possibility that an agent could be
assigned to a different cost structure within a fixed but not within an alternating order treatment.
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treatment and the number of subjects participating in a treatment are summarized in Table
3.3. A session lasted 105 minutes on average. Subjects’ average earnings in the context of
the experiment amount to 40.6CHF (43.4$).
Table 3.3: Number of Sessions and Subjects per Session






Principals and agents within our experimental environment cannot enter into binding agree-
ments. Hence, the parties face short term incentives to behave selfishly rather than co-
operatively, for instance by provision of minimal efforts and wages rather than efficient
effort and fair wage payments. As an extensive literature has argued, however, relational
contracts, informal agreements which emerge in the context of an ongoing relationship, can
provide incentives to cooperate, even in the absence of formal contracting opportunities
(see e.g. MacLeod (2007) and Malcomson (2012b) for surveys). In particular, relational
contracts can be enforced by the shadow of the future: the parties abide by the implicit
agreement because they expect the relationship to turn sour otherwise. For instance, a
principal and her agent may implicitly agree to cooperate if the short run benefits of shirk-
ing are outweighed by the costs of being punished in the future for not having honoured
the agreement.
If a relationship is ongoing, i.e. within the first fourteen rounds of a relationship in the
experimental environment, then the possibilities to punish a breach on a relational contract
do not depend on whether the infringing party moves first or second within a stage game.
For instance, a downward deviation from the implicitly agreed effort level in the current
round can be punished by a subsequent reduction in the wage payment - either in the
current round if the deviating agent moves first, or in the subsequent round if the shirking
agent acts as the second-mover in the current round. As a consequence, an agent moving
first should provide similar levels of effort than an agent moving second because selfish
behaviour can be punished in either case. Analogously, wage payments should not depend
on whether a principal moves first or second in an ongoing relationship. Taken together,
if the shadow of the future is the sole driver of behaviour, then the order of moves within
a stage game should not affect the provision of efficiency.
Hypothesis 3.1. Efficiency does not depend on the order of moves within a stage game.
Analogous to many real world repeated interactions, our experimental design frames
a relationship as consisting of a sequence of transactions. Despite the ongoing nature
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of the relationship, principals and agents may narrowly bracket each transaction: they
focus on the current stage game and, to some extent, neglect subsequent interaction in the
relationship. The subjects may especially concentrate on the outcome within a transaction,
to which the first-mover contributes by investing in advance whereas the second-mover’s
role lies in the distribution of payoffs. Such narrow bracketing of a stage game could have
consequences for the provision of efficiency.
If first-movers consider themselves as investing in advance into a transaction, then they
may give particular attention to the possibility that second-movers may not honour their
investments. Observe that principals have to contribute larger amounts than agents in
order to conduct a transaction with a particular surplus and sharing rule.9 For instance,
if the parties want to implement an efficient surplus and a sharing rule which splits the
surplus equally between the parties, then the agent has to incur the costs of efficient effort,
which equal 42 points, and the principal has to pay the fair wage for efficient effort, which
amounts to 71 points. This may imply that principals moving first under the order P may
be less willing to induce a transaction with a given efficiency level compared to agents
moving first under the order A. This line of argument suggests that efficiency provided
under the order P could be lower than under the order A.
Second-movers, by definition, decide on the distribution of payoffs within a given round.
If narrow bracketing implies a particular focus on the outcome in a given round, then
second-movers may influence the outcome to their own payoff advantage. This suggests
that second-movers earn higher profits from a transaction than first-movers. Such effect
could contribute to the consequences of the order of moves on efficiency as proposed above.
For instance, if agents who act as second-movers claim more than an equal share of the
surplus, then their principals are forced to pay more than fair wages as first-movers to
achieve a given surplus. Higher than fair wages can substantially exceed the costs of effort
necessary to implement a given level of efficiency. As a consequence, principals moving
first under the order P may be less willing to invest into a transaction with a given surplus
than agents moving first under the order A. Hence, second-movers who narrowly bracket
and distribute the payoffs within a round to their own advantage could have a hand in the
effect of the order of moves on efficiency.
Hypothesis 3.2. The order of moves affects the provision of efficiency: the order P leads
to less efficiency than the order A.
The following section presents the empirical results obtained from the experimental
design. As the above stated predictions hinge on the assumption that a relationship is
ongoing, the subsequent analysis will focus on behaviour elicited within the first fourteen
rounds, in which a relationship continues after every transaction. However, the empirical
9More formally, fix a surplus generated by effort level e and let α denote the agent’s and (1 − α) the
principal’s share of the surplus, where α ∈ (0, 1). To implement such a transaction, the agent has to invest
c(e) and the principal has to pay α10e+ (1− α)c(e). It is straightforward to see that the latter is strictly
lower than the former for any given e ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, for a fixed surplus and sharing
rule, the costs of investment for the principal always exceed the agent’s.
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effects reported below are documented in almost all rounds of the observed relationships.
Hence, alternative specifications of the investigated time horizon would lead to very similar
results.
3.4 Results
To explore the consequences of the sequence of moves on efficiency, behaviour in the condi-
tions PF and AF will be compared. These two treatments differ in the order of moves: in
PF, the principal moves first and the agent thereafter in each stage game whereas the agent
moves first and the principal thereafter at every transaction taking place in treatment AF.
Hypothesis 3.1 stated above predicts no difference in efficiency between these treatments.
By contrast, Hypothesis 3.2 suggests that effort provided in PF is lower than in AF.
Result 3.1. The order of moves affects efficiency: effort in treatment PF is lower than
effort in treatment AF.
The empirical data support Hypothesis 3.2. As Figure 3.1 shows, average effort provided
in treatment PF equals 5.37 and is significantly different from average effort provided in
treatment AF, which equals 7.08 (p-value 0.058, Wilcoxon rank-sum test10). The difference
in efforts between the two treatments already exists in the first rounds and continues over
the course of the relationships.11





















Note: Average efforts are computed over the first fourteen rounds of a
given relationship and over all relationships within a given treatment.
Hypothesis 3.2 has been motivated by the assertion of narrow bracketing. To explore
if our data is consistent with the hypothesized characteristics of bracketing behaviour, we
address subjects’ profits from each transaction. If the subjects narrowly bracket to the
10This test is performed on agents’ average efforts in the fixed order treatments PF and AF where the
average for each agent is computed over the first fourteen rounds of his relationship.
11See Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1.
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extent that they focus on the outcome of the current transaction and, at least partially,
disregard the subsequent interaction, then second-movers may exploit their role as deciding
on the distribution of payoffs. In particular, second-movers may claim higher profits for
themselves than allocate to their first-movers. Yet, second-movers earning higher profits
compared to their first-movers may be considered uncooperative and therefore be punished
in future rounds. In anticipation of this effect, second-movers may refrain from exploiting
their role to the own advantage. However, this hypothesis is not supported by our data.
Result 3.2. Second-movers earn higher profits per transaction than first-movers in the
fixed order treatments PF and AF, consistent with the hypothesis of narrow bracketing.
Considering treatment PF, average profits per round earned by the principals equal 13.6
points, which significantly differ from agents’ average profits per transaction, amounting
to 21.5 points (p-value 0.06, Wilcoxon signed-rank test12). In treatment AF, by contrast,
principals’ average profits per round, 25.9 points, are significantly different from agents’
average profits per transaction, 18.0 points (p-value 0.006, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Beginning with the first stage game, the difference between first- and second-mover profits
is persistent over the rounds.13
The relationship between the wages and efforts exerted within the relationships provides
further insight concerning the observed asymmetry in payoffs. A regression analysis indi-
cates that wages for a given effort level in treatment PF are on average 8.76 points per
transaction higher than in treatment AF.14 As Figure 3.2 illustrates, almost all outcomes
of relationships observed in treatment PF lie weakly above the line indicating the equal
split of the surplus. In other words, almost all principals pay higher than fair wages, if they
act in the position of the first-mover. On the contrary, almost all outcomes of relationships
in the context of treatment AF lie weakly below the equal split line. Thus, almost all
principals pay less than fair wages if they act as second-movers.
The evidence shows that principals in condition PF invest substantially higher amounts
as first-movers to induce a given efficiency level compared to agents moving first in condition
AF: the wages for a given effort level paid by the principals in PF strongly exceed the
corresponding effort costs which agents incur as first-movers in AF. This difference in first-
mover investments can be linked to the effect of the order of moves on efficiency: if first-
movers hesitate to invest large amounts into a transaction because their second-movers
cannot commit to honouring it, then the observed difference in first-mover investments
between principals and agents may explain why relationships in condition PF settle on
outcomes with lower efficiency than relationships in condition AF.
12In the following, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on profits are performed on subjects’ average profits, where
the average profit for each individual is taken over the first fourteen rounds of his relationship.
13See Figure B.2 in Appendix B.1.
14See Appendix B.1, Table B.1, Column (1).
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Notes: One data point marked with a dot (square) in the above plot
represents the vector of average wage and average effort generated by
a principal-agent pair in the treatment PF(AF), where the average is
computed over the first fourteen rounds of the relationship. “Equal Split”
indicates the wage which splits the surplus equally between the parties
for every given effort, where linear interpolation is applied.
To investigate the robustness of the above reported findings, behaviour observed in the
conditions PX and AX will be addressed below. The first round of a relationship in PX
takes place in the order P, whereas the first round in AX is conducted in the order A.
Thereafter, the order of moves alternates in the treatments PX and AX to the extent that
a stage game in the order P follows a transaction in the order A and vice versa. The
analysis of behaviour observed in the alternating order conditions therefore indicates to
what extent the persistence of the order of moves in the treatments PF and AF is necessary
for the consequences of the order of moves on efficiency to emerge. In case of the alternating
order treatments PX and AX, Hypothesis 3.2 predicts that transactions conducted under
the order P are characterized by lower efficiency than transactions taking place under the
order A. According to Hypothesis 3.1, no such difference should be observed.
Result 3.3. (i) The order of moves affects efficiency in the alternating order treatments
PX and AX: effort under the order P is lower than effort in the context of the order A.
(ii) Second-movers earn higher profits per transaction than first-movers in the alternating
order treatments, providing further support for the hypothesis of narrow bracketing.
Considering relationships in the alternating order treatments, average effort exerted in
stage games under the order P equals 6.27 and is significantly different from average effort
in transactions executed under the order A, 7.37 (p-value 0.000, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test15). Differences in efforts depending on the order of moves exist in almost all rounds of
15This test is performed on average efforts exerted by agents participating in the treatments PX and AX.
For each of these agents, one average is computed over all transactions conducted under the order P and
a second average is calculated over all stage games in the order A where, in both cases, the first fourteen
stage games are taken into consideration.
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the relationships.16 Thus, these findings confirm the consequences of the order of moves
on efficiency. Moreover, the evidence suggests that for such effects to arise, the order of
moves need not be the same in every transaction of a relationship. This illustrates the
robustness of the pattern observed in Result 3.1.




















Transaction in Order P Transaction in Order A
Note: Average effort in column “Transaction in Order P(A)” is com-
puted over all relationships in the alternating order conditions PX
and AX, where all transactions executed in the order P(A) within the
first fourteen rounds are taken into consideration.
We further investigate whether behaviour in the alternating order treatments shows signs
of narrow bracketing. In particular, we ask if asymmetries in profits between the first- and
second-mover go along with the observed effect on efficiency. Considering transactions in
the alternating order treatments conducted in the order P, principals earn 15.6 points on
average per round, which is significantly different from agents’ per transaction earnings,
26.3 points (p-value 0.00, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). With regards to stage games in the
order A, principals’ average earnings per transaction, 31.7 points, are significantly different
from agents’ per transaction profits, 14.5 points (p-value 0.00, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
The difference in profits between first- and second-movers persists over the course of the
relationships.17 This evidence confirms the pattern observed in Result 3.2.
The relationship between wages and efforts sheds further light on the asymmetry in
parties’ profits in the alternating order treatments. A regression analysis shows that, in
these conditions, wages for a given effort level are on average 16.25 points higher if a
transaction takes place in the order P compared to the order A.18 As Figure 3.4 illustrates,
almost all outcomes of transactions conducted under the order P are located above the line
which indicates the equal split of the surplus between the parties. In other words, almost
all principals pay higher than fair wages under the order P. This implies that principals
moving first in the order P invest substantially higher amounts to induce a transaction with
16See Figure B.3 in Appendix B.1.
17See Figure B.4 in Appendix B.1.
18See Appendix B.1, Table B.1, Column (2).
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a given efficiency level than agents moving first under the order A. The evidence therefore
provides further support for the intuition that narrow bracketing and the observed effect
of the order of moves on efficiency are related.
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Average Effort
Transaction in Order P
Transaction in Order A
Equal Split
Notes: One data point marked with a circle (square) represents
the vector of the average wage and average effort provided by one
principal-agent relationship observed in either treatment PX or treat-
ment AX, where the average is computed over all stage games con-
ducted in the order P(A) within the first fourteen rounds of the re-
lationship. “Equal Split” indicates the wage which splits the surplus
equally between the parties for every given effort where linear inter-
polation is applied.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter illustrates how the order of moves within a stage game can be used to enhance
the provision of efficiency in repeated principal-agent relationships governed by relational
contracts. The previous literature primarily views relational contracts as incentivized by
the shadow of the future: the parties stick to an implicit agreement to cooperate if they
believe that deviating to one’s own short term benefit will be punished in the course of
the future interaction. The intuition that repeated interaction can provide incentives for
cooperation is consistent with our data as average efficiency across all treatments is higher
than minimal efficiency. However, the rationale that the shadow of the future incentivizes
efficient behaviour does not predict the order of moves within a stage game to matter
for the provision of efficiency. This view therefore cannot explain the robust finding in
our experiment that transactions in which the agent moves first generate higher levels of
efficiency than stage games in which the principal acts as the first-mover. We hypothesize
that a notion of narrow bracketing can organize the observed pattern. In particular, the
data show that second-movers affect the outcome of the current stage game to their own
advantage. This suggests that they narrowly focus on the current round rather than on
the relationship as a whole. As a consequence, principals moving first have to invest higher
amounts than agents moving first in order to conduct a transaction with a given level of
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efficiency. This may explain why stage games in which the principal rather than the agent
moves first lead to less efficiency.
Several distinct mechanisms could have caused the bracketing behaviour. As Read et al.
(1999) note, individuals may narrowly bracket because of cognitive capacity limitations.
Within the present environment, second-movers may not fully comprehend the negative
consequences of claiming more than an equal share of the surplus for the provision of
efficiency and for their potential profits from the overall relationship. Moreover, individuals
may narrowly bracket each transaction to achieve a certain goal, which Read et al. (1999)
refer to as motivated bracketing. In the context of our experiment, individuals may want to
earn higher profits than their relational partner. Such kind of preference is consistent with
the observation that second-movers secure higher profits for themselves than allocate to
their first-movers. Investigating the relative impact of these mechanisms on the observed
behaviour constitutes only one out of the many interesting roads for future research which
the reported effects have unveiled.
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A.1 Regressions and Figures
Table A.1: Wage-Effort Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 7.84∗∗∗ 6.89∗∗ 5.93∗∗∗ −4.22 −7.09∗∗∗
(1.34) (3.11) (0.98) (3.00) (2.69)
Effort 6.57∗∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗ 6.03∗∗∗ 7.51∗∗∗ 6.69∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.44) (0.17) (0.95) (0.35)
Effort · 1[H] - 1.89∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ −0.37 1.75∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.17) (0.86) (0.28)
N 92 28 64 32 32
Adj. R2 0.88 0.89 0.94 0.82 0.91
Sample PC and PI PC PI AI AC
Notes: The dependent variable in all of the above regressions is wage. The
analysis is performed on average wages and average efforts (recoded s.t. e ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 9}, where the averages are taken over time for every pair of principal
and agent. 1[H] represents a dummy which equals one if costs are reported
to be high in the incomplete information conditions (PI and AI) or costs are
truly high in the context of the complete information conditions (PC and AC)
and zero otherwise. All reported standard errors are robust. ***(**) denotes
significance at the 1(5) percent level.
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Effort
Honesty, Low Costs (PI)
Low Costs (PC)
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Effort
Equal Split, High Costs
Equal Split, Low Costs
High Cost Signal (PI)
High Cost Signal (AI)
Note: One data point in the above plot represents the vector of average
wage and average effort chosen in one relationship between a principal and
an agent, where the averages are taken over all periods. “Equal Split, High
Costs” (“Equal Split, Low Costs”) indicates the wage which splits the surplus
equally between the parties for every given effort under the assumption of
high (low) costs, where linear interpolation is applied.
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A.2 Formal Definitions and Proofs
A.2.1 Complete Information
We first formulate the definitions of the strategy profiles in the complete information game
more precisely, taking into account that the stage games are extensive-form games, so that
principals and agents act after different histories.
Let hP−1 = ∅ and hPt = ((w0, e0) , ..., (wt, et)) for t ≥ 0. A strategy σP of the principal
(i = P ) maps every history hPt−1 for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} into an action wt. Next, let hA0 = w0
and hAt = ((w0, e0) , ..., (wt−1, et−1) , wt) for t ≥ 1. A strategy σθ of the agent of type θ
maps every history hAt for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} into an action et.
Definition A.1. (i) A trigger strategy profile (TP) of the RPA game with complete infor-
mation and type θ ∈ {L,H} is given by a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) and pure strategies σi















e∗ if hAt = w∗ or hAt = ((w∗, e∗) , ..., (w∗, e∗) , w∗) ,
1 otherwise.
(ii) A forgiving cut-off strategy profile (FCP) of the RPA game with complete information
and type θ ∈ {L,H} is given by a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) and pure strategies σi for
















wt′ < w∗ for all t′ ∈ {0, . . . , t},∃t′ where 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t s.t., for all τ ∈ {t′, . . . , t}, wτ < w∗ and et′−1 ≥ e∗,
e∗ otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We confine ourselves to the case of trigger-strategy profiles.1
Fix a TP sustaining (w∗, e∗). We start by considering one-shot deviations of the principal.
First, consider any history without deviation of either party. Then the resulting subgame
involves only wages w∗ and efforts e∗. The normalized discounted sum of equilibrium
payoffs of the principal is then S (e∗)+S(1)−w∗. The most profitable downward deviation is
to choose w = 0, yielding S(1). The deviation is thus not profitable if and only if Condition
(2.1) of Proposition 2.1 holds. Second, consider any history where a player has deviated.
Then, in the corresponding subgame equilibrium outcome, the principal pays a zero wage
forever and has an expected average payoff of S (1). Any deviation to a positive wage is
1For the proof concerning the case of FCP, see Appendix A.3.1.
71
A Appendix to Chapter 2
costly, without having a positive effect on the effort of the agent. Thus, deviation is not
profitable.
Next, consider one-shot deviations of the agent. First, consider any history without de-
viation of either party. The normalized discounted sum of equilibrium payoffs of the agent
is then w∗−C (e∗,θ). The most profitable downward deviation is to choose minimal efforts,
yielding normalized discounted payoffs (1− δ)w∗. The deviation is thus not profitable if
and only if Condition (2.2) of Proposition 2.1 holds. Second, consider any history where
some player has previously deviated. The agent’s normalized discounted payoffs from fol-
lowing the equilibrium strategy is thus zero. Deviation to any effort above zero would only
reduce the instantaneous payoffs without generating higher continuation payoffs. Thus,
deviation is not profitable.
A.2.2 Incomplete Information
Pooling Equilibria
The pooling strategy profiles described in Section 2.5.2 are straightforward adaptations
of the corresponding strategy profiles under complete information. We confine ourselves
to a detailed treatment of pooling trigger strategy equilibria; the analysis for the pooling
forgiving cut-off equilibria is similar.2 The adaptation of the forgiving cut-off strategy is
analogous.





pooling trigger strategy profile (PTP) of the RPA game with incomplete information is









w∗ if hPt−1 = ∅ or hPt−1 = ((w∗, e∗) , ..., (w∗, e∗))
0 otherwise,






e∗ if hAt = w∗ or hAt = ((w∗, e∗) , ..., (w∗, e∗) , w∗)
1 otherwise.
Definition A.3. A pooling trigger strategy equilibrium (PTE) is a PTP that forms a weak




) ≡ µ for all t ∈ {0, 1, ...} and all hPt−1.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. We restrict attention to the PTE.3 In a PTE, both types
of players have the same strategy, corresponding to a TE sustaining (w∗, e∗). The non-
deviation conditions of each type of agent are thus the same as for the corresponding
agent under complete information (in the TE); thus they are given by (2.2). The more
restrictive non-deviation condition is the one of the high type. Thus, the non-deviation
condition of both types of agents in the PTE holds if and only if (2.4) does. The non-
deviation conditions for the principal are the same as for the TE, as they also expect an
2We provide the details in the Appendix A.3.2.
3For the proof of the pooling forgiving cut-off equilibrium, see Appendix A.3.2.
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effort of e∗ if and only if they choose w∗. Finally, as the strategies are not informative
about agents’ types, it is consistent with Bayes’ law to stick to prior beliefs.
Separating Equilibria
We first define our notion of separating equilibrium more precisely. Very complicated
separating equilibria are conceivable in principle, but we confine ourselves to the simple
separating trigger-strategy equilibrium mentioned in the text.
Definition A.4. A separating trigger-strategy equilibrium (STE) in the RPA game with
incomplete information is a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the following prop-
erties:
(i) Initial wages are w∗ ≥ 0.
(ii) There exist eH < eL and wH < wL and strategies of the principal, σP , and agents, σθ,





eθ if hAt = w∗ or hAt = ((w∗, eθ), (wθ, eθ), ..., (wθ, eθ), wθ),








w∗ if hPt−1 = ∅,
wθ if hPt−1 = (w∗, eθ) or ((w∗, eθ), (wθ, eθ), ..., (wθ, eθ)),
0 otherwise,
(iii) Beliefs of the principal correspond to prior beliefs µ in period one. In periods two
and following, the principal who has observed an agent playing eθ in all previous periods
believes he is of type θ with probability one. In all other cases, the principal’s beliefs are
arbitrary.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. For the proof, we have to show that the following holds. First,
the principal is sequentially rational : If she faces an agent whose strategy is described by
(ii)(a) in Definition A.4 the strategy described by (i) and (ii)(b) maximizes her expected
payoff. Second, the agent is sequentially rational : If he faces a principal whose strategy is
described by (i) and (ii)(b) in Definition A.4, the strategy described by (ii)(a) maximizes
his expected payoff. Third, the principal’s beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ Law wherever
applicable. We address the two sequential rationality requirements in two lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Given the strategy of the principal, the agent’s behavior is sequentially ra-




)− c (eH , H) ≥ δ (wL − wH) (ICH)
δ
(
wL − wH) ≥ c (eL, L)− c (eH , L) (ICL)
δwH ≥ c (eH , H) (PCH)
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Proof of Lemma A.1. (i) As long as neither player has previously deviated from the
equilibrium, there are two possible types of deviations of the agent. First, there are devia-
tions that trigger minimal wages forever, namely all deviations in periods 2 and following
and all first-period deviations in period 1 to e /∈ {eL, eH}. Second, the agent of type θ can
deviate in period 1 by choosing eθ˜ with θ˜ 6= θ.
To avoid the first type of deviation, we require participation constraints: Agents must
be better off by playing the proposed equilibrium for their own type rather than triggering
minimal wages forever and therefore minimal continuation profits. The optimal deviation
is to choose minimal efforts. If such deviation takes place in periods 2,3,..., this yields
a normalized discounted sum of payoffs of (1− δ)wθ, whereas equilibrium play yields
wθ−C (eθ, θ). Thus, sequential rationality of type H agents requires that PCH holds and,





the latter inequality holds if (ICL) does. Similar arguments show that, in period 1, it is
not profitable to deviate to any e /∈ {eL, eH}, as this would also trigger minimal wages
forever.
To avoid the second type of deviation, we require incentive constraints: Agents must be
better off by choosing the proposed equilibrium action for their own type in period 1 rather
than the action for the other type. For type L, the normalized discounted sum of payoffs
after such a one-shot deviation is (1− δ)(w∗ − c(eH , L)) + δ(wH − c(eH , L)), whereas it is
(1−δ)(w∗−c(eL, L))+δ(wL−c(eL, L)) in equilibrium. These deviations are not profitable
if and only if (ICL) holds.
Next consider an agent of type H: If this player deviates to eL in period 0, he will choose
minimal effort ever after, triggering zero wages. Thus, such a deviation is not profitable if
and only if
(1− δ) (w∗ − c (eH , H))+ δ (wH − c (eH , H)) ≥ (1− δ) (w∗ − c (eL, H))+ δ (1− δ)wL
or equivalently
(1− δ) c (eL, H)− c (eH , H) ≥ δ (1− δ)wL − δwH .
This condition follows from (ICH) and (PCH) after simple manipulations.
(ii) Next, suppose the agent of type L has deviated to eH in period 1 (and then followed
the equilibrium prescription of continuing to play eH), but no other deviation has occured.
The normalized discounted sum of payoffs of the agent in such a subgame is wH−c(eH , L).
Any other choice of effort triggers zero wages and thus a normalized discounted sum of
payoffs (1− δ)wH . Thus, the non-deviation condition for type L is δwH ≥ c(eH , L). But
(PCH) implies δwH ≥ c(eH , H). Hence, such deviations are not profitable for the agent of
type L.
(iii) Finally, consider any history in which some other deviation has taken place. Then,
the continuation payoff of the agent is zero, independent of his effort choices. Thus, the
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equilibrium prescription of supplying zero effort is a (weakly) best response.
Lemma A.2. Given the strategy of the agent, the principal’s proposed strategy is sequen-
tially rational if and only if
S(eH)− wH ≥ 0





+ (1− p)S (eH)− (1− δ)w∗ − δ [pwL + (1− p) (wH)] ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma A.2. After any history in which at least one player has deviated, the
principal obtains minimal profits no matter whether she pursues the equilibrium strategy
or deviates. Thus, we only need to consider histories for which no player has deviated. The
left-hand sides in the three inequalities in the lemma are the average expected equilibrium
profits in any such history. Deviation leads to minimal average expected profits. Hence
deviation is not profitable if the three inequalities in the lemma hold.
The least costly way for the principal to guarantee that choosing eθ is sequentially
rational for the agent of type θ ∈ {H,L} is to set w∗ = 0 and to choose wL and wH so
that δwL = c
(
eL, L
) − c (eH , L) + c (eH , H) and δwH = c (eH , H), so that (ICL) and
(PCH) hold with equality. These equalities also imply (PCL). With these wage choices,
the sequential rationality conditions from Lemma 2 become
δS(eH) ≥ c (eH , H) (A.1)





+ (1− p)S (eH) ≥ p (c (eL, L)− c (eH , L)+ c (eH , H))+ (1− p) c (eH , H)
(A.3)
(A.1) and (A.2) are identical with (2.5) and (2.6). Moreover, they imply (A.3).
This completes the proof of sequential rationality. Consistency with Bayes’ rule is im-
mediate: In period 0, the principal correctly applies her prior beliefs. In any history where
the agent has always played eθ, the posterior probability of type θ in the proposed equi-
librium is 1. In any other history, Bayes’ Law cannot be used to calculate posteriors, as
such histories do not arise in equilibrium.
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A.3 Technical Appendix
In section A.3.1, we provide the proof of Proposition 2.1 for the case of FCE in the RPA
game. In section A.3.2, we turn to the case of incomplete information and provide a proof
of Proposition 2.2 for the case of PFCE. In Section, A.3.3, we address the infinitely repeated
agent-principal (RAP) game. This game is identical to the RPA game, except that the
agent moves before the principal in each stage game. The behavioural predictions obtained
for this game therefore relate to behaviour observed in our treatments AC and AI.
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 in Case of FCE
For convenience, we restate Proposition 2.1 for the case of FCE.
Proposition 2.1 (FCE). Consider the RPA game with complete information and cost
type θ ∈ {L,H}. Then, a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as an FCE for δ and
θ if and only if
S (e∗) ≥ w∗, (A.4)




Proof of Proposition 2.1 (FCE). Fix an FCP sustaining (w∗, e∗). We start by consid-
ering one-shot deviations of the principal. First, consider any history where there has been
no previous deviation of either party, or this deviation occured sufficiently long ago that the
outcome path of the corresponding subgame equilibrium involves only wages w∗ and efforts
e∗.4 The normalized discounted sum of payoffs for the principal is then S (e∗) +S(1)−w∗.
The most profitable downward deviation is to choose w = 0, yielding a normalized dis-
counted sum of payoffs of (1− δ)S(1) + δ (S (e∗) + S(1)− w∗) = S(1) + δ (S (e∗)− w∗)
The deviation is thus not profitable if and only if (1− δ) (S (e∗)− w∗) ≥ 0, which is equiv-
alent with Condition (A.4). Second, consider any history where the agent has triggered
a deviation from which he has not returned. Then, in the corresponding subgame equi-
librium outcome, the principal pays a zero wage at the corresponding node, whereas the
agent chooses e∗ thereafter. In later periods, the players choose e∗ and w∗, respectively.
The normalized discounted sum of subgame equilibrium payoffs for the principal is thus
(1− δ) (S (e∗) + S(1)) + δ (S (e∗) + S(1)− w∗) = S (e∗) + S(1) − δw∗. Deviation to any
wage above zero would only reduce the instantaneous payoffs without generating higher
continuation payoffs; thus such a deviation is not profitable.
Next, consider one-shot deviations of the agent. First, consider any history where
there has been no previous deviation of either party, or this deviation occured sufficiently
long ago that the outcome path at the corresponding subgame involves only wages w∗
4In particular, this case comprises any history where the principal has triggered a deviation from which she
has not returned: Then, the agent has already responded by choosing minimal effort before the principal
moves again and the future equilibrium behavior of the principal (agent) is to choose w∗ (e∗).
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and efforts e∗.5 The normalized discounted sum of subgame equilibrium payoffs of the
agent is then w∗ − C (e∗,θ). The most profitable downward deviation is to choose min-
imal efforts, so that the normalized discounted sum of subgame equilibrium payoffs is
(1− δ)w∗ + δ ((1− δ) (−C (e∗,θ)) + δ (w∗ − C (e∗,θ))) = (1− δ + δ2)w∗ − δC (e∗,θ). The
deviation is thus not profitable if δ (1− δ)w∗ ≥ (1− δ)C (e∗,θ), which is equivalent with
Condition (A.5). Second, consider any history where the principal has previously trig-
gered a deviation from which she has not returned. Then, in the corresponding subgame
equilibrium outcome, the agent exerts minimal effort at the corresponding node. In later
periods, the players choose e∗ and w∗, respectively. The agent’s normalized discounted
sum of subgame equilibrium payoffs is thus (1− δ)w∗+δ (w∗ − C (e∗,θ)) = w∗−δC (e∗,θ).
Deviation to any effort above zero would only reduce the instantaneous payoffs without
generating higher continuation payoffs; thus the deviation is not profitable.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2 in Case of PFCE
For convenience, we restate Proposition 2.2 for the case of PFCE.
Proposition 2.2 (PFCE). Consider the RPA game with incomplete information. Then,
the wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as a PFCE given δ if and only if





Proof of Proposition 2.2 (PFCE). In a PFCE, both types of players have the same
strategy, corresponding to an FCE sustaining (w∗, e∗). The non-deviation conditions of
each type of agent are thus the same as for the corresponding agent under complete infor-
mation (in the FCE). The more restrictive non-deviation condition is the one of the high
type. Thus, the non-deviation condition of both types of agents in the PFCE holds if and
only if (A.7) does. The non-deviation condition for the principal is the same as for the
FCE, as they also expect an effort of e∗ if and only if they choose w∗. Thus, this condition
is given by (A.6).
A.3.3 The RAP Game
We now sketch the analysis for the RAP game. To define trigger strategy profiles and for-
giving cut-off strategies in the case of complete information and pooling under incomplete
information, only mild and obvious adjustments are necessary. Once these adjustments
are in place, the following result is straightforward to prove.
Proposition A.1. (i) Consider the RAP game with complete information with cost type
θ ∈ {L,H}. Then, a wage-effort vector (w∗, e∗) is sustainable as a TE given δ and θ if
5In particular, this case comprises any history where the agent has triggered a deviation from which she
has not returned (see the argument in the previous footnote).
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and only if
δS(e∗) ≥ w∗ (A.8)
w∗ ≥ c (e∗, θ) . (A.9)
(ii) Consider the RAP game with incomplete information. Then, a wage-effort vector
(w∗, e∗) is sustainable as a PTE given δ if and only if
δS(e∗) ≥ w∗ (A.10)
w∗ ≥ c (e∗, H) . (A.11)
Proof of Proposition A.1. We prove only part (i), as the arguments for the pooling
equilibrium mirror those for the RPA game. We start by considering one-shot deviations of
the principal. First, consider any history without previous deviation of either party. Thus
the outcome path in the corresponding subgame involves only wages w∗ and efforts e∗.
The normalized discounted equilibrium payoff sum of the principal is then S (e∗) +S(1)−
w∗. The most profitable downward deviation is to choose w = 0, yielding a normalized
discounted payoff sum of S (1) + (1− δ)S (e∗). The deviation is thus not profitable if and
only if (A.8) holds. Second, consider any history with at least one deviation. Then, in
the corresponding subgame equilibrium outcome, the principal pays a zero wage forever
and obtains a normalized discounted payoff sum of S(1). Deviation to any wage above
zero would only reduce the instantaneous payoffs without generating higher continuation
payoffs; thus such a deviation is not profitable.
Next, consider one-shot deviations of the agent. First, consider any history such that
neither party has deviated so that the corresponding subgame involves only wages w∗ and
efforts e∗. The normalized discounted payoff sum of the agent is then w∗ − C (e∗,θ). The
most profitable downward deviation is to choose minimal efforts, yielding a normalized
discounted payoff sum of 0. The deviation is thus not profitable if Condition (A.9) holds.
Second, consider any history with at least one deviation. Then, in the corresponding
subgame equilibrium outcome, the agent exerts minimal effort forever and obtains a nor-
malized discounted payoff sum of zero. Deviation to any non-minimal effort would only
reduce the instantaneous payoffs without generating higher continuation payoffs. Thus,
there is no profitable deviation of the agent.
Thus, in the case of complete information and incomplete information with pooling, the
set of sustainable wage-effort vectors for the RAP game lies to the right of the corresponding
set for the standard-order case in Figure 2.6. For any given wage, higher efforts are
sustainable. The plot of the wage-effort relationship presented in Figure A.3 is consistent
with this prediction. However, simple rearrangements of the equilibrium conditions in
Proposition A.1 (i) show that the set of sustainable efforts remains unchanged by the
order of the game.
It is equally straightforward to adapt the definition of separating trigger strategy profiles
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to the RAP game. The obvious difference is that agents move first, so that they can separate
in the first period. Thus, a separating trigger strategy profile induces constant outcome
paths, with efforts eH < eL and wages wH < wL such that (i) the type θ agents plays eθ
as long as no deviation from wθ and eθ has occured and (ii) the principal plays wθ as long
as no deviation from wθ and eθ has occured. With this definition, we obtain the following
result.
Proposition A.2. Consider the RAP game with incomplete information. Then, an STE
sustaining eH and eL, exists for suitable wages wH and wL if and only if
δS(eH) ≥ c (eH , H) , (A.12)
δS(eL) ≥ c (eL, L)− c (eH , L)+ c (eH , H) . (A.13)
Proof of Proposition A.2. A separating trigger strategy profile in the RAP game induces
constant outcome paths, with efforts eH < eL and wages wH < wL such that (i) the type θ
agent chooses eθ as long as no deviation from wθ, eθ has occured; type L chooses eH after
any history where he has always chosen eH and the principal has chosen w∗ (in period 1)
and wH (in periods 2, 3, . . . ). Both types of agents choose minimal effort otherwise; (ii)
the principal plays wθ as long as no deviation from wθ, eθ has occured and she choose a zero
wage otherwise. We thus have to show that the following three conditions hold. First, we
require sequential rationality of the principal. Second, we require sequential rationality of
the agent. Third, the principal’s belief are consistent with Bayes’ rule wherever applicable.
As the latter is obvious (see the corresponding proof for the RPA game), we only have to
address the two sequential rationality requirements in the following lemmas.
Lemma A.3. Consider the RAP game with incomplete information. Given the strategy
of the principal in an STE, the proposed strategy of the agent is sequentially rational if
c (eL, H)− c (eH , H) ≥ wL − wH (ICAH)
wL − wH ≥ c (eL, L)− c (eH , L) (ICAL)
wH ≥ c (eH , H) (PCAH)
Proof of Lemma A.3. (i) As long as neither player has previously deviated from the
equilibrium, there are two possible types of deviations of the agent. First, there are devia-
tions that trigger minimal wages forever, namely all deviations in periods 2 and following
and all first-period deviations in period 1 to e /∈ {eL, eH}. Second, the agent of type θ can
deviate in period 1 by choosing eθ˜ with θ˜ 6= θ.
To avoid the first type of deviation, we require participation constraints: Agents must be
better off by playing the proposed equilibrium for their own type rather than by triggering
minimal wages forever and therefore minimal continuation profits. The optimal deviation is
to choose minimal efforts, which yields a normalized discounted sum of payoffs of 0, whereas
equilibrium play yields wθ−c (eθ, θ). Thus, sequential rationality of type-H agents requires
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that PCAH holds. Similar arguments show that, in period 1, it is not profitable for type H
to deviate to any e /∈ {eL, eH}, as this would also trigger minimal wages forever. For type-
L agents, sequential rationality requires that wL ≥ c (eL, L), which is implied by (ICAL)
and (PCH).
To avoid the second type of deviation, we require incentive constraints: Agents must
be better off by choosing the proposed equilibrium action for their own type in period 1
rather than the action for the other type. For type L, the normalized discounted sum of
payoffs after such a one-shot deviation is (1−δ)(w∗−c(eH , L))+δ(wH−c(eH , L)), whereas
it is (1− δ) (w∗ − c (eL, L))+ δ (wL − c (eL, L)) in equilibrium. These deviations are not
profitable if (ICAL) holds.
Next consider an agent of type H: if this player deviates to eL in period 0, she will choose
minimal effort ever after, triggering zero wages. Thus, such a deviation is not profitable if
and only if
(1− δ) (wH − c (eH , H))+ δ (wH − c (eH , H)) ≥ (1− δ) (wL − c (eL, H)) .
This condition follows from multiplying (ICAH) with (1− δ) and (PCAH) with δ and then
adding up.
(ii) Next, suppose the agent of type L has deviated to eH in period 1 (and then followed
the equilibrium prescription of continuing to play eH), but no other deviation has occured.
The normalized discounted sum of payoffs of the agent in such a subgame is wH−c(eH , L).
Any other choice of effort triggers zero wages and thus a normalized discounted sum of
payoffs 0. By (PCAH) and the definition of the cost function, wH ≥ c(eH , H) ≥ c(eH , L).
Thus, such deviations are not profitable for type H.
(iii) Finally, consider any history in which some other deviation has taken place. Then,
the continuation payoff of the agent is zero, independent of his effort choices. Thus, the
equilibrium prescription of supplying zero effort is a (weakly) best response.
Lemma A.4. Consider the RAP game with incomplete information. Given the strategy of
the agent in an STE, the proposed strategy of the principal is sequentially rational if and
only if
δS(eH) ≥ wH (PCPH)
δS(eL) ≥ wL (PCPL)
Proof of Lemma A.4. In any history such that one player has already deviated from
the equilibrium, the strategy of the agent implies that the principal obtains a payoff of
zero. Thus, suppose that no player has previously deviated from the equilibrium play, so
that the principal observed eθ in all previous periods. Then, the principal believes that the
agent is of type θ with probability one. Thus, if the agent follows the equilibrium strategy
in all subsequent periods, the normalized expected discounted sum of equilibrium payoffs is
S(eθ)−wθ for the principal. If she chooses the optimal deviation and sets a zero wage, the
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normalized discounted sum of payoffs is (1− δ)S(eθ). Thus, the principal is sequentially
rational.
We now use the Lemmas to complete the proof of Proposition A.2. Let wH = c (eH , H).
Then (PCAH) holds. With wL = c (eL, L) − c (eH , L) + c (eH , H), (ICAL) holds as well.
As wL−wH = c (eL, L)− c (eH , L), the assumption that c (eL, H)− c (eH , H) > c (eL, L)−
c (eH , L) implies (ICAH). Thus, by Lemma A.3 the agent is sequentially rational. Moreover,
clearly for the proposed wages, conditions (PCPH) and (PCPL) hold, if (A.12) and (A.13)
do. Thus, conditions (A.12) and (A.13) are also necessary for an STE: (PCAH) and
(PCPH) imply (A.12); (PCAH), (ICAL) and (PCPL) imply (A.13).
Thus, the conditions for the existence are exactly the same as in the RPA game.
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A.4 Instructions
A.4.1 Instructions for Buyers in Treatment PC
1 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für Käufer 
 
 
Sie nehmen nun an einer wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studie teil, die von diversen 
Forschungsförderungsstellen finanziert wird. Sie können dabei - abhängig von Ihren 
Entscheidungen – Geld verdienen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese Erklärungen genau 
durchlesen. 
 
Diese Instruktionen dienen ausschliesslich Ihrer privaten Information. Während der Studie 
herrscht ein absolutes Kommunikationsverbot. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann richten Sie 
diese bitte an uns. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Ausschluss aus der Studie und von 
allen Zahlungen. 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie erhalten Sie ein Startgeld von 10 Franken. Während der Studie sprechen 
wir nicht von Franken, sondern von Punkten. Im Verlauf der Studie können Sie einen weiteren 
Geldbetrag verdienen, indem Sie Punkte erzielen. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen wird also zunächst in 
Punkten berechnet. Die von Ihnen während der Studie erzielte Gesamtpunktezahl wird dann am 
Ende in Franken umgerechnet, dabei gilt 
 
10 Punkte = 1 Franken. 
 
Sollten Sie im Laufe der Studie Verluste machen, werden allfällige Verluste mit Ihrem Startgeld 
verrechnet. Sie können jedoch Verluste immer durch eigene Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit 
ausschliessen! Am Ende bekommen Sie von uns die während der Studie verdiente Punktezahl 
plus die 10 Franken Startgeld in bar ausbezahlt. 
 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurden die TeilnehmerInnen zufällig in zwei Gruppen aufgeteilt: Käufer 
und Verkäufer. Sie sind während der gesamten Studie ein Käufer. Jeder Käufer wurde zufällig 
einem Verkäufer zugeordnet. Die Studie besteht aus 15 Runden. Sie sind in jeder der 15 Runden 
dem gleichen Verkäufer zugeordnet. Keiner der anderen Studienteilnehmer wird Ihre genaue 




Kurzübersicht über die Studie 
 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurde jedem Käufer zufällig ein Verkäufer zugeordnet. Die Studie umfasst 
15 Runden, in denen die Zuordnung von Käufer und Verkäufer fixiert bleibt. In jeder Runde führt 
jeder Käufer mit seinem zugeordneten Verkäufer eine Transaktion durch: Der Käufer zahlt dem 
Verkäufer einen Preis für ein Produkt, dessen Qualität durch den Verkäufer bestimmt wird. 
Insbesondere erzielt der Käufer durch die Transaktion einen Gewinn, wenn er für das Produkt 
weniger bezahlt, als das Produkt ihm wert ist. Wie hoch der Wert des Produktes für den Käufer 
ist, hängt von der Qualität des Produktes ab. Der Verkäufer erzielt durch die Transaktion einen 
Gewinn, wenn er einen Preis erhält, der seine Produktionskosten übersteigt. Produktionskosten 
entstehen durch die Bereitstellung von Produktqualität. Eine höhere Qualität ist immer mit 
höheren Produktionskosten verbunden. 
 
Bestimmung der Produktionskosten 
 
Bevor Käufer und Verkäufer Transaktionen durchführen, werden die genauen Produktionskosten 
bestimmt. Ein Verkäufer kann entweder hohe oder niedrige Produktionskosten haben. Unter 
den hohen Produktionskosten kostet jede Qualitätsstufe mehr als unter den niedrigen 
Produktionskosten. Die eine Hälfte aller Verkäufer wird zufällig den hohen Produktionskosten 
zugewiesen, die andere Hälfte aller Verkäufer den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet. 
Diese Zuweisung bleibt über die gesamte Studie hinweg bestehen. 
 
Ihr Verkäufer wird zu Beginn der Studie darüber informiert, ob er den hohen oder niedrigen 
Produktionskosten zugeordnet ist. Sie werden ebenfalls über die genauen Produktionskosten Ihres 
Verkäufers informiert. 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
 
Nach Bestimmung der Produktionskosten führen Sie und Ihr zugeordneter Verkäufer in jeder der 
15 Runden eine Transaktion durch. Der Ablauf ist folgendermassen organisiert: 
 1.Stufe: Sie bezahlen einen Preis und geben eine gewünschte Produktqualität an. 
 2.Stufe: Ihr Verkäufer erhält daraufhin den von Ihnen bezahlten Preis, wird über Ihre  
  gewünschte Qualität informiert, und kann die Produktqualität wählen, die er an Sie 
  liefern will. Die von Ihnen gewünschte Qualität ist für die Wahl Ihres  
  Verkäufers nicht bindend. 
 3.Stufe: Sie erhalten die von Ihrem Verkäufer gewählte Produktqualität. Sie werden über 
  Ihr Einkommen in der aktuellen Runde informiert. Danach beginnt die nächste  
  Runde. 
 
Die Einkommen aus allen 15 Runden werden am Ende des Experiments zusammengezählt, in 
Franken umgerechnet und zusammen mit dem Startgeld bar ausbezahlt. 
 
Auf den nächsten Seiten beschreiben wir den Ablauf der Bestimmung der Produktionskosten und 











Bestimmung der Produktionskosten 
 
Die Produktionskosten des Verkäufers hängen von der Produktqualität ab. Die Produktqualität 
kann nicht kleiner als 1 und nicht höher als 10 sein: 
 
1 ≤ Produktqualität ≤ 10. 
 
Die Produktionskosten sind umso höher, je höher die gewählte Qualität. Die Produktionskosten 
hängen zudem davon ab, ob der Verkäufer den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten 
zugewiesen ist. Wenn Ihr Verkäufer den hohen Produktionskosten zugewiesen ist, dann sind 
seine mit jeder Qualitätsstufe verbundenen Produktionskosten höher als wenn er den niedrigen 
Produktionskosten zugeordnet ist. Die niedrigen und hohen Produktionskosten sind für jede 
Produktqualität in der nachstehenden Tabelle beschrieben. Die Tabelle sowie eine grafische 
Beschreibung finden Sie auch auf dem Zusatzblatt. 
 
 
Der Computer weist zu Beginn der Studie per Zufall die eine Hälfte aller Verkäufer den hohen 
Produktionskosten und die andere Hälfte den niedrigen Produktionskosten zu. 
Ihr Verkäufer wird auf dem Bildschirm über seine tatsächlichen Produktionskosten 
informiert. Die tatsächlichen Produktionskosten bleiben nach der einmaligen Zuordnung 
zu Beginn der ersten Periode in jeder der 15 Runden gleich. Sie werden ebenfalls über die 
tatsächlichen Produktionskosten Ihres Verkäufers informiert. 




Produktqualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Niedrige Produktionskosten 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 
Hohe Produktionskosten 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42 
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Ihr Verkäufer wird folgendermassen über Ihre Produktionskosten informiert (im Beispiel sind die 




Wenn Ihr Verkäufer den hohen Kosten zugeordnet ist, sehen Sie und Ihr Verkäufer analoge 
Information auf Ihren Bildschirmen. 
 
Sie und Ihr Verkäufer werden in jeder Runde, während sie Ihre Entscheidungen treffen, an die 
Ihrem Verkäufer zugewiesenen Produktionskosten erinnert.  
 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
 
Nach Bestimmung der Produktionskosten führen Sie und Ihr zugeordneter Verkäufer in jeder der 
15 Runden eine Transaktion durch. Der Ablauf jeder Runde ist wie folgt organisiert: 
 1.Stufe: Preisangabe und Qualitätswunsch. 
 2.Stufe: Festlegung der tatsächlichen Produktqualität. 
 3.Stufe: Bestimmung der Einkommen. 
 
 
1.Stufe: Preisangabe und Qualitätswunsch 
 
Zu Beginn jeder Runde bezahlt der Käufer einen Preis und gibt einen Qualitätswunsch an. Die 
Käufer müssen folgende Regeln einhalten:  
 
• Der Preis darf nicht kleiner als 0 und nicht höher als 100 sein:  
 
0 ≤ Preis≤ 100. 
 
• Die gewünschte Produktqualität darf nicht kleiner als 1 und nicht höher als 10 sein: 
 















Im obigen Beispiel der Bildschirmanzeige ist der Verkäufer den niedrigen Kosten zugewiesen. 
Sie sehen eine analoge Bildschirmanzeige, wenn Ihr Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat. 
 
Klicken Sie auf den „OK“-Knopf um den im Feld eingegebenen Preis und Ihre eingegebene 
gewünschte Qualität definitiv zu machen. Bitte beachten Sie hierbei stets die mit der 
gewünschten Qualität verbundenen Produktionskosten, die von der Zuteilung Ihres 
Verkäufers zu den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten abhängen. Solange Sie nicht 
„OK“ gedrückt haben, können Sie Ihre Wahl revidieren. 
 
2.Stufe: Festlegung der tatsächlichen Produktqualität 
 
Daraufhin erhält Ihr Verkäufer den bezahlten Preis und wird über Ihren Qualitätswunsch 
informiert. Dann kann Ihr Verkäufer bestimmen, welche Produktqualität er an Sie liefern will. 
Die von Ihnen gewünschte Produktqualität ist für Ihren Verkäufer nicht bindend. Ihr 
Verkäufer kann exakt die von Ihnen gewünschte Qualität wählen, aber auch eine höhere 
oder tiefere Qualität. 
Die Qualität, die Ihr Verkäufer wählt, muss ein ganzzahliger Wert zwischen 1 und 10 sein: 
 
1 ≤ tatsächliche Produktqualität ≤ 10. 
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In obigem Beispiel der Bildschirmanzeige ist Ihr Verkäufer den niedrigen Kosten zugeordnet. Ihr 
Verkäufer erhält eine analoge Bildschirmanzeige, wenn er den hohen Kosten zugeordnet ist. 
 
3.Stufe: Bestimmung der Einkommen 
 
Das Einkommen Ihres Verkäufers hängt vom bezahlten Preis, der von Ihm gewählten 
Produktqualität und den Ihm zugewiesenen Produktionskosten ab. 
 
Wenn Ihr Verkäufer den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet ist, dann berechnet sich 
sein Einkommen wie folgt: 
 
 








Wenn Ihr Verkäufer den hohen Produktionskosten zugeordnet ist, dann berechnet sich sein 
Einkommen wie folgt: 
 
 




Das Einkommen Ihres Verkäufers ist demzufolge umso höher, je höher der von Ihnen 
angegebene Preis. Ausserdem gilt, dass das Einkommen Ihres Verkäufers umso höher ist, je tiefer 
seine Produktionskosten. 
Wie oben beschrieben gilt, dass mehr Qualität immer mehr kostet. Darüber hinaus sind die 
Produktionskosten für jede gewählte Qualitätsstufe höher, wenn Ihr Verkäufer den hohen 
Produktionskosten zugewiesen ist, als wenn Ihr Verkäufer den niedrigen Produktionskosten 
zugeordnet ist. Die genauen Werte entnehmen Sie oben stehender Tabelle oder der Tabelle und 
Grafik auf dem Zusatzblatt. 
 
Ihr Einkommen hängt davon ab, welchen Preis Sie bezahlt haben, und welchen Wert das Produkt 
für Sie hat. Der Wert des Produktes für Sie wird durch die von Ihrem Verkäufer gewählte 
tatsächliche Produktqualität wie folgt bestimmt. 
 
Wert für Sie = 10* tatsächliche Produktqualität. 
 
Eine tabellarische und grafische Beschreibung des Werts für den Käufer für jede tatsächliche 
Produktqualität entnehmen Sie dem Zusatzblatt.  
 
Insgesamt ergibt sich Ihr Einkommen wie folgt:  
 
 
Ihr Einkommen = Wert für Sie – Preis 
           = 10*tatsächliche Produktqualität - Preis 
 
 
Ihr Einkommen ist folglich umso höher, je höher die von Ihrem Verkäufer gelieferte 
Produktqualität, da eine höhere Qualität einen höheren Wert für Sie ergibt. Gleichzeitig ist Ihr 
Einkommen umso höher, je tiefer der Preis, den Sie für das Produkt bezahlt haben. 
 
Die Einkommen aller Verkäufer und Käufer werden in der oben beschriebenen Weise berechnet. 
Jeder Verkäufer kann also das Einkommen seines Käufers berechnen. Zudem kann jeder Käufer 
das Einkommen seines Verkäufers bestimmen, unter Berücksichtigung der Zuordnung seines 
Verkäufers zu den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten. 
 
Beachten Sie, dass Käufer und Verkäufer in jeder Periode auch Verluste erzielen können. Diese 
müssen aus dem jeweiligen Startgeld bzw. aus in anderen Perioden erzielten Einkommen bezahlt 
werden. Beachten Sie, dass eigene Verluste sowie Verluste für den anderen immer durch eigene 
Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen werden können. 
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Nachstehende Beispiele sollen die Bestimmung der Einkommen illustrieren. 
 
Beispiel 1: 
Ein Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 35 und wünscht eine Qualität von 8. Sein Verkäufer wählt 
eine tatsächliche Qualität von 4. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 4*10-35=5. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 35-2=33. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 35-10=25. 
 
Beispiel 2: 
Ein Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 50 und wünscht eine Qualität von 10. Sein Verkäufer wählt 
eine tatsächliche Qualität von 8. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 8*10-50=30. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 50-10=40. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 50-30=20. 
 
Beispiel 3: 
Ein Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 25 und wünscht eine Qualität von 4. Sein Verkäufer wählt 
eine tatsächliche Qualität von 7. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 7*10-25=45. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 25-8=17. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 25-25=0. 
 
Am Ende jeder Runde wird Ihrem Verkäufer eine Zusammenfassung der aktuellen Runde auf 
dem Bildschirm präsentiert. Diese beinhaltet:  
• Welchen Preis Sie angegeben haben. 
• Ihre gewünschte Qualität. 
• Die tatsächliche Qualität, die Ihr Verkäufer gewählt hat. 
• Das Einkommen Ihres Verkäufers in dieser Runde. 
 
Sie erhalten ebenfalls eine Zusammenfassung über:  
• Ihren angegebenen Preis. 
• Ihre gewünschte Qualität. 
• Die tatsächliche Qualität, die Ihr Verkäufer gewählt hat. 
• Ihr erzieltes Einkommen in dieser Runde. 
 
Nachdem die Zusammenfassung zu sehen ist, ist die aktuelle Runde abgeschlossen. Danach 
beginnt die nächste Runde. Insgesamt besteht die Studie aus 15 Runden, und Sie sind in jeder der 
15 Runden demselben Verkäufer zugeordnet. 
 
Die Studie beginnt erst dann, wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit dem Ablauf der Studie vollständig 









Bitte lösen Sie diese Aufgaben vollständig und unter Angabe des Lösungswegs. Wenn Sie 




Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 55 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 9. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 8.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 2: 
Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 60 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 9. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 5.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 3: 
Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 9 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 4. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 1.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 4: 
Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 40 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 10. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 8.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Wenn Sie mit dem Lösen der Übungsaufgaben fertig sind, empfehlen wir Ihnen, sich die 
Aufgaben und deren Lösungen noch einmal anzusehen. Anschliessend überlegen Sie sich bitte, 
welche Entscheidungen Sie im Experiment treffen wollen. 
  






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Produktqualität
Wert für den Käufer
Hohe Produktionskosten
Niedrige Produktionskosten
Produktqualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Niedrige 
Produktionskosten 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 
Hohe Produktionskosten 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42 
Wert für den Käufer 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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A.4.2 Instructions for Sellers in Treatment PI
1 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für Verkäufer 
 
 
Sie nehmen nun an einer wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studie teil, die von diversen 
Forschungsförderungsstellen finanziert wird. Sie können dabei - abhängig von Ihren 
Entscheidungen – Geld verdienen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese Erklärungen genau 
durchlesen. 
 
Diese Instruktionen dienen ausschliesslich Ihrer privaten Information. Während der Studie 
herrscht ein absolutes Kommunikationsverbot. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann richten Sie 
diese bitte an uns. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Ausschluss aus der Studie und von 
allen Zahlungen. 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie erhalten Sie ein Startgeld von 10 Franken. Während der Studie sprechen 
wir nicht von Franken, sondern von Punkten. Im Verlauf der Studie können Sie einen weiteren 
Geldbetrag verdienen, indem Sie Punkte erzielen. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen wird also zunächst in 
Punkten berechnet. Die von Ihnen während der Studie erzielte Gesamtpunktezahl wird dann am 
Ende in Franken umgerechnet, dabei gilt 
 
10 Punkte = 1 Franken. 
 
Sollten Sie im Laufe der Studie Verluste machen, werden allfällige Verluste mit Ihrem Startgeld 
verrechnet. Sie können jedoch Verluste immer durch eigene Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit 
ausschliessen! Am Ende bekommen Sie von uns die während der Studie verdiente Punktezahl 
plus die 10 Franken Startgeld in bar ausbezahlt. 
 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurden die TeilnehmerInnen zufällig in zwei Gruppen aufgeteilt: Käufer 
und Verkäufer. Sie sind während der gesamten Studie ein Verkäufer. Jeder Verkäufer wurde 
zufällig einem Käufer zugeordnet. Die Studie besteht aus 15 Runden. Sie sind in jeder der 15 
Runden dem gleichen Käufer zugeordnet. Keiner der anderen Studienteilnehmer wird Ihre 




Kurzübersicht über die Studie 
 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurde jedem Verkäufer zufällig ein Käufer zugeordnet. Die Studie umfasst 
15 Runden, in denen die Zuordnung von Verkäufer und Käufer fixiert bleibt. In jeder Runde führt 
jeder Käufer mit seinem zugeordneten Verkäufer eine Transaktion durch: Der Käufer zahlt dem 
Verkäufer einen Preis für ein Produkt, dessen Qualität durch den Verkäufer bestimmt wird. 
Insbesondere erzielt der Käufer durch die Transaktion einen Gewinn, wenn er für das Produkt 
weniger bezahlt, als das Produkt ihm wert ist. Wie hoch der Wert des Produktes für den Käufer 
ist, hängt von der Qualität des Produktes ab. Der Verkäufer erzielt durch die Transaktion einen 
Gewinn, wenn er einen Preis erhält, der seine Produktionskosten übersteigt. Produktionskosten 
entstehen durch die Bereitstellung von Produktqualität. Eine höhere Qualität ist immer mit 
höheren Produktionskosten verbunden. 
 
Bestimmung der Produktionskosten 
 
Bevor Käufer und Verkäufer Transaktionen durchführen, werden die genauen Produktionskosten 
bestimmt. Ein Verkäufer kann entweder hohe oder niedrige Produktionskosten haben. Unter 
den hohen Produktionskosten kostet jede Qualitätsstufe mehr als unter den niedrigen 
Produktionskosten. Die eine Hälfte aller Verkäufer wird zufällig den hohen Produktionskosten 
zugewiesen, die andere Hälfte aller Verkäufer den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet. 
Diese Zuweisung bleibt über die gesamte Studie hinweg bestehen. 
 
Sie werden zu Beginn der Studie darüber informiert, ob Sie den hohen oder niedrigen 
Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind. Der Ihnen zugeordnete Käufer ist nicht darüber informiert, 
ob Sie den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind. Sie haben jedoch die 
Möglichkeit Ihrem Käufer zu Beginn der Studie einmalig eine Nachricht über Ihre 
Produktionskosten zu übermitteln. 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
 
Nach Bestimmung der Produktionskosten führen Sie und Ihr zugeordneter Käufer in jeder der 15 
Runden eine Transaktion durch. Der Ablauf ist folgendermassen organisiert: 
 1.Stufe: Ihr Käufer bezahlt einen Preis und gibt eine gewünschte Produktqualität an. 
 2.Stufe: Sie erhalten daraufhin den bezahlten Preis, werden über die gewünschte Qualität 
  informiert, und können die Produktqualität wählen, die Sie an Ihren Käufer liefern 
  wollen. Die gewünschte Qualität Ihres Käufers ist für Ihre Wahl der   
  tatsächlichen Qualität nicht bindend. 
 3.Stufe: Ihr Käufer erhält die von Ihnen gewählte Produktqualität. Sie werden über Ihr  
  Einkommen in der aktuellen Runde informiert. Danach beginnt die nächste Runde. 
 
Die Einkommen aus allen 15 Runden werden am Ende des Experiments zusammengezählt, in 
Franken umgerechnet und zusammen mit dem Startgeld bar ausbezahlt. 
 
Auf den nächsten Seiten beschreiben wir den Ablauf der Bestimmung der Produktionskosten und 





Information über den genauen Ablauf der Studie 
 
 
Bestimmung der Produktionskosten 
 
Die Produktionskosten des Verkäufers hängen von der Produktqualität ab. Die Produktqualität 
kann nicht kleiner als 1 und nicht höher als 10 sein: 
 
1 ≤ Produktqualität ≤ 10. 
 
Die Produktionskosten sind umso höher, je höher die gewählte Qualität. Die Produktionskosten 
hängen zudem davon ab, ob der Verkäufer den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten 
zugewiesen ist. Wenn Sie den hohen Produktionskosten zugewiesen sind, dann sind Ihre mit 
jeder Qualitätsstufe verbundenen Produktionskosten höher als wenn Sie den niedrigen 
Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind. Die niedrigen und hohen Produktionskosten sind für jede 
Produktqualität in der nachstehenden Tabelle beschrieben. Die Tabelle sowie eine grafische 
Beschreibung finden Sie auch auf dem Zusatzblatt. 
 
 
Der Computer weist zu Beginn der Studie per Zufall die eine Hälfte aller Verkäufer den hohen 
Produktionskosten und die andere Hälfte den niedrigen Produktionskosten zu. 
Sie werden auf dem Bildschirm über Ihre tatsächlichen Produktionskosten informiert. Die 
tatsächlichen Produktionskosten bleiben nach der einmaligen Zuordnung zu Beginn der ersten 
Periode in jeder der 15 Runden gleich. 
Ihrem Käufer ist nicht bekannt, welche Produktionskosten Ihnen tatsächlich zugeordnet 
sind, d.h. er weiss nicht, ob Sie hohe oder niedrige Produktionskosten haben. 
 
Sie können Ihrem Käufer jedoch zu Beginn der Studie einmalig eine Nachricht senden. Sie 
haben die Wahl zwischen der Nachricht „Ich habe niedrige Produktionskosten.“ und der 
Nachricht „Ich habe hohe Produktionskosten.“ Unabhängig von Ihren tatsächlichen Kosten 
können Sie eine der beiden Nachrichten frei auswählen.  
 
Zum Beispiel, wenn Sie den niedrigen Kosten zugeordnet sind, dann sehen sie folgende 
Information auf Ihrem Bildschirm: 
 
Produktqualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Niedrige Produktionskosten 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 
Hohe Produktionskosten 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42 





Wenn Sie den hohen Kosten zugeordnet sind, sehen Sie eine analoge Bildschirmanzeige. 
Wählen Sie die von Ihnen gewünschte Nachricht aus. Solange Sie den „OK“-Knopf nicht 
angeklickt haben, können Sie Ihre Wahl noch verändern. Die von Ihnen gewählte Nachricht wird 
dann an Ihrem Käufer übermittelt und kann nicht mehr verändert werden. Zum Beispiel, wenn 
Sie die Nachricht „Ich habe niedrige Produktionskosten.“ gewählt haben, bekommt Ihr 




Ihr Käufer bekommt eine analoge Bildschirmanzeige, wenn Sie die Nachricht „Ich habe hohe 
Produktionskosten.“ gewählt haben. 
 
Sie können nur zu Beginn der Studie dem Käufer eine Nachricht über Ihre Produktionskosten 
schicken. Danach haben Sie hierzu keine Möglichkeit mehr. Der Käufer wird in jeder Periode, 
während er den Preis und die gewünschte Qualität festlegt, wieder an Ihre Nachricht erinnert. 
 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
 
Nach Bestimmung der Produktionskosten führen Sie und Ihr zugeordneter Käufer in jeder der 15 
Runden eine Transaktion durch. Der Ablauf jeder Runde ist wie folgt organisiert: 
  
 1.Stufe: Preisangabe und Qualitätswunsch. 
 2.Stufe: Festlegung der tatsächlichen Produktqualität. 





1.Stufe: Preisangabe und Qualitätswunsch 
 
Zu Beginn jeder Runde bezahlt der Käufer einen Preis und gibt einen Qualitätswunsch an. Die 
Käufer müssen folgende Regeln einhalten:  
 
• Der Preis darf nicht kleiner als 0 und nicht höher als 100 sein:  
 
0 ≤ Preis≤ 100. 
 
• Die gewünschte Produktqualität darf nicht kleiner als 1 und nicht höher als 10 sein: 
 
1 ≤ gewünschte Produktqualität ≤ 10. 
 





Im obigen Beispiel der Bildschirmanzeige hat der Verkäufer dem Käufer zu Beginn der Studie 
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2.Stufe: Festlegung der tatsächlichen Produktqualität 
 
Daraufhin erhalten Sie den bezahlten Preis und werden über den Qualitätswunsch informiert. 
Dann können Sie bestimmen, welche Produktqualität Sie an Ihren Käufer liefern wollen. Die von 
Ihrem Käufer gewünschte Produktqualität ist für Sie als Verkäufer nicht bindend. Sie 




Die Qualität, die Sie wählen, muss ein ganzzahliger Wert zwischen 1 und 10 sein: 
 
1 ≤ tatsächliche Produktqualität ≤ 10. 
 




In obigem Beispiel der Bildschirmanzeige ist der Verkäufer den niedrigen Kosten zugeordnet und 
hat zu Beginn der Studie die Nachricht gesendet „Ich habe niedrige Produktionskosten.“ 
 
Um die tatsächliche Produktqualität zu wählen, die Sie liefern möchten, geben Sie den Wert für 
die Qualität in das Feld „Tatsächliche Qualität:“ ein. Bitte beachten Sie hierbei stets die mit 
der tatsächlichen Qualität verbundenen Kosten, die von Ihrer Zuteilung zu den hohen oder 




Klicken Sie auf den „weiter“-Knopf um eine Vorschau auf Ihr Einkommen und das Einkommen 
Ihres Käufers zu erhalten, das sich durch Ihre gewählte Qualität ergibt. Im Rahmen dieser 
Vorschau haben Sie die Möglichkeit durch klicken des „Qualität Ändern“-Knopfs die Wahl Ihrer 
tatsächlichen Qualität in dieser Runde zu korrigieren. Durch klicken des “OK“-Knopfs machen 
Sie Ihre eingegebene Qualität in dieser Runde definitiv. 
 
3.Stufe: Bestimmung der Einkommen 
 
Ihr Einkommen hängt vom bezahlten Preis, der von Ihnen gewählten Produktqualität und den 
Ihnen zugewiesenen Produktionskosten ab. 
 
Wenn Sie den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind, dann berechnet sich Ihr 
Einkommen wie folgt: 
 
 
Ihr Einkommen = Preis – niedrige Produktionskosten der gewählten Produktqualität 
 
 




Ihr Einkommen = Preis – hohe Produktionskosten der gewählten Produktqualität 
 
 
Ihr Einkommen ist demzufolge umso höher, je höher der vom Käufer angegebene Preis. 
Ausserdem gilt, dass Ihr Einkommen umso höher ist, je tiefer die Produktionskosten. 
Wie oben beschrieben gilt, dass mehr Qualität immer mehr kostet. Darüber hinaus sind Ihre 
Produktionskosten für jede gewählte Qualitätsstufe höher, wenn Sie den hohen 
Produktionskosten zugewiesen sind, als wenn Sie den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet 
sind. Die genauen Werte entnehmen Sie oben stehender Tabelle oder der Tabelle und Grafik auf 
dem Zusatzblatt. 
 
Das Einkommen Ihres Käufers hängt davon ab, welchen Preis er bezahlt hat, und welchen Wert 
das Produkt für Ihn hat. Der Wert für Ihren Käufer wird durch die von Ihnen gewählte 
tatsächliche Produktqualität wie folgt bestimmt: 
 
Wert für Ihren Käufer = 10* tatsächliche Produktqualität. 
 
Eine tabellarische und grafische Beschreibung des Werts für den Käufer für jede tatsächliche 
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Insgesamt ergibt sich das Einkommen Ihres Käufers wie folgt:  
 
 
Einkommen Ihres Käufers = Wert für Ihren Käufer – Preis 
         = 10*tatsächliche Produktqualität – Preis 
 
 
Das Einkommen Ihres Käufers ist folglich umso höher, je höher die von Ihnen gelieferte 
Produktqualität, da eine höhere Qualität einen höheren Wert für Ihren Käufer ergibt. Gleichzeitig 
ist sein Einkommen umso höher, je tiefer der Preis, den er für das Produkt bezahlt. 
 
Die Einkommen aller Verkäufer und Käufer werden in der oben beschriebenen Weise berechnet. 
Jeder Verkäufer kann also das Einkommen seines Käufers berechnen. Ein Käufer kann das 
Einkommen seines Verkäufers bestimmen, unter der Annahme, dass der Verkäufer hohe oder 
niedrige Produktionskosten hat. Da der Käufer die tatsächlichen Produktionskosten jedoch nicht 
eindeutig kennt (er sieht nur die Nachricht des Verkäufers), kann er das tatsächliche Einkommen 
des Verkäufers nicht eindeutig bestimmen. 
 
Beachten Sie, dass Käufer und Verkäufer in jeder Periode auch Verluste erzielen können. Diese 
müssen aus dem jeweiligen Startgeld bzw. aus in anderen Perioden erzielten Einkommen bezahlt 
werden. Beachten Sie, dass eigene Verluste sowie Verluste für den anderen immer durch eigene 
Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen werden können. 
 
Nachstehende Beispiele sollen die Bestimmung der Einkommen illustrieren. 
 
Beispiel 1: 
Ein Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 35 und wünscht eine Qualität von 8. Sein Verkäufer wählt 
eine tatsächliche Qualität von 4. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 4*10-35=5. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 35-2=33. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 35-10=25. 
 
Beispiel 2: 
Ein Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 50 und wünscht eine Qualität von 10. Sein Verkäufer wählt 
eine tatsächliche Qualität von 8. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 8*10-50=30. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 50-10=40. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 50-30=20. 
 
Beispiel 3: 
Ein Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 25 und wünscht eine Qualität von 4. Sein Verkäufer wählt 
eine tatsächliche Qualität von 7. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 7*10-25=45. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 25-8=17. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 25-25=0. 
 
Am Ende jeder Runde wird Ihnen eine Zusammenfassung der aktuellen Runde auf dem 




• Welchen Preis der Käufer angegeben hat. 
• Die gewünschte Qualität des Käufers. 
• Die tatsächliche Qualität, die Sie gewählt haben. 
• Ihr erzieltes Einkommen in dieser Runde. 
 
Auch Ihr Käufer erhält eine Zusammenfassung. Er wird informiert über: 
• Seinen angegebenen Preis. 
• Seine gewünschte Qualität. 
• Die tatsächliche Qualität, die Sie gewählt haben. 
• Sein erzieltes Einkommen in dieser Runde. 
 
Nachdem die Zusammenfassung zu sehen ist, ist die aktuelle Runde abgeschlossen. Danach 
beginnt die nächste Runde. Insgesamt besteht die Studie aus 15 Runden, und Sie sind in jeder der 
15 Runden demselben Käufer zugeordnet. 
 
Die Studie beginnt erst dann, wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit dem Ablauf der Studie vollständig 
vertraut sind. Um dies sicher zu stellen, bitten wir Sie unten stehende Übungsaufgaben zu lösen. 
  







Bitte lösen Sie diese Aufgaben vollständig und unter Angabe des Lösungswegs. Wenn Sie 




Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 55 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 9. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 8.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 2: 
Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 60 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 9. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 5.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 3: 
Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 9 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 4. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 1.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 4: 
Der bezahlte Preis des Käufers ist 40 und seine gewünschte Qualität ist 10. Der zugewiesene 
Verkäufer wählt eine tatsächliche Qualität von 8.   
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Wenn Sie mit dem Lösen der Übungsaufgaben fertig sind, empfehlen wir Ihnen, sich die 
Aufgaben und deren Lösungen noch einmal anzusehen. Anschliessend überlegen Sie sich bitte, 

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Produktqualität
Wert für den Käufer
Hohe Produktionskosten
Niedrige Produktionskosten
Produktqualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Niedrige 
Produktionskosten 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 
Hohe Produktionskosten 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42 
Wert für den Käufer 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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B.1 Regressions and Figures










Adj. R2 0.94 0.87
Treatment order F X
Notes: Column (1) relates to data observed in the fixed order treatments PF
and AF and column (2) to data elicited in the alternating order conditions
PX and AX. The dependent variable in all of the above regressions is wage.
The analysis is performed on average wages and average efforts as described
below Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4. Average efforts were subtracted by one such
that they can take values in [0, 9]. 1[P ] represents a dummy which equals
one if the transactions were conducted under the order P and zero otherwise:
in column (1), the dummy equals one if the observation was made in the
context of treatment PF and zero if it was observed in AF; in column (2), the
dummy equals one if the vector of average effort and price was computed over
transactions conducted in the order P and zero if it was computed over rounds
which took place in the order A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are robust in column (1) and clustered on the pair level in column (2).
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
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B.1 Regressions and Figures


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
PF AF
Note: One data point marked by a dot (square) indicates the aver-
age effort taken over all agents within treatment PF (AF) in a given
period.

































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
PF AF
Note: One data point marked by a dot (square) represents the dif-
ference between the average of principals’ profits per transaction and
the average of agents’ payoffs per round where the averages are com-
puted for a given period and over all principals or agents, respectively,
observed in treatment PF (AF).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
Transaction in Order P Transaction in Order A
Note: One data point marked by a circle (hollow square) represents
the average effort computed over all agents in the treatments PX and
AX for whom the transaction in a given period took place in the order
P(A); e.g. in period 3, all agents in PX (AX) are concerned.

































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
Transaction in Order P Transaction in Order A
Note: One data point marked with a circle (hollow square)
represents the difference between the principals’ average prof-
its and the agents’ average profits where the averages are com-
puted over all principals and agents, respectively, in the al-
ternating order treatments, for whom their transaction was
conducted under the order P(A) at the given period; e.g. in





B.2.1 Instructions for Sellers in Treatment AF
1 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für Verkäufer 
 
 
Sie nehmen nun an einer wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studie teil, die von diversen 
Forschungsförderungsstellen finanziert wird. Sie können dabei - abhängig von Ihren 
Entscheidungen – Geld verdienen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese Erklärungen genau 
durchlesen. 
 
Diese Instruktionen dienen ausschliesslich Ihrer privaten Information. Während der Studie 
herrscht ein absolutes Kommunikationsverbot. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann richten Sie 
diese bitte an uns. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Ausschluss aus der Studie und von 
allen Zahlungen. 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie erhalten Sie ein Startgeld von 10 Franken. Während der Studie sprechen 
wir nicht von Franken, sondern von Punkten. Im Verlauf der Studie können Sie einen weiteren 
Geldbetrag verdienen, indem Sie Punkte erzielen. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen wird also zunächst in 
Punkten berechnet. Die von Ihnen während der Studie erzielte Gesamtpunktezahl wird dann am 
Ende in Franken umgerechnet, dabei gilt 
 
10 Punkte = 1 Franken. 
 
Sollten Sie im Laufe der Studie Verluste machen, werden allfällige Verluste mit Ihrem Startgeld 
verrechnet. Sie können jedoch Verluste immer durch eigene Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit 
ausschliessen! Am Ende bekommen Sie von uns die während der Studie verdiente Punktezahl 
plus die 10 Franken Startgeld in bar ausbezahlt. 
 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurden die TeilnehmerInnen zufällig in zwei Gruppen aufgeteilt: Käufer 
und Verkäufer. Sie sind während der gesamten Studie ein Verkäufer. Jeder Verkäufer wurde 
zufällig einem Käufer zugeordnet. Die Studie besteht aus 15 Runden. Sie sind in jeder der 15 
Runden dem gleichen Käufer zugeordnet. Keiner der anderen Studienteilnehmer wird Ihre 




Kurzübersicht über die Studie 
 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurde jedem Verkäufer zufällig ein Käufer zugeordnet. Die Studie umfasst 
15 Runden, in denen die Zuordnung von Verkäufer und Käufer fixiert bleibt. In jeder Runde führt 
jeder Verkäufer mit seinem zugeordneten Käufer eine Transaktion durch: Der Verkäufer 
bestimmt die Qualität eines Produkts für das der Käufer einen Preis bezahlt. Der Käufer erzielt 
durch die Transaktion einen Gewinn, wenn er für das Produkt weniger bezahlt, als das Produkt 
ihm wert ist. Wie hoch der Wert des Produktes für den Käufer ist, hängt von der Qualität des 
Produktes ab. Der Verkäufer erzielt durch die Transaktion einen Gewinn, wenn er einen Preis 
erhält, der seine Produktionskosten übersteigt. Produktionskosten entstehen durch die 
Bereitstellung von Produktqualität. Eine höhere Qualität ist immer mit höheren 
Produktionskosten verbunden. 
 
Bestimmung der Produktionskosten 
 
Bevor Käufer und Verkäufer Transaktionen durchführen, werden die genauen Produktionskosten 
bestimmt. Ein Verkäufer kann entweder hohe oder niedrige Produktionskosten haben. Unter 
den hohen Produktionskosten kostet jede Qualitätsstufe mehr als unter den niedrigen 
Produktionskosten. Die eine Hälfte aller Verkäufer wird zufällig den hohen Produktionskosten 
zugewiesen, die andere Hälfte aller Verkäufer den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet. 
Diese Zuweisung bleibt über die gesamte Studie hinweg bestehen. 
 
Sie werden zu Beginn der Studie darüber informiert, ob Sie den hohen oder niedrigen 
Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind. Der Ihnen zugeordnete Käufer wird ebenfalls über Ihre 
genauen Produktionskosten informiert. 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
 
Nach Bestimmung der Produktionskosten führen Sie und Ihr zugeordneter Käufer in jeder der 15 
Runden eine Transaktion durch. Der Ablauf ist folgendermassen organisiert: 
1.Stufe: Sie wählen die Produktqualität, die Sie an Ihren Käufer liefern wollen, und geben 
einen gewünschten Preis an. 
2.Stufe: Ihr Käufer erhält daraufhin die von Ihnen gewählte Produktqualität, wird über Ihren 
gewünschten Preis informiert und wählt den tatsächlichen Preis, den er Ihnen 
bezahlen möchte. Der von Ihnen gewünschte Preis ist für die Wahl des 
tatsächlichen Preises durch Ihren Käufer nicht bindend. 
3.Stufe: Sie erhalten den von Ihrem Käufer gewählten Preis und werden über Ihr Einkommen 
in der aktuellen Runde informiert. Danach beginnt die nächste Runde. 
 
Die Einkommen aus allen 15 Runden werden am Ende der Studie zusammengezählt, in Franken 
umgerechnet und zusammen mit dem Startgeld bar ausbezahlt. 
Auf den nächsten Seiten beschreiben wir den Ablauf der Bestimmung der Produktionskosten und 
die Transaktion weiter im Detail. 
 
 




Information über den genauen Ablauf der Studie 
 
 
Bestimmung der Produktionskosten 
 
Die Produktionskosten des Verkäufers hängen von der Produktqualität ab. Die Produktqualität 
kann nicht kleiner als 1 und nicht höher als 10 sein: 
 
1 ≤ Produktqualität ≤ 10. 
 
Die Produktionskosten sind umso höher, je höher die gewählte Qualität. Die Produktionskosten 
hängen zudem davon ab, ob der Verkäufer den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten 
zugewiesen ist. Wenn Sie den hohen Produktionskosten zugewiesen sind, dann sind Ihre mit 
jeder Qualitätsstufe verbundenen Produktionskosten höher als wenn Sie den niedrigen 
Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind. Die niedrigen und hohen Produktionskosten sind für jede 
Produktqualität in der nachstehenden Tabelle beschrieben. Die Tabelle sowie eine grafische 
Beschreibung finden Sie auch auf dem Zusatzblatt. 
 
 
Der Computer weist zu Beginn der Studie per Zufall die eine Hälfte aller Verkäufer den hohen 
Produktionskosten und die andere Hälfte den niedrigen Produktionskosten zu. 
Sie werden auf dem Bildschirm über Ihre tatsächlichen Produktionskosten informiert. Die 
tatsächlichen Produktionskosten bleiben nach der einmaligen Zuordnung zu Beginn der 
ersten Periode in jeder der 15 Runden gleich.  Ihr zugeordneter Käufer wird ebenfalls über 
Ihre tatsächlich zugewiesenen Produktionskosten informiert. 
Zum Beispiel, wenn Sie den niedrigen Kosten zugeordnet sind, sehen sie folgende Information 




Im Fall der Zuordnung zu den niedrigen Kosten bekommt Ihr zugeordneter Käufer folgende 
Information: 
 
Produktqualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Niedrige Produktionskosten 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 






Wenn Sie den hohen Kosten zugeordnet sind, sehen Sie und Ihr Käufer analoge Information auf 
Ihren Bildschirmen. 
 
Sie und Ihr Käufer werden in jeder Runde, während sie Ihre Entscheidungen treffen, an die Ihnen 
zugewiesenen Produktionskosten erinnert. 
 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
 
Nach Bestimmung der Produktionskosten führen Sie und Ihr zugeordneter Käufer in jeder der 15 
Runden eine Transaktion durch. Der Ablauf jeder Runde ist wie folgt organisiert: 
  
 1.Stufe: Festlegung der Qualität und Angabe eines gewünschten Preises. 
 2.Stufe: Festlegung des tatsächlichen Preises. 
 3.Stufe: Bestimmung der Einkommen. 
 
1.Stufe: Festlegung der Qualität und Angabe eines gewünschten Preises. 
 
Zu Beginn jeder Runde legen Sie eine Produktqualität fest und geben einen gewünschten Preis 
an. Sie müssen müssen folgende Regeln einhalten:  
 
• Die Qualität, die Sie wählen, muss ein ganzzahliger Wert zwischen 1 und 10 sein:  
 
1 ≤  Qualität ≤ 10. 
 
• Ihr gewünschter Preis darf nicht kleiner als 0 und nicht höher als 100 sein: 
 
0 ≤ gewünschter Preis ≤ 100. 
 
Die Wahl der Qualität und die Angabe des gewünschten Preises tätigen Sie über folgende 
Bildschirmanzeige: 





Im obigen Beispiel der Bildschirmanzeige ist der Verkäufer den niedrigen Kosten zugeordnet. 
 
Geben Sie die Produktqualität, die Sie liefern möchten, und den gewünschten Preis in die jeweils 
dafür vorgesehenen Felder ein. Beachten Sie stets die mit der Qualität verbundenen Kosten, 
die von Ihrer Zuteilung zu den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten abhängen. Machen 
Sie Ihre Eingaben durch klicken des „OK“-Knopfs in dieser Runde definitiv. 
 
 
2.Stufe: Festlegung des tatsächlichen Preises 
 
Daraufhin erhält Ihr Käufer die bereit gestellte Qualität und wird über Ihren gewünschten Preis 
informiert. Dann kann Ihr Käufer bestimmen, welchen Preis er tatsächlich bezahlen will. Der von 
Ihnen gewünschte Preis ist für Ihren Käufer nicht bindend. Ihr Käufer kann exakt den von 
Ihnen gewünschten Preis wählen, aber auch einen höheren oder niedrigeren Preis. 
 
Der Preis, den Ihr Käufer wählt, darf nicht kleiner als 0 und nicht höher als 100 sein: 
 
0 ≤ tatsächlicher Preis ≤ 100. 
 







In obigem Beispiel der Bildschirmanzeige ist der Verkäufer den niedrigen Kosten zugeordnet. 
 
3.Stufe: Bestimmung der Einkommen 
 
Ihr Einkommen hängt vom Preis, den Ihr Käufer bezahlt hat, der von Ihnen gewählten 
Produktqualität und den Ihnen zugewiesenen Produktionskosten ab. 
 
Wenn Sie den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet sind, dann berechnet sich Ihr 
Einkommen wie folgt: 
 
 
Ihr Einkommen, wenn Sie niedrige Kosten haben 
  = tatsächlicher Preis – niedrige Produktionskosten der gewählten Qualität 
 
 




Ihr Einkommen, wenn Sie hohe Kosten haben 
  = tatsächlicher Preis – hohe Produktionskosten der gewählten Qualität 
 




Ihr Einkommen ist demzufolge umso höher, je höher der von Ihrem Käufer gewählte tatsächliche 
Preis. Ausserdem gilt, dass Ihr Einkommen umso höher ist, je tiefer die Produktionskosten. 
Wie oben beschrieben gilt, dass mehr Qualität immer mehr kostet. Darüber hinaus sind Ihre 
Produktionskosten für jede gewählte Qualitätsstufe höher, wenn Sie den hohen 
Produktionskosten zugewiesen sind, als wenn Sie den niedrigen Produktionskosten zugeordnet 
sind. Die genauen Werte entnehmen Sie oben stehender Tabelle oder der Tabelle und Grafik auf 
dem Zusatzblatt. 
 
Das Einkommen Ihres Käufers hängt davon ab, welchen Preis er bezahlt hat, und welchen Wert 
das Produkt für Ihn hat. Der Wert für Ihren Käufer wird durch die von Ihnen gewählte 
Produktqualität wie folgt bestimmt: 
 
Wert für Ihren Käufer = 10* gewählte Qualität. 
 
Eine tabellarische und grafische Beschreibung des Werts für den Käufer für jede gewählte 
Produktqualität entnehmen Sie dem Zusatzblatt.  
 
Insgesamt ergibt sich das Einkommen Ihres Käufers wie folgt:  
 
 
Einkommen Ihres Käufers = Wert für Ihren Käufer – tatsächlicher Preis 
       = 10* gewählte Qualität – tatsächlicher Preis 
 
 
Das Einkommen Ihres Käufers ist folglich umso höher, je höher die von Ihnen gelieferte 
Produktqualität, da eine höhere Qualität einen höheren Wert für Ihren Käufer ergibt. Gleichzeitig 
ist sein Einkommen umso höher, je tiefer der Preis, den er für das Produkt bezahlt. 
 
Die Einkommen aller Verkäufer und Käufer werden in der oben beschriebenen Weise berechnet. 
Jeder Verkäufer kann also das Einkommen seines Käufers berechnen. Zudem kann jeder Käufer 
das Einkommen seines Verkäufers bestimmen, unter Berücksichtigung der Zuordnung seines 
Verkäufers zu den hohen oder niedrigen Produktionskosten. 
 
Beachten Sie, dass Käufer und Verkäufer in jeder Periode auch Verluste erzielen können. Diese 
müssen aus dem jeweiligen Startgeld bzw. aus in anderen Perioden erzielten Einkommen bezahlt 
werden. Beachten Sie, dass eigene Verluste sowie Verluste für den anderen immer durch eigene 
Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen werden können. 
 
Nachstehende Beispiele sollen die Bestimmung der Einkommen illustrieren. 
 
Beispiel 1: 
Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 8 und wünscht einen Preis von 60. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 50. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 8*10-50=30. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 50-10=40. 







Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 4 und wünscht einen Preis von 20. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 30. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 4*10-30=10. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 30-2=28. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 30-10=20. 
 
Beispiel 3: 
Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 7 und wünscht einen Preis von 40. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 30. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 7*10-30=40. 
Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 30-8=22. 
Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 30-25=5. 
 
Am Ende jeder Runde wird Ihnen und Ihrem Käufer eine Zusammenfassung der aktuellen Runde 
auf dem Bildschirm präsentiert. Diese beinhaltet:  
• Die gewählte Qualität. 
• Den gewünschten Preis. 
• Den tatsächlich bezahlten Preis. 
Darüber hinaus werden Sie über Ihr Einkommen und Ihr Käufer ebenfalls über sein eigenes 
Einkommen in dieser Runde informiert. 
 
Nachdem die Zusammenfassung zu sehen ist, ist die aktuelle Runde abgeschlossen. Danach 
beginnt die nächste Runde. Insgesamt besteht die Studie aus 15 Runden, und Sie sind in jeder der 
15 Runden demselben Käufer zugeordnet. 
 
Die Studie beginnt erst dann, wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit dem Ablauf der Studie vollständig 
vertraut sind. Um dies sicher zu stellen, bitten wir Sie die auf der nächsten Seite stehenden 
Übungsaufgaben zu lösen. 
  







Bitte lösen Sie diese Aufgaben vollständig und unter Angabe des Lösungswegs. Wenn Sie 




Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 10 und wünscht einen Preis von 70. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 60. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 2: 
Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 1 und wünscht einen Preis von 4. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 5. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 3: 
Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 5 und wünscht einen Preis von 35. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 35. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Aufgabe 4: 
Ein Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 7 und wünscht einen Preis von 60. Sein Käufer bezahlt 
einen Preis von 35. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer niedrige Kosten hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 Wenn der Verkäufer hohe Kosten zugeordnet hat, dann ist sein Einkommen: 
 
Wenn Sie mit dem Lösen der Übungsaufgaben fertig sind, empfehlen wir Ihnen, sich die 
Aufgaben und deren Lösungen noch einmal anzusehen. Anschliessend überlegen Sie sich bitte, 

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Produktqualität
Wert für den Käufer
Hohe Produktionskosten
Niedrige Produktionskosten
Produktqualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Niedrige 
Produktionskosten 0 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 
Hohe Produktionskosten 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42 
Wert für den Käufer 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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B.2 Instructions
B.2.2 Instructions for Buyers in Treatment AX
1 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für Käufer 
 
 
Sie nehmen nun an einer wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Studie teil, die von diversen 
Forschungsförderungsstellen finanziert wird. Sie können dabei - abhängig von Ihren 
Entscheidungen – Geld verdienen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese Erklärungen genau 
durchlesen. 
 
Diese Instruktionen dienen ausschliesslich Ihrer privaten Information. Während der Studie 
herrscht ein absolutes Kommunikationsverbot. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann richten Sie diese 
bitte an uns. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Ausschluss aus der Studie und von allen 
Zahlungen. 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie wurden die TeilnehmerInnen zufällig in zwei Gruppen aufgeteilt: Käufer 
und Verkäufer. Sie sind während der gesamten Studie ein Käufer. Sie werden im Rahmen 
dieser Studie an vier Interaktionen mit vier verschiedenen Verkäufern teilnehmen. In jeder 
Interaktion sind Sie jeweils einem Verkäufer fix zugeordnet. 
 
Zu Beginn der Studie erhalten Sie ein Startgeld von 10 Franken. Im Rahmen jeder Interaktion 
können Sie zusätzlich Punkte erzielen. Durch Erwerb von Punkten können Sie weiteres Geld 
verdienen. Dabei wird genau eine Ihrer vier Interaktionen zufällig ausgewählt. Alle Punkte, die 
Sie im Rahmen dieser zufällig ausgewählten Interaktion erzielt haben, werden wie folgt in 
Franken umgerechnet: 
10 Punkte = 1 Franken. 
 
Sollten Verluste entstehen, werden diese mit Ihrem Startgeld verrechnet. Sie können jedoch 
Verluste immer durch eigene Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit ausschliessen. Am Ende der Studie 
bekommen Sie alle Punkte, die Sie im Rahmen der zufällig ausgewählten Interaktion erzielt 
haben, plus die 10 Franken Startgeld in bar ausbezahlt. 
 
Keiner der anderen Studienteilnehmer wird die genaue Zuordnung und die Entscheidungen von 









Die Studie besteht aus vier Interaktionen. Zu Beginn einer Interaktion wird jedem Verkäufer 
zufällig ein Käufer zugeordnet. Dabei wird ausgeschlossen, dass die beiden Parteien bereits in 
einer vergangenen Interaktion zugeordnet waren. Eine Interaktion umfasst 15 Runden, in 
denen die Zuordnung von Käufer und Verkäufer fixiert bleibt. In jeder Runde einer Interaktion 
führen ein Käufer und sein zugeordneter Verkäufer eine Transaktion durch. 
 
Ablauf einer Transaktion 
In jeder Runde führen die zugeordneten Parteien eine Transaktion durch: Der Verkäufer 
bestimmt die Qualität eines Produkts, für das der Käufer einen Preis bezahlt. Der Käufer erzielt 
durch die Transaktion einen Gewinn, wenn er für das Produkt weniger bezahlt, als das Produkt 
ihm wert ist. Wie hoch der Wert des Produktes für den Käufer ist, hängt von der Qualität des 
Produktes ab. Der Verkäufer erzielt durch die Transaktion einen Gewinn, wenn er einen Preis 
erhält, der seine Produktionskosten übersteigt. Produktionskosten entstehen durch die 
Bereitstellung von Produktqualität. Eine höhere Qualität ist immer mit höheren 
Produktionskosten verbunden. 
 
In jeder ungeraden Runde (1,3,5,…,15) ist eine Transaktion in folgende Stufen eingeteilt: 
 
1.Stufe: Der Verkäufer wählt eine Produktqualität und gibt einen gewünschten Preis an. 
2.Stufe: Der Käufer erhält daraufhin die gewählte Produktqualität, wird über den 
gewünschten Preis informiert und wählt den tatsächlichen Preis, den er bezahlen 
möchte. Der vom Verkäufer gewünschte Preis ist für die Wahl des tatsächlichen 
Preises durch den Käufer nicht bindend. 
3.Stufe: Der Verkäufer erhält den von seinem Käufer gewählten Preis. Käufer und Verkäufer 
werden jeweils über die erzielten Punkte in der aktuellen Runde informiert. Danach 
beginnt die nächste Runde. 
 
 
In jeder geraden Runde (2,4,6,…,14) ist eine Transaktion in folgende Stufen eingeteilt: 
 
1.Stufe: Der Käufer bezahlt einen Preis und gibt eine gewünschte Produktqualität an. 
2.Stufe: Der Verkäufer erhält daraufhin den bezahlten Preis, wird über die gewünschte 
Qualität informiert, und wählt die tatsächliche Produktqualität, die er liefern möchte. 
Die gewünschte Qualität des Käufers ist für die Wahl der tatsächlichen 
Qualität durch den  Verkäufer nicht bindend. 
3.Stufe: Der Käufer erhält die von seinem Verkäufer gewählte Qualität. Käufer und 
Verkäufer werden jeweils über die erzielten Punkte in der aktuellen Runde 
informiert. Danach beginnt die nächste Runde. 
 
 
Nachstehend finden Sie weitere wichtige Details zu einer Transaktion. 
 




Details zu einer Transaktion 
 
 
In jeder Runde müssen Käufer und Verkäufer bei ihren Entscheidungen folgende Regeln 
einhalten: 
• Die tatsächliche Qualität, die ein Verkäufer wählt, muss ein ganzzahliger Wert zwischen 1 
und 10 sein:   1 ≤  tatsächliche Qualität ≤ 10. 
 
• Der tatsächliche Preis, den ein Käufer wählt, darf nicht kleiner als 0 und nicht höher als 
100 sein:  0 ≤ tatsächlicher Preis ≤ 100. 
 
Auf der 1. Stufe jeder geraden Runde muss ein Käufer zusätzlich berücksichtigen: 
• Die gewünschte Qualität muss ein ganzzahliger Wert zwischen 1 und 10 sein: 
    1 ≤  gewünschte Qualität ≤ 10. 
 
Auf der 1. Stufe jeder ungeraden Runde muss der Verkäufer zusätzlich berücksichtigen: 
• Der gewünschte Preis darf nicht kleiner als 0 und nicht höher als 100 sein: 
   0 ≤ gewünschter Preis ≤ 100. 
 
1.Stufe einer Transaktion 
 
In jeder ungeraden Runde gibt der Verkäufer eine Qualität und einen gewünschten Preis über 
nachstehend abgebildete Bildschirmanzeige an: 
 
 




In jeder geraden Runde wählt der Käufer einen Preis und gibt eine gewünschte Qualität an. Die 
Eingabe dieser Entscheidungen findet über eine analoge Bildschirmanzeige statt und wird 
ebenfalls durch klicken eines „OK“-Knopfes definitiv gemacht. 
 
2.Stufe der Transaktion 
 
In jeder ungeraden Runde erhält der Käufer daraufhin die vom Verkäufer gewählte Qualität 
und wird über dessen gewünschten Preis informiert. Der Käufer kann dann den Preis bestimmen, 
den er tatsächlich bezahlen will. Der vom Verkäufer gewünschte Preis ist für den Käufer 
dabei nicht bindend. Ein Käufer kann exakt den vom Verkäufer gewünschten Preis wählen, 
aber auch einen höheren oder niedrigeren Preis. 




Durch klicken des „weiter“- Knopfes erhält ein Käufer eine Vorschau auf die erzielten 
Einkommen in dieser Runde. Ein Käufer hat dann die Möglichkeit die Wahl des tatsächlichen 
Preises noch einmal zu korrigieren, bevor er seine Entscheidung definitiv macht. 
 
In jeder geraden Runde erhält der Verkäufer den vom Käufer bezahlten Preis und wird über 
dessen gewünschte Qualität informiert. Der Verkäufer kann dann die Qualität bestimmen, die er 
tatsächlich liefern will. Die vom Käufer gewünschte Qualität ist für den Verkäufer dabei 
nicht bindend. Ein Verkäufer kann exakt die vom Käufer gewünschte Qualität wählen, 
aber auch eine höhere oder niedrigere Qualität. 
Die Eingabe der tatsächlichen Qualität tätigt der Verkäufer über eine Bildschirmanzeige, die 
analog zur oben Abgebildeten ist. Ein Verkäufer erhält danach ebenso eine Vorschau auf die 
erzielten Einkommen in dieser Runde und hat die Möglichkeit seine Eingabe noch einmal zu 
korrigieren, bevor er seine Entscheidung in der aktuellen Runde definitiv macht. 
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3.Stufe der Transaktion 
 
Das Einkommen eines Käufers hängt ab vom tatsächlich bezahlten Preis und dem Wert, den das 
Produkt für ihn hat. Der Wert des Produkts für einen Käufer wird durch die von seinem 
Verkäufer gewählte tatsächliche Produktqualität wie folgt bestimmt: 
 
Wert für den Käufer = 10* tatsächliche Qualität. 
 
Insgesamt ergibt sich das Einkommen eines Käufers wie folgt:  
 
 
Einkommen eines Käufers = Wert für den Käufer – tatsächlicher Preis 
              = 10* tatsächliche Qualität – tatsächlicher Preis 
 
 
Das Einkommen eines Käufers ist folglich umso höher, je höher die von seinem Verkäufer 
gelieferte Produktqualität, da eine höhere Qualität einen höheren Wert für den Käufer ergibt. 
Gleichzeitig ist das Einkommen eines Käufers umso höher, je tiefer der Preis, den er für das 
Produkt bezahlt. 
 
Das Einkommen eines Verkäufers hängt ab vom tatsächlich bezahlten Preis und den 
Produktionskosten, die durch die Wahl der tatsächlichen Produktqualität entstehen: 
 
 
Einkommen eines Verkäufers = 
   tatsächlicher Preis – Produktionskosten der tatsächlichen Qualität 
 
 
Das Einkommen eines Verkäufers ist demzufolge umso höher, je höher der von seinem Käufer 
gewählte tatsächliche Preis. Ausserdem gilt, dass das Einkommen eines Verkäufers umso höher 
ist, je niedriger die anfallenden Produktionskosten. Wie Sie nachstehender Tabelle entnehmen 
können, ist eine höhere Qualität immer mit höheren Produktionskosten verbunden. 
 
 
Dem beigelegten Zusatzblatt können Sie eine grafische Darstellung der Produktionskosten sowie 
des Werts für den Käufer entnehmen. 
Die Einkommen aller Verkäufer und Käufer werden in der oben beschriebenen Weise berechnet. 
Jeder Verkäufer kann also das Einkommen seines Käufers berechnen. Zudem kann jeder Käufer 
das Einkommen seines Verkäufers bestimmen. 
 
Beachten Sie, dass Käufer und Verkäufer in jeder Runde auch Verluste erzielen können. 
Beachten Sie, dass eigene Verluste sowie Verluste für den anderen immer durch eigene 
Entscheidungen mit Sicherheit ausgeschlossen werden können. 
Qualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






Die erzielten Einkommen werden am Ende der Studie wie folgt in Franken umgerechnet: Genau 
eine Ihrer vier Interaktionen wird zufällig ausgewählt. Alle Einkommen, die Sie in den 15 
Runden dieser zufällig ausgewählten Interaktion erzielt haben, werden am Ende der Studie 
zusammen gezählt, in Franken umgerechnet und zusammen mit dem Startgeld in bar ausbezahlt. 
 
Nachstehende Beispiele sollen die Bestimmung der Einkommen illustrieren. 
 
Beispiel 1: 
In Runde 2 bezahlt ein Käufer einen Preis von 50 und wünscht eine Qualität von 10. Sein 
Verkäufer wählt eine Qualität von 8. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 8*10-50=30. 
Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist: 50-30=20. 
 
Beispiel 2: 
In Runde 7 wählt ein Verkäufer eine Qualität von 6 und wünscht einen Preis von 50. Sein Käufer 
bezahlt einen Preis von 30. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 6*10-30=30. 
Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist: 30-20=10.  
 
Beispiel 3: 
In Runde 11 wählt ein Verkäufer eine Qualität von 7 und wünscht einen Preis von 50. Sein 
Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 40. 
Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 7*10-40=30. 
Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist: 40-25=15. 
 
Am Ende jeder Runde wird jedem Käufer und Verkäufer eine Zusammenfassung der 
Entscheidungen beider Parteien sowie das jeweilige Einkommen in der aktuellen Runde auf dem 
Bildschirm präsentiert. Klicken Sie auf den „weiter zur nächsten Runde“-Knopf um die nächste 
Runde zu beginnen. 
 
Die Studie beginnt erst dann, wenn alle TeilnehmerInnen mit dem Ablauf der Studie vollständig 
vertraut sind. Um dies sicher zu stellen, bitten wir Sie die auf der nächsten Seite stehenden 
Übungsaufgaben zu lösen. 
  







Bitte lösen Sie diese Aufgaben vollständig und unter Angabe des Lösungswegs. Wenn Sie 
Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an die Leiter der Studie. 
 
Aufgabe 1: 
In Runde 2 wählt ein Käufer einen Preis 45 und wünscht eine Qualität von 10. Der Verkäufer 
wählt eine Qualität von 8. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist: 
 
Aufgabe 2: 
In Runde 5 wählt ein Verkäufer eine Qualität von 5 und wünscht einen Preis von 35. Sein Käufer 
bezahlt einen Preis von 30. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist:  
 Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist:  
 
Aufgabe 3: 
In Runde 8 wählt ein Käufer einen Preis von 9 und wünscht eine Qualität von 4. Sein Verkäufer 
wählt eine Qualität von 1. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist: 
 
Aufgabe 4: 
In Runde 11 wählt ein Verkäufer eine Qualität von 10 und wünscht einen Preis von 70. Sein 
Käufer bezahlt einen Preis von 75. 
 
 Das Einkommen des Käufers ist: 
 Das Einkommen des Verkäufers ist: 
 
Bitte geben Sie den Studienleitern per Handzeichen Bescheid, wenn Sie mit dem Lösen der 
Übungsaufgaben fertig sind. 
Bis zum Beginn der Studie empfehlen wir Ihnen nochmals zu überlegen, welche Entscheidungen 


























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Produktqualität
Wert für den Käufer
Produktionskosten
Qualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Produktionskosten 0 3 6 10 15 20 25 30 36 42 
Wert für den Käufer 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
B Appendix to Chapter 3
124
